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CLUSTER BOMBS OVER KOSOVO: 
A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
Thomas Michael McDonnell' 
l%e day after NATO jets had dropped cluster bombs near the village 
of Doganovic in Kosovo, several boys were looking after their 
livestock in a nearby field. The boys, including the five Kodza 
brothers, ages 3 to 15, apparently found a dud American-made 
cluster bomb and began to play with it. The soda-can size bomb 
with a small parachute attached then exploded, killing all five 
Kodza brothers: Edon, Fisnik Osman, Burim, and Valjdet. Two 
other boys were seriously injured.' 
"I have been an orthopedist for 15 years now, working in a crisis 
region where we often have injuries, but neither I nor my colleagues 
have ever seen such horrific wounds as those caused bv clkter 
" 
bombs .... The limbs are so crushed that the only remaining option is 
amputation," statement made by Dr. Rade Grbic, a surgeon and 
director of the main hospital in Pristina, capital of Kosovo, after 
saving the lives of two ethnic Albanian boys wounded when the 
other boys played with the cluster bomb.' 
* Associate Professor, Pace University School of Law, B.A., J.D., Fordham 
University. I wish to thank Professors Eric E. Bergsten, John E. Noyes, Ralph M. Stein, and 
Mark von Stemberg, Atty. at Law, for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I 
also wish to thank Margaret Moreland, law librarian; Carol Grisanti, my secretary; my 
research assistants, Nancy Avery, Allison Clifford, and Robert DeDona; and my wife, 
Kathryn Judkins McDonnell, whose support helped make this Article possible. I dedicate 
this Article to my mother, Anne Marie McDomell. 
** The Kosovo Cluster Bomblet Threat Map on page 33 was produced by the 
United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre and indicates the cluster bomblet threat 
before clearance efforts commenced. United Nations, Kosovo Reported CBU Map, 
available at http:llwww.un.orglDepts/dpko/mine/macc/do~doads/con~atiodcbu.jpg 
(last visited Mar. 21,2002). 
1. Five Boys Reportedly Killed by NATO Cluster Bomb (BBC television 
broadcast, Apr. 26,1999). 
2. Paul Watson, Crisis in Yugoslavia, Dispatch from Kosovo; Unexploded 
Weapons Pose Deadly Threat on Ground Anns: Cluster Bombs Turn Part of Province into 
a No-Man's Land, L.A. m s ,  Apr. 28,1999, at Al. 
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As the United States continues to fight a war against private terror 
organizations, we and our coalition partners must avoid resorting to terror 
ourselves, lest our moral and legal standing be undermined. Both in Afghanistan 
and in Kosovo, the United States employed a weapon that violates the spirit if  not 
the letter of  humanitarian law. That weapon, the cluster bomb, unduly endangers 
and terrorizes civilians. Although focusing primarily on NATO's use o f  this 
weapon in Serbia and its Kosovo province, the thesis of  this Article also applies to 
the United States' employing cluster bombs in our war in Afghanistan, a war to 
defeat and capture those responsible for the September 11  attack^.^ 
Under international law, the premeditated killing of  thousands of 
defenseless civilians on that date constituted a war crime, if  committed by state 
sponsored agents, and a crime against humanity, if  committed by a terror 
~rganizat ion.~ The simultaneous destruction of civilian airliners and buildings are 
likewise international crimes.' Americans and concerned people all over the globe 
were justifiably outraged by these perpetrators using civilian planes as weapons of 
mass destruction. 
3. Because journalists were excluded by both sides fkom combat zones during 
the war in Afghanistan, reports about targeting, bombardments, and civilian casualties have 
been hard to verify, as of this writing. See Howard Kurtz, War Coverage Takes a Negative 
Turn; Civilian Deaths, Military Errors Become Focus as Reporters Revisit Bombing Sites, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2002, at A14. Although the Coalition attempted to limit civilian 
deaths, a Boston Globe investigation estimated that the Coalition caused at least 1,000 
civilian casualties. See John Donnelly, Civilian Toll in US. Raids Put at l,000[;] Bombing 
Flaws, Manhunt Cited, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17,2002, at Al; see also Dana Priest, In War, 
Mud Huts and Hard Calls; As US. Teams Guided Pilots' Attacks. Civilian Presence Made 
Task Tougher, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2002, at A01. But see Victor Davis Hanson, Things 
Forgotten, NAT'L REV., Feb. 19,2002 (emphasizing the small number of civilian casualties 
caused by Coalition forces in the war in Afghanistan), available at LEXIS, News Library, 
National Review File. After September 11, Congress overwhelmingly passed a use of force 
resolution, authorizing the President to use "all necessary force" against any elements, 
foreign or domestic, "so long as he determines that they planned, authorized, committed or 
aided the September 11 attacks,. . .in order to prevent future attacks." Harold H. Koh, 
Preserving American Values, The Challenge at Home and Abroad, in THE AGE OF TERROR 
145, 166 (Strobe Talbott & Nancy Chanda eds., 2002) (quoting S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. 
(2001)). 
4. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), July 17, 1998, 
arts. 7, 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, and by 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, G.A. Res. 105, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/105, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefr (last 
visited Mar. 19,2001) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
5. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 
1316 U.N.T.S. 205, 245; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Jan. 26, 1973, art. l ,24  U.S.T. 564. 
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Assuming that the A1 Qaeda terror organization carried out these attacks! 
the United States is faced with a daunting military challenge, namely, fighting a 
largely unidentified enemy that operates stealthily around the world in possibly as 
many as sixty ~ountries.~ Given the massive scale and the utter barbarity of the 
September 11 attacks, both the people and government of the United States 
naturally have demanded a forceful response. Under these circumstances, however, 
the United States and any other nation that together attempt to combat such an 
adversary run the risk of achieving a tactical success at the cost of a strategic 
failure. As Secretary of State Colin Powell said: 
Respect for the dignity and rights of the individual, and the 
strengthening of democratic institutions lead to more stable nations 
and a more stable world where the seeds of terrorism cannot take 
root and cannot grow. The rule of law, anti-cormption efforts[,] and 
equal economic opportunity, give citizens confidence that they will 
be treated fairly, and receive justi~e.~ 
If, for example, the United States and other coalition countries kill significant 
numbers of innocent Muslim civilians or use indiscriminate weapons, we may be 
helping terrorism "take root" rather than weeding it out. 
Only if the United States strictly adheres to the "rule of law," to take, 
among other things, all reasonable steps to avoid civilian casualties and the 
destruction of civilian objects, will the military response aid in ending rather than 
inflaming terrorist movements? I argue here that our employing the cluster bomb 
in the former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan will undercut respect for international 
humanitarian law and for the United States as a country that prides itself on its 
respect for the rule of law. Using such a weapon in Afghanistan and in other 
-- - -- -- 
6. See Scenes of Rejoicing and Words of Strategy from Bin Laden and His 
Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,2001, at B4 (Osama Bin Laden implying on videotape that A1 
Qaeda planned the "martyrdom operation" to crash the airliners into the World Trade 
Center). 
7. See Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, America's Chaotic Road to War: Bush's 
Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in First Frantic Hours After Attack, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 27,2002, at A01. 
S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the 9th OSCE Ministerial 
Council @ec. 4,2001), available at http:l/~mmv.osce.orglevents/mc/romania2001/do~umen 
ts/files/mc-100763 1 14So.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,2002) (emphasis added). 
9. Violating other rules of humanitarian law, such as killing or mistreating 
Taliban or A1 Qaeda prisoners of war, may provoke additional acts of terror. See Geneva 
Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ("Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power 
causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is 
prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach....") (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); 
Carlotta Gall, A Nation Challenged: Prisoners, Witnesses Say Many Taliban Died in 
Custody, N.Y. TrmEs, Dec. 11, 2001, at A1 (reporting that dozens of Taliban prisoners of 
war were asphyxiated while being transported in shipping containers). 
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Muslim countries may thus foster rage and resentment that may help h e 1  rather 
than dampen t e r r~ r i sm. '~  
NATO's Intervention in Kosovo 
Shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization1' began its bombing 
campaign of  Serbia and Kosovo on March 24, 1999, the Milosevic regime, 
reminiscent of Nazi Germany, intensified the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, forcibly 
removing about one-third of  the Albanian-Kosovar population from their homes, 
killing hundreds, raping scores of Albanian-Kosovar women, pillaging and 
destroying Albanian-Kosovar homes, property, and cultural landmarks.'' Although 
10. See Koh, supra note 3, at 161. 
11. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949,63 Stat. 2241,34 U.N.T.S. 244 (entered 
into force Aug. 24, 1949). 
12. See Charles Babington, West to Bolster Balkans, WASH. POST, July 31, 1999, 
at A15 (reporting that "almost 800,000" Kosovar Albanians fled the "Serb-led campaign of 
expulsion and terror that coincided with NATO's seventy-eight day bombing campaign"); 
Human Rights Watch, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Kosovo: Human Rights Watch, 
Rape as a Weapon of "Ethnic Cleansing," 1 1 (2000) (also estimating that 800,000 ethnic 
Albanians were forced out of Kosovo), available at http://www.hnv.org/ 
reports/2000/fry/index.htm#TopOfPage, Gender-based Violence Against Kosovar Albanian 
Women, Attacks in Flight (last visited Apr. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, 
Rape as a Weapon]. Apparently, the rapes were carried out by men belonging to 
paramilitary groups, by police, and by FRY soldiers. See Human Rights Watch, Rape as a 
Weapon, supra; see also Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic et al., 11 40, 90-100 (I.C.T.Y. 
1999) (No. IT-99-37-1) (stating that over 740,000 Kosovo Albanians were expelled from 
Kosovo and charging Milosevic and his cohorts with war crimes and crimes against 
humanity), available at http://www/un.org/icty/indicknent/english/miI-ii990524e.h~; 
Andrew Herscher & Andras Riedmayer, Architectural Heritage in Kosovo: A Post-War 
Report (Sept. 21, 2000), available at http://palimpsest.stanford.edu/byform~mailing- 
lists/cdV2000/1124.html (last modified Jan. 13, 2001). Some commentators criticized 
NATO for failing to negotiate in good faith with Slobodan Milosevic. These commentators 
criticize NATO for giving Milosevic, before March 24, 1999, at Rambouillet, a "take it or 
leave it deal," which no leader could accept. See, e.g., HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA 
NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? 262 (2001); Noam Chomsky, Kosovo Peace Accord, Z MAG., 
July 1999, at 1, 7 (quoting Appendix B to the proposed Rambouillet agreement, "NATO 
personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, fkee and 
unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY)] including associated airspace and territorial waters"). One prominent international 
law scholar concludes that NATO's ultimatum to Milosevic constituted a failure to attempt 
to solve the crisis diplomatically, "cast[ing] a dark shadow across the NATO initiative." 
Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 847, 855 (1999). Others point out that the alleged human rights abuses committed 
by Milosevic then did not rise to the level of gross or massive such as to justify the 
intervention. See, e.g., Jonathan I .  Charney, Anticipatoy Humanitarian Intervention in 
Kosovo, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1231, 1246 (1999) ("The extent of the human rights 
violations in Kosovo prior to the withdrawal of the OSCE's observer force was not massive 
and widespread."); Raju G.C. Thomas, NATO and International Law, JURIST, 727  (Apr. 26, 
1999) (noting that prior to NATO's attack, the deaths of 2000 on all sides--one-third 
Serbian and two-thirds Albanian-and the "internal displacement of 300,000 people in 
Kosovo did not constitute genocide," justifying the intervention), available at 
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hardly on the scale of the Nazis (an estimated 10,500 Albanian-Kosovars were 
killed and well over a hundred Albanian-Kosovar women were raped13), that a 
European govemment14 could openly engage in such conduct outraged the West 
and hardened NATO's resolve. 
Since Slobodan Milosevic's summary surrender to the Hague, the return 
of a democratically minded president to Yugoslavia, and the violent attacks by 
some Albanian-Kosovars against Serbian civilians, against Serb churches, and 
http://jurist.la~v.pitt.edu~thomas.htm. But see, e.g., Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality 
of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1748 
(2000) (arguing that the FRY'S human rights violations in Kosovo had met this threshold, 
noting, among other things, that in 1998 because of FRY actions, approximately 300,000 
Albanian-Kosovars fled their villages and hid in the hills); W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo 
Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 860, 861 (1999) (noting that "[flortunately, an event on the 
scale of the holocaust has not become the minimum requirement for the exercise of 
international concern"), available at http://asil.org/kosovo.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2002) 
(emphasis in original); accord Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving 
Towardrr International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the 
World Communi@?, 10 Em. J. INT'L L. 23,24 (1999). 
13. See CENT. & E. Em.  LAW ~ T I V E  ET AL., POLITICAL KILLINGS IN 
K~~OVAKOSOVO, Mar.-June 1999, at 1 (2000) (statisticians estimate that 10,500 Kosovar 
Albanians were killed between March 20, 1999 and June 12, 1999), available at 
http://hrdata.aaas.org/kosovo/pWp1-2 (last visited Apr. 2, 2002); Human Rights Watch, 
Rape as a Weapon, supra note 12, fi 4 (finding ninety-six cases of sexual assault by 
Yugoslav soldiers, Serbian police, or paramilitaries during the period of the NATO 
bombing and concluding that the actual number is "probably much higher"), available at 
http://~mmv.hnv.orglreports/2000/ fiy/index.htm#TopOfPage, Gender-based Violence 
Against Kosovar Albanian Women, Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence as Weapons 
of Systematic "Ethnic Cleansing." But see Amended Indictment, Prosecutor v. Slobodan 
Milosevic, a 24 (I.C.T.Y. 2001) (No. IT-99-37-1) (charging Slobodan Milosevic and his co- 
defendants for the murders of approximately 926 Albanian-Kosovars, including 300 who 
were allegedly missing; these murders were allegedly directly committed by Serbian and 
Yugoslav army, police, and paramilitary forces in Kosovo h m  January 1, 1999 through 
June 20, 1999), available at http://mv.un.org!icty/milosevic/mil-am. 
14. Turkish authorities have engaged in major human rights abuses. See 
Amnesty Int'l, Annual Report: Turkey, qfi 11-18 (1999), available at http://wv.amnesty. 
org/ailib/aireporttar99/eur44.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002); Amnesty Int'l, 1996 U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights: Amnesty International Calls on the Commission to Take 
Action on Human Rights Violations in China, Colombia, Indonesia and East Timor. Nigeria 
and Turkey, 77 13-15 (1996) (noting the widespread practice of torture and disappearances 
in Turkey), available at http://~veb.amnesty.org/802568F7005C4453/0/94BDDF5A568lDl 
802569000068A2A8?0pen (last visited Apr. 5, 2002); Human Rights Watch, Europe and 
Central Asia Overview, 51 30-31 (1999) (noting Turkish authorities denying Kurds basic 
cultural and political rights, subjecting Kurdish parties to police raids, and torturing 
suspects in custody), available at http:llwww.hrw.org!wr2WEca.htm#TopOfPage (last 
visited Apr. 5,2002). Turkey may not be considered part of Western Europe in this sense. 
One could argue that the republics comprising the former Yugoslavia are not part of Europe 
either, but at the point where Asia and Europe meet. See ROBERT D. KAPLAN, BALKAN 
GHOSTS 7 (1994). Nonetheless, the proximity of the Yugoslavia crisis to Western Europe 
probably played a role in NATO's decision to intervene. 
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against the government of  Macedonia,15 the black and white clarity of the war 
against Milosevic turned a bit gray. Yet Milosevic's campaign of killing, raping, 
and banishing Albanian-Kosovars justifiably received nearly universal 
condernnation.16 Many in the human rights community applauded NATO's 
intervention. Czech President Vaclav Havel, for example, stated that NATO "acted 
out of  respect for human rights" and "in the name of  principles and  value^."'^ 
Unlike Russia in Chechnya18 or the United States in Vietnam,'9 NATO 
commanders generally made a concerted effort to limit civilian casualties during 
15. See Michael Evans, NATO Bombs Still Killing Kosovans, TIMES (London), 
Aug. 16, 1999, at 14, available at http://www.Sunday-times.co.uk.news/pages/tim/99/ 
08/16/timfgneur01005.htm1?999 (last visited Apr. 5, 2002); Carlotta Gall, NATO Soldiers 
Fire on Kosovo Albanians, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,2001, at A3 (reporting that NATO soldiers 
fired on Albanian gunmen to "stem the flow of arms and men to Albanian guerrillas in 
Macedonia"); Macedonian Troops and Rebels Keep Battling, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,2001, at 
A4; Marlise Sirnons & Carlotta Gall, Milosevic Is Given to U.N. for Trial in War-Crime 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at Al. But see Carlotta Gall, A Dark Secret Comes to 
Light in Serbia, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2001, at A10 (reporting that on April 9, 1999, a 
professional diver checked on a truck sunk in the Danube, which later was found to contain 
the bodies of eighty-six people, including children, presumably Albanian-Kosovars, killed 
as part of the ethnic cleansing campaign). 
16. NATO's intervention can also be understood in terms of the historical 
context. Milosevic's regime played a central role in the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia. The 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's forces killing between forty to forty-five civilian 
Albanian-Kosovars in Racak in January 1999 was interpreted as a warning to the West of 
what Milosevic may have planned for Kosovo as a whole. See GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, 
WAGING MODERN WAR 158-59 (2001); Falk, supra note 12, at 849 (characterizing pro- 
interventionist arguments as follows: "it was.. .reasonable in light of earlier Serb tactics in 
Bosnia, as epitomized by concentration camps, numerous massacres and crimes against 
humanity, and the brutal annihilation in 1996 of some seven thousand Bosnian Muslims 
sheltered by the UN safe haven of Srebenica, that international action of significant 
magnitude was needed in short order if full-scale ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was to be 
avoided"). A Serb scholar has called for an investigation of apparent Serb crimes against 
humanity in Kosovo. See Konstantin Obradovic, International Humanitarian Law and the 
Kosovo Crisis, 839 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 699, 77 51-52 (2000), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.ns~4dc394db5b54fJfa4125673900241f2870ee9lbal52ad 
1014125698a003 15a07?0penDocument (last visited Apr. 5,2002). 
17. Robert Hayden, Humanitarian Hypocrisy, JURIST, 1 2 (1999) (quoting 
Vaclav Havel, Kosovo and the End of the Nation State, N.Y. REV., June 10, 1999, at 6), 
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/hayden.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2001). Elie Wiesel, 
noted Holocaust survivor, called the war "moral" and stated that "where evil shows its face, 
you must intervene." Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the New Interventionism: Promise or 
Peril?, 9 J. TRANSNAT'LL. & POL'Y 153, 153 (1999) (quoting David Rhode, Wiesel, Man of 
Peace, Cites Need to Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1999, at A15); see also Reisman, supra note 
12, at 861. 
18. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: CHECHNYA FOR THE 
MOTHERLAND (1999) (documenting the targeting and killing of civilians in Grozny and 
elsewhere), available at http://web.amnesty.org/802568F7005C4453/0/63F63639FCAF524 
E8025690000692D5E!Open (last visited Apr. 5,2002); Janine di Giovanni, Battered Rebels 
Flee Ruined Grozny, TIMES (London), Feb. 1, 2000, at 14 (describing the Russian 
bombardment of Grozny), available at 2000 WL 2863223; Human Rights Watch, Russian 
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the NATO intervention in Kosovo and Serbia." This is not to suggest that NATO 
did all it could have done to avoid civilian casualties. NATO pilots flew at high 
- - -- - 
Atrocities in Chechnya Detailed (2000), available at http://wwv.hrw.org./press/ 
2000/06.chech0602.htm (last visited Apr. 5,2002). 
19. See ERIC PROKOSCH, THE TECHNOLOGY OF KILLING--A MILITARY AND 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPONS 96 (1995) (concluding that the United 
States did not have a policy of indiscriminate bombing in Vietnam, but that the choice of 
munitions, broad discretion given to pilots concerning "targets of opportunity," and 
inaccumte bombing led to high civilian casualties); JOSEPH M. SIVEENEY ET AL., THE 
INTERNATIONAL EGAL SYSTEM 700 (2d ed. 1981) (quoting The Christmas Bombing, N.Y. 
T ~ h m ,  Dec. 31, 1972, $4.1 (magazine) (describing indiscriminate United States bombing 
of areas in then North Vietnam)). But see Burris Camahan, Linebacker 11 and Protocol I: 
The Convergence ofLaw and Professionalism, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 861 (1981) (arguing that 
the U.S. bombing of Hanoi complied with Additional Protocol I); SIVEENEY ET AL., supra, at 
704 (quoting HENRY KISSINGER, W m  HOUSE YEARS 1454, 1460 (1979) (citing Malcolm 
Browme for the proposition that "the damage caused by American bombing [of Hanoi] was 
grossly exaggerated")). For differing views of civilian casualties caused in Desert Storm, 
see WDLE E. WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DURING 
THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR (1991); Anthony Chase, 
Historical Reconsttuction in Popular Legal and Political Culture, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1969,2012,2013 (1994) (noting that seventy percent of the bombs dropped in Desert Storm 
missed their targets, which must have resulted in a considerable number of civilian 
casualties given that much of the conflict took place in populated areas). But see U.S. DEP'T 
OF DEE., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT, AN INTERIM REPORT O CONGRESS 12-2 
to 12-3 (1991) (stating that Coalition forces selected munitions and aircraft to minimize 
civilian casualties: "[tlo the degree possible and consistent with risk to aircraft and 
aircrewvs, aircraft and munitions were carefully selected so that attacks on targets within 
populated areas that could prove the greatest degree of accuracy and the least risk to 
civilian objects and the civilian population"); Comdr. Charles A. Allen, Panel Discussion, 
Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and 
Necessity, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 39,6546 (1992) (Panelist Fred Green noting that 
even if the Middle East Watch's estimates of civilian casualties were correct, given "the 
amount of ordnance delivered, that level is itself prima facie evidence of a very 
discriminate air campaign"); Adrienne L. DeSaussure, The Role of the L&w of Anned 
ConfIct in the Persian Gulf War, an Overview, 1994 A.F. L. REV. 41,48-58 (asserting that 
the Coalition, including the United States, strictly complied with humanitarian law during 
the conflict in contrast to Iraq's repeated violations). 
20. See Tim Ripley, Kosovo: A Bomb Damage Assessment, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE 
REV. 10, 10 (Sept. 1999) (''[Tlhe ovenvhelming majority of NATO air strikes were very 
accurate and almost all hit their intended aim points. Serb claims that the Albanian refugees 
were fleeing indiscriminate NATO bombing are palpably false."), available at 1999 WL 
8945937. NATO initially estimated that its actions caused no more than 1500 civilians' 
deaths. Human Rights Watch concluded that about 500 civilians were actually killed by . 
NATO lvarplanes. See Elizabeth Becker, Rights Group Says NATO Killed 500 Civilians in 
Kosovo War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000, at A10; Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in 
the NATO Air Campaign, 7 1 (2000), available at http:llwmmv.hnv.org/reports/2OOO/ 
nato/index.htm#TopO£Page, The Civilian Deaths (last visited Apr. 5, 2002) [hereinafter 
Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths]. The Yugoslav government claims 1200 to 5700 
civilian deaths. See Human Rights Watch, Rape as a Weapon, supra note 12, 73 ,  available 
at http://~mmv.hnv.org/reports/2OOO/~/indexXh~TopOfPage, Summary; see also William 
M .  Arkin, Smart Bombs, Dumb Targeting?, 56 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 46, at 7 11 
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altitude, probably making it difficult to distinguish some civilians and civilian 
objects fiom legitimate targets." NATO planes also bombed a wide variety of 
targets, including bridges, electrical generating plants, oil refineries, and the like, 
which, though they may fit within the definition of "military objective," are 
predominantly used by and for civilians.22 NATO, however, did far more than most 
amed forces do to avoid civilian casualties." 
But NATO warplanes did employ the cluster bomb in this conflict. This 
Article contends that, even under NATO's restrictive rules of the 
cluster bomb not only poses special dangers for civilians, but also can terrorize 
them long after the fighting stops: all the more reason, therefore, that in the more 
(2000), available at http:// ~vw.thebulletin.org/issues/2000/mj00/mjOOarkin.html (last 
visited Apr. 5,2002). 
21. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. 
22. See Obradovic, supra note 16 (arguing that Article 52(3) of Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibited NATO's destroying the bridge at 
Varvarin, because "it would be difficult to classify [the bridge] ... as a military objective that 
had effectively contributed to the war effort of the Yugoslav army, nor did its destruction 
give NATO forces any 'definite military advantage"'); see also Allen, supra note 19, at 42- 
43 (Panelist Frits Kalshoven discussing when a bridge is a legitimate military objective), 
49-50 (Panelist Francoise J. Hampton discussing the proportionality principle and the 
conditions under which bridges in the Gulf War may be attacked). But see Allen, supra note 
19 at 54-55 (Panelist Yoram Dinstein arguing that any bridge "spanning a great river like 
the Euphrates can be classified as a major artery of communication" and thus is a legitimate 
military objective); -Arkin, supra note 20, at 46. William Arkin criticized NATO for 
adopting a mechanical approach to target selection rather than evaluating whether the target 
was actually contributing to the Yugoslav military effort. Arkin also criticized NATO for 
attacking the electric grid and for conducting so called "crony attacks," attacks on the 
businesses of Milosevic's "cronies" that had marginal value as purely military objectives. 
See Arkin, supra note 20, at 46. 
23. See supra note 20. NATO, however, has been accused of committing a war 
crime in bombing Belgrade's civilian television station. See AMNESTY INT'L, 
NATOEEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA "COLLATERAL DAMAGE" OR UNLA\VFUZ. 
KILLINGS? VIOLATION F THE LAW OF WAR BY NATO DURING OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
46 (2000). But see FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE STABLISHED TO 
REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, 
7 56 (2000) (rejecting the argument that the station was a "civilian object" and concluding it 
was a legitimate "military objective"), available at http://\mmv.un.org/icty/pressreal/ 
nato061300.htm (visited Mar. 19,2001) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR]; Human 
Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 20, 7 1 (concluding that the bombing of the 
station was a violation of humanitarian law, but not a war crime), available at 
http://~wv.hrw.org/report~/2OOO/nato/index.htm#TopOage, International Humanitarian 
Law and Accountability. 
24. "The rules of engagement from the very start were very strict: It was ordered 
that bombs would not be released on any target unless the pilot could confirm the target and 
be assured of no civilian casualties." Lt. Comdr. Stuart Walter Belt, Missiles Over Kosovo: 
Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Custornaly Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in 
Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 115, 159 n.268 (2000) (quoting John Tirpak, The First Six 
Weeks, A.F. MAG., June 1999, at 27). This standard would, nonetheless, seem difficult to 
strictly carry out from 15,000 feet. 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  44 A r i z .  L.  Rev .  40 2002 
20021 CLUSTER BOMBS OVER KOSOVO 41 
typical conflict when the parties care less about the plight of the civilian 
population, the cluster bomb puts civilians in extreme peril. 
Although never deployed after 1945, the threat of missile-delivered 
thermonuclear warheads held the world on edge throughout the cold war. Since the 
advent of nuclear weapons, however, the technology of so-called conventional 
weapons has advanced exponentially. In the last decade, the laser rifle capable of 
permanently blinding enemy soldiers has been introdu~ed;~' the general purpose 
bomb can now be delivered by global positioning satellite systems; and, during the 
Vietnam War, the anti-personnel cluster bomb was developed by the United 
 state^?^ Testing proved this last weapon more effective than napalm.27 "We 
thought," said a high ranking military officer about the deployment of cluster 
bombs in Vietnam, that "these weapons could give us a quantum leap on the 
enemy, but not break the unwritten rules Cpresumably against deploying nuclear 
~eapons .1"~~ Wary of student protests over the use of napalm, the Air Force 
quietly introduced cluster bombs into the war?' Until NATO's intervention in 
Kosovo, the cluster bomb had largely escaped public scrutiny. 
Cluster bombs endanger the civilian population in two principal ways. A 
cluster bomb consists of a great number of small, but extraordinarily powerfid 
25. See Victor W. Sidel, The International Anns Trade and its Impact on Health, 
31 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1677, 1678 (1995) (noting China's sales of laser blinding rifles at recent 
arms marts), available at http://bmj.com~cgi/content/fu1Y311/7021/1677 (last visited Apr. 5, 
2002). 
26. See Michael Krepon, Weapons Potentially Inhumane: The Case of Cluster 
Bombs, in IV THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE CONCLUDING PHASE 267- 
68 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1976). 
27. See id. Note that laser-blinding weapons have been banned by international 
convention. See Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), Additional Protocol to 
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, Oct. 13, 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1218 (1996), and in DOCUMENTS ON THE 
LAWS OF WAR, 143 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1989) bereinafter Blinding 
Laser Weapons Protocol]. Article 1 provides: "It is prohibited to employ laser weapons 
specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the 
naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices. The high Contracting Parties shall 
not transfer such weapons to any State or non-State entity." Id. arts. 1, 3. The Protocol, 
howvever, does not ban lasers fiom the battlefield nor ban the manufacture or stockpiling of 
laser weapons. See id. art. 3; W. Hays Parks, Memorandum oflaw: Travaux Preparatoires 
and Legal Analysis of Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol, ARMY LAW., June 1997, at 33. 
28. Krepon, supra note 26, at 269. 
29. See id. at 271-72. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered in 1965 that "no 
publicity be given to this weapon." PROKOSCH, supra note 19, at 99 (citing KAHIN, 531 n.5 - 
(2d ed. 1987)). 
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bombs, contained within a large canister or di~penser.~' The cluster bomb is an 
"area weapon," so called because a single dispenser can spread its cluster bombs 
over a huge area, from one to five football fields?' Each of the small bombs 
contains over a hundred tiny pieces of shrapnel, which can cause physical injury at 
especially long distances?' If dropped on a military target in a populated area, 
cluster bombs, because of their enormous footprint and because of each small 
bomb's terrific destructive power, almost certainly will kill, maim, or othenvise 
wound a large number of innocent civilians. 
Secondly, five to thirty percent of the small cluster bombs are duds?' But 
they can remain dangerous years after launch; a slight vibration can detonate them. 
At least in some models, the passage of time makes the cluster bomb more 
dangerous, as the fuzing mechanism  deteriorate^?^ Since the small cluster bombs 
often look like toys, children tend to pick them up, often resulting in death or 
amputation. The question here is whether the cluster bomb violates international 
law. Both the United States and Russia insist that these bombs do not?' This 
Article will examine that claim, focusing on the manner in which NATO used this 
weapon in the former Yugoslavia. 
30. See Federation of American Scientists, CBU-87, 7 1, available at 
h t t p : l / ~ ~ v . f a s . o r g l m a n / d o d - l O l / s y s / d u m b  (last visited Apr. 5, 2002) 
[hereinafter FAS, CBU-871. 
3 1. See infia notes 56-65 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion 
of this point. 
32. See Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate 
Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law, 22 MCH. J. INT'L L. 85, 89 (2000) 
(asserting that a CBU-87B submunition may shower shrapnel in an area out to a radius of 
up to 150 meters (492 ft.)). Precise distances are hard to verify, but the high initial velocity 
of the fi-agments suggests that a submunition may injure humans far away fiom the impact 
site. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
33. See Paul Beaver, Unexploded Ordnance Proves a Problem in Kosovo, 3 
JANE'S MSSILES & ROCKETS, Aug. 1,1999,$8, available at 1999 WL 7271366. 
34. See RAE MCGRATH, U.K. WORKING GROUP ON LAND~NS, CLUSTER B O ~ ~ B S  
4, available at http://www.landmineaction.org/clusterb.h (last visited Apr. 5,2002). 
35. "These weapons are not mines, are acceptable under the laws of armed 
conflict.. .." U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS: KOSOVO/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
AFTER-ACTION REPORT 90 (2000), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
pubs/kaar02072000.pdf fiereinafter AFER-ACTION REPORT]. Furthermore, Maj. Gen. 
Charles Wald testified in a congressional hearing that cluster munitions are legal: 
Have lawyers vetoed use of these-these military lawyers-have they 
vetoed occasionally the use of CBU-87s? 
WALD: Never. It's not illegal. It's totally within the law of armed 
conflict, and it's legal in the international community to use that 
weapon. 
TITUS PEACHEY & VIRGIL WIEBE, THE MENNONITE CENTRAL C O M M ~ E  CLUSTER Bohm 
REPORT 16 (2000) (quoting Pentagon Briefing on Operation Allied Forces (May 14, 1999) 
(statement of Maj. Gen. Charles Wald)); see also Pave1 Baev, West Can't Oppose War, 
Mosco~v TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999 (responding to NATO criticism of Russia's use of cluster 
bombs in Chechnya), available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, Moscow Times File. 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  44 A r i z .  L.  Rev .  42 2002 
20021 CLUSTER BOMBS OVER KOSOVO 43 
Part I of this Article will analyze the cluster bomb, with particular 
emphasis on the cluster bomb the United States primarily used in the conflict, 
namely, the Cluster Bomb Unit 87-B (CBU-87B). Part II of this Article discusses 
the history of the international law of air warfare and analyzes whether the cluster 
bomb is a weapon causing "unnecessary and superfluous suffering." Part III 
analyzes the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
determines whether NATO's employing cluster bombs in Serbia and Kosovo 
violated this Protocol. Part IV analyzes whether NATO member states should incur 
a duty to make reparations and whether members of NATO's military forces have 
committed war crimes for using this weapon. 
A. The Nature of Cluster Boinbs 
All bombs or warheads fall within three general classes: (1) the general 
purpose bomb; (2) the penetration bomb; and (3) the fragmentation b0mb.3~ A 
bomb (warhead) consists of the follo\ving: (a) a casing, @) an explosive fill, and 
(c) a fuze (arming and safety mechani~rn)?~ The general-purpose bomb has usually 
a one-half inch (1.27 cm.) casing; fifty percent of the bomb's weight consists of the 
explosive fill. On exploding, the casing produces a fragmentation effect and the 
explosive fill produces a blast effect?' The penetration bomb typically has a much 
harder casing with a significantly lower percentage of its weight devoted to 
explosive fill?' A hgmentation bomb has a much lower ratio of weight of 
explosive fill to total weight. The casing of a fragmentation bomb is scored so that, 
upon impact, it will break up into numerous pieces of shrapnel that will fly at high 
velocities to kill or injure troops or to penetrate light armor. A hand grenade, for 
example, can be thought of as a primitive type of fragmentation bomb. 
36. See Federation of American Scientists, Bombs for Beginners, 1 2, available 
at http:llwnnv.fas.orgImanldod-10l/sysldumb/bombs.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2002) 
[hereinafter FAS, Bombs for Beginners]. 
37. See id.; see also ARTHUR BAMFORD HARTLEY, THEUNEXPLODED BOMB 9
(1958) (describing a conventional bomb as "a combination of the following parts: [l] a 
container or bomb-case, often referred to simply as the case; [2] a fuze; [3] an 'initiating 
charge' or gaine, with which is usually associated a secondary, or booster, charge often 
refemed to (from its composition) as thepicrics; [4] the main charge or mainfilling (usually 
high explosive); [5] superstructure fittings-fins, lifting-lugs, kopfrings, etc") (emphasis 
added); Greg Gobel, Dumb Bombs, at 2, available at http://vectorsite.tripod.com/ 
avbomb0.htrnl (last visited Apr. 5, 2002); U.S. Navy, Warhead Primer (describing the 
elements of a warhead as follows: fuze (including the safety and arming devices); explosive 
fill; warhead case), available at http://~vww.ih.navy.mil (last visited Apr. 5,2002). 
38. See FAS, Bombs for Beginners, supra note 36, at Damage Mechanisms, 71 
11-12, available at http:ll~n~v.fas.org/manldod-lOl/syddumb/bombs.htm. 
39. See id. 
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I .  An Exponentially More Powerful Fragmentation Bomb 
Unlike the general-purpose bomb or the penetration bomb, a cluster bomb 
contains smaller bombs inside. It is a highly developed kgmentation bomb.40 
Essentially, each cluster bomb consists of a large canister, the dispenser, wvhich 
holds anywhere fiom 10 to 500 small fiagmentation bombs (submunitions), 
euphemistically called "bomblets.'"" When dropped fiom an aircraft, the dispenser 
of the cluster bomb hurtles to earth, but, well before making impact:' releases the 
small bomblets. The dispenser is designed to spin so on dispersal it spreads the 
bomblets over a large area.43 
40. The submunitions within the cluster bomb do not have to be fragmentation 
bombs. Note the CBU-97, a cluster bomb containing an anti-tank submunition whose 
primary role is penetrating tanks and other armored vehicles. See also Glenn W. Goodman, 
Jr., Highly Effective New US Smart Submunitions Promise To Be True Force Multipliers, 
ARMED FORCES J. INT'L L., Aug. 2000, at 20-23 (analyzing the advantages of the CBU-97). 
Nevertheless, cluster bombs originated as fragmentation weapons and the greatest danger 
they pose to the civilian population is as a fragmentation weapon But see Conflict in the 
Balkans; Balkans Notebook; Cluster Bombs Killed Refugees, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 
18, 1999, at 16A (noting that NATO may have mistakenly dropped CBU-97 anti-tank heat 
seeking submunitions on a column of refugees; the submunitions apparently cannot tell a 
tractor from a tank), available at 1999 W L  3763859. NATO, however, denied ever using 
cluster bombs against the refugee column. See NATO Press Conference, Apr. 19, 1999 
(statement of Brigadier General Daniel R. Leaf), available at 
http://w\vw.nato.int~docdspeecW1999/s99O419bbhtrn. That UXO clearance crews have not 
found CBU-97 remnants or duds supports NATO's denial. Unless otherwise indicated, 
cluster bombs as used in this Article refer to cluster bombs containing fragmentation 
submunitions. 
41. See PROKOSCH, supra note 19, at 105-06 (noting that the manufacturer of 
cluster bombs and the military chose bland language in naming the components of the 
cluster bombs in contrast to the colofil language chosen to name other types of weapon 
systems and providing an excellent discussion of cluster bombs, generally). 
42. The canister of the CBU-87 can release its bomblets at an altitude fiom 300 
to 3000 feet. Capt. Kelly Leggette, The Air Force's New Cluster Weapon-The Combined 
Efects Munition, USAF FIGHTER WEAPONS REV., Spring 1988, at 25. 
43. The Air Force's Air University defines cluster bombs as follows: 
Cluster munitions (CBUs) fall into the dumb bomb or unguided category 
with the exception of sensor-fuzed weapons. CBU's combine dispensers, 
fuzes, and submunitions into a single weapon with a specialized or 
general-purpose mission. Once released, CBUs fall for a specified 
amount of time or distance before their dispensers open, allowing the 
submunitions to effectively cover a wide area target. The submunitions 
are activated by an internal fuze and can detonate above ground, at 
impact, or in a delayed mode. 
Air University, Cluster Bomb List, 7 2 (1996), available at 
http://www.au.af.mii/addatabase/projects/ay 1996/acsc/96-004/hardwvare/docs/cluster.htm 
(last visited Apr. 5,2002) pereinafter Cluster Bomb List]. 
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The cluster bomb favored by the United States Air Force in Kosovo, the 
CBU-S7B, contains 202 b ~ m b l e t s . ~ ~  The CBU-87B weighs 1000 pounds (455 
kilos). It consists of the following hvo parts: (1) a dispenser nearly 8 feet long and 
15 112 inches (2.44 m. x .39 m.) in diameter, technically called the SUU-65 
Tactical Munitions Dispenser (TMD), containing 202 "bomblets," and (2) the 
warhead consisting of bomblets or submunitions themselves, technically termed, 
Bomb Live Unit 97/B (BLU-97/B)?5 Each bomblet is about the size of a soda can, 
7" by 2.5" (17.8 cm. x 6.4 cm.), weighs 3.41 pounds (1.55 k.), and is painted 
yellow with a red stripe. Upon release by the canister (dispenser), each bomblet 
opens a small parachute (a ballute) that arms the bomblet, slows its descent, and 
properly orients it?6 The spin rate of the dispenser and the altitude at which it 
releases the bomblets can be adjusted to enlarge or contract the area coveredP7An 
optional Doppler radar device helps insure the altitude of release?' The bomblets 
"are usually designed to explode on impact, just before impact, or a short time after 
irnpa~t.'"'~ The container (casing) of each bomblet is scored so as to produce over 
300 shards of shrapnel?' Although cluster bombs originated as an antipersonnel 
weapon, the BLU-97 also serves as an anti-armor weapon and an incendiary bomb: 
Each of the BLU-97/B submunitions possesses a zirconium ring to start fires and a 
shaped charge to penetrate up to seven inches (17.8 cm.) of armor. The lethal 
power of the BLU-97 has been described as follows: 
The warhead characteristics of the Combined Effects Bomblet 
(CEB) are ... far superior to those of its predecessors. Its greater 
esplosive weight (0.65 pounds), larger cone diameter (2.35 inches), 
greater cone angle (70 degrees) and top-attack orientation provide 
extremely lethal armor penetration and after armor effect. Its 
controlled fragments (308 thikty-grain) maintain lethality at great 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - 
44. Technically, the version used in Kosovo and Serbia was the CBU-87BiB: 
"[Tlhe CBU-87BiB is identical to the CBU-87/B, except the CBU-87BiB7s submunitions 
have an all-mechanical secondary detonator instead of the piezoelectric detonator." Capt. 
Ronald P. Morrell, Employing CBU-87s in the B-I, USA3 FIGHTER WEAPONS REV., Winter 
1996, at 12. Since most of the literature refers to this weapon as the CBU-87/B, this Article 
will use that description as well to avoid confusion. 
45. Note, technically, the bomblet in use during the KosovoiSerbia conflict was 
denominated the '73LU-97 MB," because it used a different secondary detonator as set forth 
in the previous note. See Morrell, supra note 44, at 13. For simplicity, this Article will refer 
to this submunition as the "BLU-97." See also PEACHEY & WIEBE, supra note 35, at 9. 
46. See Leggette, supra note 42, at 27. 
47. See infra note 57 for a discussion of spin rate. 
48. See Leggette, supra note 42, at 25 ("An optional FZU-39iB doppler radar 
sensor may be attached and allows dispenser functioning at preselected heights of burst 
WOB) ranging from 300 to 3,000 feet above ground level."). 
49. Virgil Wiebe & Titus Peachey, Drop Today, Kill Tomorrow, Cluster 
Munitions as Inhumane and Indiscriminate Weapons, at 2 (1997) (Mennonite Central 
Committee 1997), available at http:/i~nnv.mcc.org/clusterbomb/drop~today/ (last visited 
Apr. 5,2002). 
50. See Edmond Dantes, CBU-87 Combined Eflects Munition: The Pilot's 
Weapon of Choice, ASIAN DEE. J., Mar. 1991, at 78. 
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distances and will defeat the majority of targets found on today's 
battlefield. In addition the CEMs have shown dramatic performance 
against trucks, aircraft, radar installations, and surface ship 
communications and deck equipment, which is far superior to any 
other area weapon?' 
A single BLU-97 bomblet can cause serious injury over long distances. 
"The 1988 CEM Test and Evaluation report by the USAF Tactical Fighter 
Weapons Center determined a pattern density of two bomblets per 1000 square feet 
(304.9 sq. m.) provided significant damage from fragmentation to soft targets."52 
Another test showed the lethal effect over a 1000 square foot area of roughly nine 
bomblets: 
Significant damage to an armored target, such as an APC or a tank, 
requires a direct hit by shaped charges. A pattern density of 8.8 
submunitions per 1,000 square feet (304.9 sq. m.) resulted in an 
eighty-five percent probability of hit (Pa [presumably by the shaped 
charge53] against a randomly placed 200 square foot ~ e h i c l e ? ~  
The submunition can cause serious injuries over long distances because of the 
extreme velocity each of its more than 300 pieces of shrapnel attains: 
An automatic rifle bullet has a starting speed of 750 meters per 
second, while the explosive charges within cluster bombs have a 
starting speed of 2,500 meters per second. When reaching ... a 
[human target], the combination of kinetic energy and explosive 
power makes a wound t h i i  times larger than the projectile itselfs5 
51. Id. at 80 (emphasis added). Cluster bombs in Desert Storm, however, often 
did not destroy individual artillery pieces, "but rather [they] were knocked out becazcse of 
effects on ammunition stores and crews." Donald R. Kennedy & William L. Kincheloe, 
Steel Rain: Submunitions in the Desert, ARMY LAW., Jan. 1993, at 24,26 (emphasis added); 
see also Leggette, supra note 42, at 27 (describing the BLU-97B bomblet, including its 
fragmentation, incendiary, and armor penetrating characteristics). 
52. Capt. Robert G. Vallin, How to Effectively and Efficiently Employ the CBU- 
87 with the F-16C, USAF FIGHTER WEAPONS REV., Spring 1981, at 2 (emphasis added). 
53. Recall that there are 308 pieces of shrapnel per bomblet, but only one shaped 
charge. See, e.g., Dantes, supra note 50. 
54. Morrell, supra note 44, at 13. 
55. Vesna Peric-Zimonjic, NATO Cluster Bombs Spray Death, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE, May 14, 1999, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inter Press Service File, May 
14, 1999 (citing an unnamed military source); see also Human Rights Watch, Ticking Time 
Bombs, fi 4 (1999) ("If the bomblet has been properly oriented, the dowvnivard-firing charge 
travels at 2,570 feet per second upon detonation."), available at 
http://~~vw.hrw.org/reports/1999/nato2/nato995-02.h (last visited Apr. 5, 2002); cf: R.G. 
LEE ET AL., GUIDED WEAPONS 171 (3d ed. 1998) ("On detonation, the fragments [of 
fragmentation warheads] are propelled outwvards at velocities of 2000 to 4000 metres per 
second."). 
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Containing 202 BLU-97 bomblets producing over 55,000 pieces of 
a single CBU-87B may, depending on various factors, cover as large an 
area as 800 ft. by 400 ft. (244 m. x 122 m.) or approximatelyfive and  one-half 
football fields.57 Usually several CBU-S7Bs are dropped at once." The  B-1 
Bomber as well as the B-52 can carry thirty CBU-S7Bs; the B-2 Bomber can carry 
thirty-six.'g These can b e  dropped close together or some distance apart to create a 
56. The 55,000 figure assumes a dud rate of ten percent. If the dud rate were 
only five percent as the manufacturers claim, the number of fragments increases to over 
59,000. See infra notes 75-110 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of dud 
cluster bomb submunitions. 
57. See Cluster Bomb List, supra note 43, 7 7, available at 
http:llwvw.au.af.mivau/databaselprojectslay 1996/acsc/96-004/hardware/docslcluster.htm. 
The exact size of the footprint made by the CBU-8703 can vary, depending on "altitude 
from which the dispenser is dropped, altitude at which the dispenser opens, the dispenser 
spin rate, wind, and the slope of the ground on which the bomblets fall." PEACHEY & 
WEBE, supra note 35, at 12-13 (quoting rates of 400 feet by 800 ft. (244 m. by 130 m.) 
medium to high altitude delivery according to William Arkin, that is, 5.5 football fields; 
295 feet by 361 feet (90 meters by 110 meters), or 1.8 football fields, according to the Asian 
Defence Journal). 
Spin rate affects the size of the footprint. A low spin rate of 500 rpm "creates a 
pattern of bomblets making impact roughly three meters apart. A high spin rate of 2500 rpm 
scatters the bomblets roughly six meters apart on impact." Id. at 12 n.43; see also Leggette, 
supra note 42, at 25 (stating that the spin rate settings "allowO a range of impact patterns 
from 70 by 70 feet [21 m. by 21 m.] (less than one-tenth a football field) to 450 by 150 feet 
[I37 m. by 46 m.] (slightly more than one football field)). Spin rates lower than 1000 are 
considered too dense. See Valliin, supra note 52, at 3. For maximum effectiveness, a spin 
rate of 2000 is generally recommended. See Capt. Bruce West, Employment of the B-1 and 
CBU-87, USAF FIGHTER WEAPONS REV., Summer 1994, at 2, 4; see also Morrell, supra 
note 44, at 14. Captain West also observes that "the approved spin rates for the CEM 
[Combined Effects Munitions such as the BLU-971 are setting 3 (1000 revolutions per 
minute (rpm)) and setting 5 (2000 rpm)." See Morell, supra note 44, at 13. But see Vallin, 
supra note 52, at 5-6 (recommending 2000 spin rate against a variety of targets, but 1500 
against principally armor). 
Peachey and Wiebe note that some of the discrepancy in the size of the footprint 
may arise from how a footprint is defined. Some may be referring to the "main impact area" 
of the bomblets, omitting those bomblets straying fiom the main impact area. PEACHEY & 
WIEBE, supra note 35, at 13. Furthermore each bomblet propels shrapnel "long distances" 
possibly being able to cause injury 500 feet (152 m.) from the point of impact. See FAS, 
CBU-87, supra note 30, fi 1, available at http:llwmnv.fas.org/man.dod-lOl/sys/d~ 
87.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2002) ("The footprint for the CBU-87 is approximately 200 
meters by 400 meters" [656 ft. by 13 12 ft.] or approximately 14.9 football fields.); see also 
Human Rights Watch, NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia (1999), available at 
http:llwnmv.hnv.org/backgrounderlarmslclwO5 1 1-htm (last visited Apr. 5,2002). 
58. See Dantes, supra note 50, at 80; see also PEACHEY & WIEBE, supra note 35, 
at 14 (noting that NATO dropped up to twenty cluster bomb dispensers on a park "just on 
the outskirts of Pristina," the administrative capital of Kosovo); Wiebe, supra, note 32, at 
110 (noting that in 1999 clearance crews in the village of Musa, Kosovo discovered at least 
five cluster bomb footprints where NATO had targeted Serb anti-aircraft positions). 
59. See Federation of American Scientists, B-52, at Specifications (2000), 
available at http:llwww.fas.org/nuke/guide/usalbomber-2 (last visited Apr. 5,2002); 
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larger f~otprint.~'  For example, six of an F-15E fighter's load of twelve CBU- 
87Bs6' can be set (1) to create "salvo" fire, making a footprint fiom nearly two to 
nearly seven and one half football fields62 (concentrating the six CBUs on a single 
spot), or (2) to create "ripple" fire making a footprint fiom nearly four football 
fields to more than eleven football fields (essentially dropping the six cluster 
bombs end-to-end in a straight Bomb and mine clearance crews in Kosovo 
note that the footprint CBU-87Bs create is typically a square kilometer (.62 sq. 
mile), or nearly nineteenfo~tballfields.~~ Furthermore, the cluster bomb can cause 
injury far beyond its actual footprint.6' 
Unlike earlier cluster bombs, the CBU-87B can be dropped fiom as high 
as 40,000 feet (12,195 m.).66 In the SerbialKosovo conflict, the bombers generally 
flew at altitudes of 15,000 feet (4,573 m.) or above to avoid the Serb anti-aircraft 
batte1ies.6~ Although the bombs can also be delivered by missiles, rockets, or 
see also FAS, CBU-87B, supra note 57, at Specifications (noting that the F-4 canies six 
CBU-87Bs; the F-16, the A-7 and the A10 carry four; and the F-1 1 1 caries eight CBU-87s). 
Apparently, a B-52 attack with cluster bombs cost the Serbs the most casualties in a single 
engagement in the conflict. See Charles Bremner, B-52 Raid "Killed Several Hundred 
Serbs," TIMES (London), June 10, 1999 (fewer than half the 800 to 1200 Serb troops are 
believed to have survived the cluster bomb attack by the B-52 bomber); William Drozdiak, 
War in the Balkans/Hundreds of Serb Troops Die in Air Raid, H ~ u s .  CHRON., June 9, 1999, 
at 24 (same). 
60. See Morrell, supra note 44, at 12. Capt. Morrell illustrates his points nith a 
table, indicating the pattern length, pattern width, and density of cluster bombs when, fiom 
the B-1 Bomber, ten are dropped at time, when twenty are dropped at a time, or when thirty 
are dropped at a time. See id. at 15. 
61. See Federation of American Scientists, The F-15 Eagle, at Specifications 
(2000), available at http:l/wmv.fas.orglmanldod-lOl/sys/ac/f-15.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 
2002). 
62. Such a footprint would range fiom 328 to 656 square foot area (100 by 200- 
sq. m. area). See Dantes, supra note 50, at 79. 
63. Such a footprint would range from 656 ft. by 328 ft. (200 m. by 100 m.) to 
1,968 ft. by 328 ft. (600 m. by 100 m.). See Dantes, supra note 50, at 79; see also Leggette, 
supra note 42, at 25. 
64. See PEACHEY & WIEBE, supra note 35, at 14. 
65. See id. at 13 (quoting Human Rights Watch Project, US. Cluster Bombs for 
Turkey, 1 52 (1994), available at http://~vww.hnv.org/reports/1994/turkey2/ (last visited 
Apr. 5,2002), for the proposition that shrapnel fiom cluster bombs can injure human beings 
as much as 500 ft. away). "Thus, anyone within a long distance fiom the perimeter created 
by the bomblets in a cluster strike could potentially be hit by flying shrapnel. While a 
typical footprint for a CBU-87 strike may be 200 by 400 meters 1656 ft. by 1312 ft.] (14.9 
football fields), the area in wvbich people would risk injury during the strike would be closer 
to 350 by 550 meters [I148 ft. by 1804 ft.] (almost 36 football fields))." Id. at 14. 
66. See Dantes, supra note 50, at 78. 
67. NATO prohibited military aircraft from flying below 15,000 ft. because they 
did not know the numbers of anti-aircraft missiles that the Serbs had. See Nick Cook, War 
of Extremes, JANE'S DEE. WEEKLY, July 7, 1999,n 14, available at 1999 \.IT. 7271279; John 
A. Tirpak, Washington Watch, A.F. m~. ,  May 5, 1999, 7 44, available at 
http://wvw.afa.org/magazine/wvatch~O699watchhhtml; see also CLARK, supra note 16, at 276 
(stating that NATO had set up a system "to enable our aircraft to descend well below 
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artillery, they were delivered only by aircraft in Yugosla~ia.~~ Dropping the bombs 
from great altitude, however, increases the risk of missing the target. In Desert 
Storm, for esample, "bombing fiom medium or high altitudes had a significant 
impact on both cluster bomb accuracy and reliability. Not only was there a greater 
dispersal pattern for the submunitions than was intended with low altitude delive~y, 
but pilots were outside the range needed to make sighting correction or assess 
damage."'' The evidence is unclear whether flying at 15,000 feet or higher during 
the Kosovo conflict endangered civilians. Since, however, "pilots' ability to 
properly identi @...mobile targets was so important to avoid civilian 
casualties, ...[th el civilian deaths raise the question0 whether ... flying at high 
altitudes may have contributed to these civilian deaths by precluding proper target 
identifi~ation."'~ 
15,000 feet, if necessary to identify targets on the ground, but the pilots reported that they 
were usually more effective using high powered binoculars and orbiting well above 
antiaircraft machine gun altitudes"). 
68. See NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia, supra note 57, 7 2, 
available at http:/l1mmv.hnv.org/backgrounder/a1mslclusO51 lhtrn. 
69. Id. 7 12. "The 15,000-feet rule effectively made it impossible for NATO 
aircrews to respect the findamental rule of distinguishing between military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects." AhmsW INT'L, supra note 23, at 37. The report quoted 
Brigadier General Leaf: "mt appears [from the videos of the attack] possible the vehicles 
are tractor type vehicles. As I reviewed the tapes with the pilots, they agreed. However, 
they were emphatic from the attack altitude to the naked eye, they appeared to be military 
vehicles ...." (emphasis in original). Id. at 37 (quoting Brigadier General Leaf during the 
April 19 press briefing). The report also quotes General Michael Short on the pilots' 
reactions to the Djakovica bombings: 
[Tlhey came back to me and said, '[\v]e need to let the fonvard air 
controllers go down to 5,000 feet. We need to let the strikers go down as 
low as 8,000 feet and in a diving delivery to ensure that they verify their 
target, and then right back up again to 15,000 feet. We think that will get 
it done. We acknowledge that that increased the risk significantly, but 
none of us want to hit a tractor full of refigees again. We can't stand 
that.' 
Id. (quoting General Michael Short in a BBC television documentary); see also CLARK, 
supra note 16, at 115 (stating that he was assured that the pilots could hit their targets fiom 
this altitude and that "the political impact of aircraft losses would still outweigh any 
potential benefits of a few Serb vehicles hit"). 
70. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 20, 7 6, available at 
http://~mmv.hnv.org/reportsl2OOOInatolindex.htrnTopOage, The Civilian Deaths; see 
also infa note 257 and accompanying text. But see REPORTTO THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 
23, available at http:l/wmmv.un.org/ictylpressreaVnatoO61300.h. The report concluded 
that despite the high altitude, NATO pilots apparently hit their targets "in the vast majority 
of cases": 
The committee agrees there is nothing inherently unla\vful about flying 
above the height which can be reached by enemy air defenses. However, 
NATO air commanders have a duty to take practicable measures to 
distinguish military objectives from civilians or civilian objectives. The 
15,000 feet minimum altitude adopted for part of the campaign may 
have meant the target could not be verified with the naked eye. 
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Cluster bombs used in Serbia and the Kosovo Province are both 
sophisticated and dumb. It is a sophisticated weapon in the sense that the designers 
have taken the simple concept of a hand-grenade and in a single bomb have created 
a weapon thousands of times more powerful. Except for nuclear weapons, 
biological weapons, and poison gas, the cluster bomb is perhaps more dangerous to 
civilians than any other weapon in modem ~ a r f a r e . ~ '  It is also sophisticated given 
its several components: dispensers that can be set at various rates of spin and 
programmed to release at a designated altitude, submunitions with high tech 
arming mechanisms, secondary fuzes, and ballutes. It is dumb in the sense that the 
submunitions or bomblets used in the former Yugoslavia could not be aimed at a 
target independently." Given the huge area that a single bomb can cover, these 
weapons pose enormous risks to noncombatants, men, women, and children, wvho 
happen to be unlucky enough to fall within the trajectory of the over 55,000 pieces 
of  shrapnel of the two hundred or more bomblets that a single cluster bomb 
releases:73 "Because of  the high velocity of the fragments and the uniformity of 
However, it appears that with the use of modem technology, the 
obligation to distinguish was effectively carried out in the vast majority 
of cases during the bombing campaign. 
Id. 7 56. Compare INT'L COMh4. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yves 
Sandoz, et al. eds., 1987) bereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]: 
It is principally by visual means-in particular, by means of aerial 
observation-that an attacker will find out that an intended objective is 
not a military objective, or that it is an object entitled to special 
protection. Thus, to take a simple example, an airman wvho has received 
the order to machine-gun troops traveling along a road, and who finds 
only children going to school, must abstain fiom attack. However, with 
the increased range of weapons, particularly in military operations on 
land, it may happen that the attacker has no direct view of the objective, 
either because it is very far away or because the attack takes place at 
night. In this case, even greater caution is required. 
Id. at 686 (emphasis added). 
71. Incendiary weapons might qualify, but recall that cluster bombs are more 
"effective" against personnel than napalm. See Krepon, supra note 26, at 269. 
72. See Cluster Bomb List, supra note 43,7 1 ("(CBUs) fall into the dumb bomb 
or unguided category...."), available at http:~wv.au.aEmivau/database/projectsl 
ay1996/acsc/96-004hardware/docs/cluster.h. The United States has one cluster bomb 
with "smart" submunitions: the CBU-97, a heat seeking anti-tank submunition. Despite 
earlier reports that NATO planes dropped CBU-97s on a refugee column in Kosovo, the 
evidence now suggests NATO used other bombs to cany out the attack. For a more detailed 
discussion of this incident, see infra note 297. See also Goodman, supra note 40, at 20-23 
(analyzing the advantages of the CBU-97). Reports indicate that the cluster bomb 
dispensers dropped in Afghanistan were equipped with a new tail kit that has enhanced 
accuracy. See Watson, supra note 2. 
73. Usually more than one CBU-87B is dropped at a time. Given the use of 
multiple cluster bombs on one target area, it is not surprising that one Air Force Captain 
referred to the use of CBU-87s as the '"shotgun' school of bombing." This may also explain 
why several deminers working the Decani area of Kosovo regularly referred to cluster 
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dispersion, i t  is a virtual certainty that any person located within the pattern area 
will be killed or wounded"74 
2. Deadly Duds 
Aside fiom blanketing huge areas, cluster bombs produce a large number 
of duds. The manufacturer of the CBU-87B submunition claims a dud rate of  five 
percenL7' Thus, the manufacturer expects that of the 202 "bombletsYy in a single 
CBU-87B, 10 to 11 of them will fail to explode. There have been, however, 
numerous reports that in combat conditions, the dud rate is considerably higher- 
up  to 23 to 30% or up to 46 to 60 bomblets per CBU-87B?6 In the Persian Gulf 
War, thousands of bomblets failed to explode because they landed in deep ~ a n d . 7 ~  
Despite subsequent modifications to the bomblet,7' some observers believe that 
landing on a soft surface prevented many bomblets fiom detonating in 
Yug0slavia.7~ 
bomb footprints as a "square kilometer in size" [or almost 19 football fields]. PEACHEY & 
WEBE, supra note 35, at 14. 
74. Krepon, supra note 26, at 26768. 
75. See Federation of American Scientists, BLU-97/23 Combined Effects Bomb, 7 
2, available at http://~mmv.fas.org/man~dod-l0l/sysldumb/cbu-87.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 
2002). 
76. See Beaver, supra note 33, 8 8 (stating that "NATO specialists say that they 
would expect about thirty percent of the munitions left from the cluster bomb canisters to 
remain live and unexploded after each raid"); see also Richard Norton-Tailor, A Million 
Tiny Fragments with Each Impact, GUARDIAN, June 23, 1999, 7 9 (quoting Colonel Bede 
Grossmith of the Royal Engineers: "We would expect ten percent [of the RBL755 
bomblets] not to go off'), available at http://ww.guardian.co.~osovo/ 
Story/0,2763,207744,00. html. 
77. See Trevor Nash, RO in Kuwait: The Big Clean-up, 1992 ASIAN J. AIR 
WARFARE 60, 60 (1992); see also Lt. Col. Gary W. Wright, Scatterable Munitions = 
Unexploded Ordnance = Fratricide 14 (unpublished USAWC Military Studies Program 
Paper, U.S. Anny War College, Carlisle Bmcks ,  Pennsylvania 17013) (citing Steve Kroft, 
Director, The Battlefield (60 Minutes CBS News, Oct. 25, 1991)). 
78. See Momell, supra note 44, at 12 C[T]he CBU-87B/B is identical to the 
CBU-87/B, except the CBU-87B/BYs submunitions have an all-mechanical secondary 
detonator instead of the piezoelectric detonator."). Presumably, the modification was to 
make the secondary fuze more sensitive to reduce the dud rate. See Leggette, supra note 42, 
at 27-29 (noting that the secondary omnidiectional firing mechanism together with the 
primary fuze should make the bomblet "function equally well on hard or soft terrain 
including snow, mud and water," thereby reducing the dud rate); see also Ticking Time 
Bombs, supra note 55, available at http://wmv.hnv.org/reportsl1999/nato2/nato995-O2.htm. 
Experience in combat conditions, however, suggests that this assertion overstates the 
capability of the bomblet. See PEACHEY & WIEBE, supra note 35, at 10-1 1. The secondary 
hze  is supposed "to detonate if the bomblet impacts other than straight on, or if the 
bomblet lands in soft terrain or water." Id. 
79. See, e.g., MCGRATH, supra note 34, at 2. McGrath notes other causes for 
submunition failure: faulty manufacture, lengthy storage of submunitions, ground crews' 
mistakes in loading, and the mechanical stresses of flying in combat. See id. Bomblets 
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NATO dropped nearly 1,800 cluster bomb dispensers on Yugoslavia-in 
Serbia and Kosovo?' Approximately 1,100 were CBU-87Bs dropped by the United 
States; over 530 were RBL755s dropped by Great Britain; apparently 165 CBU- 
87Bs were dropped by the Dutch." With 202 cluster bombs per CBU-87B 
caught in tree branches or whose descent is slowed by tree branches may also fail to impact 
with enough force to detonate. See id. 
80. See US. Dep 't of Def, Briefing, June 22, 1999 (statement of K e ~ e t h  Bacon, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense) ("The U.S. dropped about 1,100 cluster bombs. Not 
all of those were dropped in Kosovo, obviously."), available at 
http://~mmv.defenselink.miUnews/Jun1999/t06221999~t0622asd.html; see also U.K. 
Ministry of Def., Lessons From the Crisis, Appendix F (2000) (noting that Great Britain 
dropped 531 RBL55 cluster bombs in the Kosovo intervention), available at 
h t t p : / / \ m m v . i s n - 1 a s e . e t h z . c W c g i - b i n / i s n o c  
FrameCGI.map&ri=&lang=en&ds=isnqull&d=http%3a%2Ph2fimmv.mod.uk%2fmdex.ph 
p3%3fpage%3dl557&pa=25%7e53 1%4010%7e532%4010%7ebombs%403%7ebombs%40 
10%7ecluster%403%7ebombs%40 1%7e53 1%403%7e532%403%7ecluster%40 10% e53 1 % 
401%7e532%401%7eclusterDh401%7ecluster%404%7ebomb%404%7e53 1%404%7e532% 
404%7ekosovo%4010%7e53 1%402%7e532%402%7ekosovo%403%7ekosovo%401%7eko 
sovo%404%7ec1usterOh402%7ebomb%402%7ekosovo%402%7e& (last visited Apr. 5, 
2002). UNMACC had determined that 1279 cluster bomb dispensers were dropped on the 
Kosovo Province. E-mail from Col. Flanagan, head of the U.N. Mine Action Coordination 
Centre, to Thomas Michael McDonnell, Associate Professor of Law, Pace University 
School of Law (June 28, 2001) (on file at Pace Law School Library) Fereinafter Col. 
Flanagan E-mail]; see also Richard Lloyd, Civilians Face Persistent Threat from 
Unexploded Cluster Bombs, JANE'S DEF. WEEKLY, Nov. 29, 2000, fi 1, available at 2000 
WL 26051028.. Presumably, the remainder, about 352, were dropped on Serbia proper. 
The cluster bomb dispensers dropped on Kosovo contained approximately 289,536 
submunitions (cluster bombs). See id. 7 1 .  Assuming the same ratio of CBU-87Bs to 
RBL755s in Serbia as in the conflict as a whole, approximately 64,000 cluster bombs were 
dropped on Serbia. The figures for Kosovo were, however, subsequently increased. See 
infra notes 81,84. 
81. See Wiebe, supra note 32, at 127-28 (citing Memorandum from F.H.G. 
Degrave (Minister of Defense) & J.J. van Artsen (Minister of Foreign Affairs), to the Chair 
of the Permanent Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Lower House of the States-General, 
Cluster Bombs (Nov. 17, 2000) and calculating the total number of cluster bombs 
dispensers dropped by NATO at 1797). NATO provided United Nations Mine Action 
Coordination Centre (UNMACC) the following figures for bombs dropped solely on 
Kosovo: "Three different types of cluster bombs were used by the allied forces (833 by 
CBU-87,96 x CBU-99 and 492 x RBL-755) although no reference was made to the use of 
the CBU-99 'Rockeye' bombs when the information was initially provided." UNMIK, Mine 
Action Programme, Annual Report 2001, fi 11 (2001), available at 
http://wwmv.mineaction.org/~mik~org/doloads/repo/ualrepoOOl.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 5,2002). The RBL755 resembles the CBU-87. Its earlier version, the BL755, is 
described as "[a] 'dual-role' weapon similar to the U.S. CBU-87 [and] designed to attack a 
range of both 'hard and soft' targets. The TDM [the dispenser] weighs 600 lbs., and 
contains 147 'beer-can size' bomblets similar in appearance to the BLU-97 bomblet 
delivered by the CBU-87." Ticking Time Bombs, supra note 55, fi 6, available at 
http://wmv.hnv.org/ reports/l999/nato2/nato995-0l.htm (last visited June 16, 2001). The 
"R" variant of the BL755 was developed after the Gulf War to provide medium-altitude 
operations (above 10,000 ft.) (3,048 m.). See also TIM LAMING, ROYAL AIR FORCE MANUAL 
233 (1994) (describing the BL755 Cluster Bomb as capable of "destroy[ing] both soft- and 
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dispenser and 147 per RBL755 dispenser, NATO dropped over 330,000 cluster 
bombs on Yugoslavia. Even accepting the manufacturers' conservative dud rate 
yields a high number of  duds in Kosovo and Serbia, namely, over 16,000.82 After 
removing a large number of  dud cluster bombs fi-om Kosovo, the United Nations 
Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) estimated that the actual dud rate 
for cluster bombs dropped there was seven percent for CBU-87Bs and eleven 
percent for RBL-755.83 Assuming the same rate for cluster bombs dropped in 
Serbia (outside of Kosovo) yields 26,457 total dud cluster bombs on the ground.84 
hard-skinned targets whilst enabling the carrier aircraft to maintain a low-level attack 
profile" and noting each of its 147 bomblets incorporate shaped charges "capable of 
penetrating 250mm thick amour"); Gobel, supra note 37, at 14 (noting that the BL755 
bomblets are 15 centimeters long (5.9 inches) and about 5 centimeters (2 inches) in 
diameter, "combining a hollow charge with spiral segmenting case for antipersonnel 
attack"). 
The United States also dropped the Rockeye Cluster Bomb, used extensively in 
Vietnam and having a high dud rate, but no figures had initially been released as to how 
many were used or at what targets these bombs were aimed. See AFTER-ACTION REPORT, 
supra note 35, at 89; Mary Foster, Kosovo and Landmines, Kosovo and the Landmine 
Treaty, PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR, Sept. 1999, fi 13 (observing that the Rockeye I1 Mk20 
system with Mk 118 bomblets, contains 247 cylindrical submunitions which are designed to 
detonate on impact, "but frequently-as often as 30 to 40% of the time in the Gulf War- 
don't"), available at http://~mmv.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/MOMTOR~mons99~.html 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2002). UNMACC received information indicating that 96 Rockeye 
dispensers were dropped on Kosovo. See UNMIK, supra, at 4, available at 
http:N~m~v.mineaction.ors/unmikikorg/do\OOl.pdf. FAS 
describes the Rockeye as follows: 
The MK-20 Rockeye is a free-fall, unguided cluster weapon designed to 
kill tanks and armored vehicles. The system consists of a clamshell 
dispenser, a mechanical MK-339 timed fke ,  and 247 dual-purpose 
armor-piercing shaped-charge bomblets. The bomblet weighs 1.32 
pounds and has a 0.4-pound shaped-charge warhead of high explosives, 
which produces up to 250,000 psi at the point of impact, allowing 
penetration of approximately 7.5 inches of armor. Rockeye is most 
efficiently used against area targets requiring penetration to kill. 
Federation of American Scientists, MK-Rockeye, fi 1 (1999), available at 
http:l/www.fas.orgIman/dod-lOl/sysld~ (last visited Jan 30, 2002). See 
PROKOSCH supra note 19, at 101-02, for an analysis of the Rockeye. 
S2. See infra note 84 for the calculations. 
83. See Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, fi 2 (2001) (noting 
that UNMACC made this estimate in March 2001), available at 
http:l/~mmv.hnv.orglbackgrounder/arms/cluster-bckl03l.htm#kosovo (last visited Apr. 10, 
2002). Approximately 600 cluster bomb dispensers were dropped by Coalition Forces as of 
the end of November 2001. See Paul Watson, Silent Peril Lies in Wait for Afghanistan's 
People, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at Al. A villager returned to his home in Kalakan, 
Afghanistan, 12 miles from Kabul, two weeks after the United States planes had dropped 
cluster bombs there. He picked up a "dud" cluster bomb, which exploded, killing him and a 
companion. See id. 
In late October 2001, the United States began broadcasting warnings to the people 
of Afghanistan to distinguish between food packets and dud cluster bombs. See Afghans 
Karned Over Cluster Bombs, Oct. 30,2001, available at http://~vw.cnn.com~2002/ US110 
Heinonline - -  44 Ariz. L. Rev. 53 2002 
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:l 
In Afghanistan, UMMACC has indicated that coalition forces provided 
information on  103 cluster bomb strikes and that 1,210 CBU-87B dispensers were 
dropped on 78 of these sites, totaling 244,420 cluster bomb let^.^^ Assuming a dud 
rate of seven percent yields 17,109 cluster bombs that remain on the ground in 
Mghani~tan .8~ When figures become available for the remaining 25 sites, the total 
number of dud cluster bombs may approach the numbers in Kosovo and Serbia?' 
- 
/29/ret.bomb.wvamings/index.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002). Both the food packets and the 
cluster bombs have the same yellow color. See id. A UN demining team reported that in the 
last week of October, eight villagers were killed outright by a cluster bomb attack after the 
United States apparently mistakenly dropped a cluster bomb on Shakar Qala, an Afghan 
village near the city of Herat. See id. Another villager was wounded after picking up a dud 
cluster bomb. See id. 
84. The calculations are as follo~vs: 1100 CBU-87s dropped by the U.S. plus 165 
CBU-87s dropped by the Dutch, equals 1265 CBU-87's dropped. Each CBU-87 contains 
202 bomblets, for a total of 255,530 bomblets [I265 by 202 = 255,5301. Great Britain 
dropped 530 RBL-755's, each with 147 bomblets, totaling 77, 910 bomblets [530 by 147 = 
77,9101. Adding the two totals yields 333,440 bomblets [255,530 + 77,910 = 333,440.1 A 
five percent overall dud rate computes as follo~vs: 333,440 by .05 = 16,672. The 
calculations for a seven percent dud rate for CBU-87s are: 255,530 by .07 =17,887.1, and 
for an eleven percent dud rate for RBL-775 are: 77,910 by .ll = 8,570.1. Adding the hvo 
together yields a final figure for duds dropped on Yugoslavia: 17,887.1 + 8570.1 = 26,457.2 
total duds. These calculations do not include the Rockeye Cluster Bomb (CBU-99); NATO 
belatedly reported having dropped ninety-six CBU-99s on the Kosovo Province alone. See 
UNMIK, supra note 81, f i  11. Research has not yet revealed whether the Rockeyes form 
part of or are in addition to the 1100 cluster bomb dispensers dropped by the United States. 
Since the Rockeye dispenser contains 247 bomblets as contrasted with the 202 bomblets 
carried by the CBU-87, the total number of bomblets is, in any event, presumably higher 
than the estimate given above. 
More precise figures from NATO are available for cluster bombs dropped on 
the Kosovo Province alone and for their likely dud rate: 833 CBU-87s x 202 = 168,266 s 
.07 = 11,778.62; 492 RBL-755s x 147 = 72,324 x . l l  = 7,955.64; 96 CBU-99s x 247 = 
23,712 x .10 = 2,371.2. See UNh4IK supra note 81,19. Totaling the duds for these three 
types of cluster bombs, [I 1,778.62 + 7,955.64 + 2371.21 yields 22,105.46 duds in Kosovo. 
(This figure assumes a ten percent dud rate for the CBU-99; using a five percent dud rate 
for that cluster bomb would yield a slightly lower number of total duds, namely, 
approximately 20,920.) 
85. See UN To Clear Coalition Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, BBC 
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Jan. 3, 2002, 7 6, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring File. 
86. Some de-miners on the ground in Afghanistan have reported dud rates for 
CBU bomblets of hventy percent. The Pentagon itself apparently is claiming a ten percent 
dud rate. See Elizabeth Neuffer, Fighting Terror After the Battle/Civilian Casualties, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20,2002, at A23, available at LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File. 
87. The high dud rate may in part be due to a great many of the bomblets being 
past the warranty date indicated by their manufacturers. See Carlotta Gall, Mines and NATO 
Bombs Still Killing in Kosovo, N.Y. -s, Aug. 6, 1999, at A3. Human Rights Watch 
estimates the dud cluster bomb rate in Kosovo to be approximately ten to fifteen percent, 
thus from 25,000 to 37,500 dud cluster bombs (not counting cluster bombs dropped in 
Serbia proper). On the other hand, the number of dud submunitions the coalition dropped 
on Iraq and Kuwait in the Gulf War (excluding Gator Mine submunitions) is vastly larger: 
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Although duds, these bomblets remain dangerous. Their fuzing 
mechanism is "sens i t i~e ."~~ A slight vibration can set off the bomblets. Brigadier 
General John Craddock, the commander of  Task Force Falcon, the US 
peacekeeping force in Kosovo, described the extent of  and risk posed by  dud 
cluster bombs: 
When you fly over in a helicopter you can see a lot of cluster 
bombs-not a lot but a significant amount of cluster bombs .... 
We're not out looking for it. We're just documenting it where we 
fmd it. F terms of unexploded ordnance, a cluster bomb 
submunition] is probably the biggest danger in that it is so fragile .... 
I don't know that the residents are aware of how dangerous it is to 
even walk by that. [Walking by] could set it 03'' 
In addition to the civilian population, cluster bombs have endangered 
ordnance clearance crews and fiiendly troops entering an area subjected to cluster 
1,532,850. See Wright, supra note 77, at 38 (basing his figures on the manufacturers' 
conservative estimates of dud rates); see also III GULF WAR AIR POWER SURVEY 234 (1993) 
(not counting Army artillery's massive use of cluster bombs (Dual Purpose Improved 
Conventional Munitions @PIC) and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems W R S ) ,  the Air 
Force alone dropped 21,696 Vietnam era cluster bomb dispensers (CBU-52/58/71); 10,035 
CBU-87 dispensers; 5,345 Rockeye cluster bombs dispensers W O ) ,  and 1105 Gator 
Mines dispensers (CBU-89)); Human Rights Watch, NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in 
Yugoslavia, supra note 57,7 11 (estimating the number of live submunitions left in Iraq and 
Kuwait to be "at a minimum, 1.2 to 1.5 million''), available at http:// 
~nnv.hnv.org/backgrounder/arm~/ clus05 1 1 .htm. 
88. Describing the BLU-97 submunition used in the Gulf War, Lt. Col. Wright 
noted, "[tlhe BLU-97 is initiated by an extremely sensitive f u e  and duds should not be 
moved." Wright, supra note 77, at 11 (emphasis added). 
89. Beaver, supra note 33, 5 8 (reporting on a Department of Defense @OD) 
briefing on July 23, 1999) (emphasis added). The DoD report on the Kosovo Air Operation 
notes the danger of dud cluster bombs: 
Plecause the bomblets are dispensed over a relatively large area and a 
small percentage of them typically fail to detonate, there is an 
unexploded ordnance hazard associated with this weapon. These 
submunitions are not mines, are acceptable under the laws of armed 
conflict, and are not timed to go off as anti-personnel devices. However, 
if the submunitions are disturbed or disassembled, they may explode, 
thus the need for early and aggressive unexploded--ordnance clearing 
efforts. 
PEACHEY & WIEBE, supra note 35, at 16 (quoting AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 35, at 
90); see also REPORT OF THE INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS FOR THE REVIE\v CONFERENCE 
OF 1980 U.N. CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN 
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH h 4 ~ ~  BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO 
HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS 155 (I.C.R.C. 1994) (noting that dud cluster bomblets "are 
liable to explode at any time and can be triggered by even the slightest movement of the 
ground on which they are lying, such as vibrations caused by people walking or a moving 
vehicle"). 
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weapon b~mbardrnent?~ For example, the first NATO casualties in the Kosovo 
humanitarian intervention occurred after the conflict when a British clearance crew 
was attempting to remove BLU-97 bomblets. Some of them detonated, killing two 
British soldiers and bvo civilian clearance workers?' Similarly, after the Gulf War, 
seven United States soldiers charged with clearing an Iraqi airfield were killed 
when a pile of BLU-97 bomblets inexplicably blew up. This incident happened 
during daylight when the highly trained crew was carrying out its duties: "The 
battalion commander indicated that the clearance mission was extremely difficult 
because every square meter on the airfield appeared to have one or two unexploded 
b~mblets ."~~ 
Although probably not intended by its  designer^:^ the dud cluster bomb 
in effect becomes a landmine. Like a landmine, it can go off at the slightest touch, 
it is about the same size, and it can be concealed by falling into mud, undergrowth, 
or water?4 It is, in fact, more deadly than the typical landmine?' "The 
90. "When US Marine Corps forces attempted a night assault against Iraqi- 
occupied Kuwait International Airport, they reportedly were held up, not by fierce 
resistance, but by unexploded coalition cluster-bomb submunitions and mines." PEACHEY &
\VIEBE, supra note 35, at 16 (quoting Christopher Centner, Ignorance Is Risk: The Big 
Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks, AIRPOWER JOURNAL, Winter 1992, at 28). 
91. See Donna Bryson, Blast Killing Four Came from NATO Cluster Bomb, 
ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, July 22, 1999, at 4A. 
92. Wright, supra note 77, at 11 (emphasis added); see also U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASUALTIES CAUSED BY IMPROPER HANDLING OF UNEXPLODED 
SUBMUNITIONS, OPERATION DESERT STORM, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, Aug. 
6, 1993 (finding that twenty-five U.S. military personnel were killed by U.S. submunitions 
and others were injured). 
93. Apparently, Germany, however, designed a large number of bombs dropped 
over London to go off a considerable time after landing to terrorize the population and to 
intimidate bomb clearance crews. See HARTLEY, supra note 37, at 28 (noting that in World 
War 11 German bombs could be and often were set for a delayed detonation for up to eighty 
hours after landing). A member of such a crew never knew if the bomb that had failed to 
explode was in fact a dud or had a delayed operating fuze. The BLU-97's can be set to 
delay the time of explosion until some time after they landed on the ground. Reportedly, 
some that were dropped in Kosovo and Serbia were so set or at least for some reason 
exploded sometime after landing on the ground. See Watson, supra note 2, at Al. 
94. See Wiebe & Peachey, supra note 49, at 3 (noting that "[iln this way, they 
become 'hidden killers' blending into their surroundings like landmines. One of the more 
'typical' cluster bomb accidents in Laos occurs in the fields and gardens, when Lao 
villagers use hoes and diggers to prepare the soil for planting. The hidden submunitions 
have in effect created a minefield." Furthermore, '"[a]lthough UXO is not a mine, UXO 
hazards pose problems similar to mines concerning both personnel safety and the 
movement and maneuver of forces on the battlefield."' Id. (quoting UXO: MULTISERVICE 
PROCEDURES FOR OPERATIONS IN AN UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE NVIRONMENT, AIR LAND SEA 
APPLICATION CENTER, ch. 2, pt. 1 (1996)). For a detailed discussion of cluster bombs in 
Laos, see Carmel Capati, Comment, The Tragedy of Cluster Bombs in Laos: An Argument 
for Inclusion in the Proposed International Ban on Landmines, 16 WIS.  INT'L L.J. 227 
(1997). For a sobering discussion of mine clearance fiom first-hand experience, see 
Brigadier P.M. ~ l a ~ d e k  Kuwait: Mine Clearing After Iraqi Invasion, 126 AR& Q. & DEF. 
J. 1 ,4 (1996). 
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submunitions in cluster weapons generally have a higher explosive charge than 
anti-personnel landmines. This, coupled with the hgrnentation pattern of the 
heavy outer shell, results in more upper-body injuries and deaths when compared 
to landmines," not to mention their "longer lethal range than most anti-personnel 
land mine^."^^ 
Because cluster bomb dispensers discharge hundreds of dumb bomblets 
over large areas, subject to variations in wind, terrain, altitude, and spin rate, 
planners cannot target individual bomblets. It is thus impossible to know the 
precise footprint made by the submunitions in a given cluster bomb attack. During 
the Gulf War, "locations of UXO (unexploded ordnance) footprints [areas of 
possible UXO concentration] were not tracked and never passed to mobility 
 planner^."^' According to the United States military service procedures report cited 
above, "[c]urrently, [at the conclusion of Desert Storm], no system exists to 
accurately track unexploded submunitions to facilitate surface movement and 
mane~ver."'~ In Kosovo, NATO took nearly a year to release to the UNMACC 
detailed information on cluster bomb targets and drop sites and much of the 
information was inaccurate?' 
Because of the difficulty of tracking and dehsing dud cluster bombs, they 
may imperil civilians and friendly troops far more than landmines. By posing a risk 
of gruesome wounds or death, dud cluster bombs also prevent some farmers from 
cultivating fields and other civilians from walking in certain parts of their land or 
using certain parks.loO Even a five percent dud rate is enough to terrorize civilians 
in areas subject to cluster bomb bombardment: 
Assuming a fairly standard strike of five [cluster bomb dispensers of 
UK's RBL755 with 147 bomblets each], the resulting thirty-five 
unexploded bomblets may have a post-conflict impact ranging from 
insignificant to devastating. Thirty-five bomblets spread across the 
agricultural and grazing land of a subsistence community could 
effectively destroy its future and force it to abandon its homes and 
land. It has no way of knowing that there are "only" 35 bomblets 
95. See Wiebe & Peachey, supra note 49, at 3. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. (quoting Wright, supra note 77, at 17). 
98. Id. (quoting UXO, supra note 94, ch.1, at 1). 
99. See infra notes 246-52 and accompanying text. 
100. See Lucian Kim, Making Kosovo Safe from Thousandr of Land Mines, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 15, 1999, fl 4 (noting that fear of mines (and dud cluster 
bombs) can be "as detrimental as their actual existence, since a perceived threat limits 
people's movements as much as a real one"); cf: W.F. Deedes, Nation Tied to the Land 
Learns to Live with Deadly Harvest, ELECTRONIC TELEGRAPH, Nov. 14, 1997 (observing 
that in 1996, one third of the arable land in a Laotian province, some 300,000 hectares, 
could still not be cultivated because of the unexploded ordnance from the Vietnam War, 
principally dud American cluster bombs), available at http://mv.telegraph.co.uk/et? 
ac=005242090943279&rtmo=V15u4jPx&atmo=rmmq&pg=/et~97/11/14/~vrninel14.html 
(last visited Apr. 5,2002) 
Heinonline - -  44 Ariz. L. Rev. 57 2002 
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:l 
present nor would it have any reasonable expectation of the land 
being cleared within a feasible time~cale.'~' 
The tenor that dud cluster bombs inspire was not limited to Kosovo and 
Serbia. NATO planes jettisoned cluster bombs and other ordnance in the Adriatic 
Sea when the planes were low on fuel or having mechanical difficulties. Italian 
fisherman began finding cluster bomblets in their nets.'" One cluster bomb 
exploded, causing a devastating fire in one fishing vessel and seriously injuring a 
crew member. The owner of that vessel said, "I'm afraid. I doubt they will be able 
to recover all these little cluster bombs. It will be a danger to us for years and 
years."103 Consequently, these submunitions not only endanger civilians, but also 
affect their morale and way of life. 
Tragically, dud cluster bombs appear to have a special allure for children. 
The BLU-97B, for example, bright yellow, the size of a soda can, with a small 
parachute on the top, looks like a high tech toy. A high percentage of civilians 
killed or maimed by dud cluster bombs are boys and girls who pick the duds up to 
play with. The case of the five young boys killed by a dud cluster bomb, discussed 
at the beginning of this Article, is, unfortunately, not ~nique.'~'' A World Health 
10 1. MCGRATH, supra note 34, at 2. 
102. See Tim Hundley, Kosovo War's Jetsam Leaves Italy Fisherman Trawling 
for Trouble, CHI. TRIB., July 16, 1999,l 15 (reporting that Italian government temporarily 
banned trawling in the Atlantic because of the ordnance dumping), available at 1999 LVL 
2893228. 
103. Id.; see also Paul Beaver, The Challenge of Mine Clearance and Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal, JANE'S DEF. WEEKLY, July 14, 1999,l 12 (noting that NATO aircraft 
dropped ordnance, presumably including cluster bombs, "in surrounding watersy'); Rachel 
Stohl, Cluster Bombs Leave Lasting Legacy, CENTER FOR DEF. INFO., Aug. 5, 1999, fl 5 
(noting that ninety-seven bomblets have been recovered by allied minesweepers in the 
Adriatic sea: "munitions dumped at sea have caused deaths and injuries to Italian fisherman 
in the Adriatic and cost others the majority of the year's profits"), available at 
http://www.cdi.org/weekly/l999/issue30.html#1. 
104. In another case, ten young men and boys in the village of Jahoc in Kosovo 
were playing around with a BLU-97 bomblet shortly after the war. They assumed that the 
bright yellow bomblet with the parachute was a complete dud. One young man who was 
trying to open it was "tom apart." Dan Eggen, NATO 'Dud.' Keep Killing in Kosovo; 
Faulv Cluster Bombs Taking Lives, Limbs, WASH. POST, July 19, 1999, at A01, available 
at 1999 WL 17014725. Two others were killed; the remaining seven were injured, two 
critically. See id,; see also PEACHEY & WIEBE, supra note 35, at 18 ("It was yellow and it 
had a parachute," said Jashair, 10, of the cluster bomb that he and his fiiends found in 
October 1999 near the village of Boboshu. "We picked it up, and we banged it in the field. 
Then I poked it with a stick and it exploded," blinding him in one eye. (quoting JeEey 
Fleishman, In Peacetime Kosovo, Bomb Casualties Continue, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 21, 
1999, 9 2, available at http://www.converge.org.nz~pma~sleth.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 
2002)); Capati, supra note 94, at 227 (citing the case of a fifteen-year-old killed in Laos 
while tilling a rice paddy); Peter J. Ekberg, Remotely Delivered Landmines and 
International Law, 33 COLTJM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 149, 149 (1995) (providing a personal 
account of a Bedouin teenage girl who had picked up a dud cluster bomb during Operation 
Desert Storm; the bomb exploded taking all the fingers off her right hand and causing 
grievous wounds to her face and chest); Ann Pedersen, The Legacy of War, Bombs, Mines 
Heinonline - -  44 Ariz. L. Rev. 58 2002 
20021 CLUSTER BOMBS OVER KOSOVO 59 
Organization study found that of the 150 casualties of landmines and dud cluster 
bombs in Kosovo as of July 1999, seventy-one percent of the victims were under 
the age of twenty-four.los About forty percent of these casualties were attributable 
to dud cluster bombs.106 Another study found that a child in Kosovo is nearly five 
times more likely to be killed or injured by a cluster bomb than by a land~nine.'~' 
UNMACC,  part of the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMliK), estimated in October 1999 that "624 minefields and 1,392 
cluster bombs with as many as 30,000 unexploded bomblets, [sic] had been 
dropped in 333 confirmed sites [in Kosovo, not counting Serbia sites] during the 
\var."lo8 These figures were later updated to 1279 cluster bomb dispensers dropped 
on Kosovo, in 583 strikes, at 350 separate  location^.'^ Although U N M A C C  
and Mortars in Laos, U.N. VOLUNTEERS NEWS, Aug. 1997 (observing that in 1997 tsventy- 
four years after the American bombing of Laos, about 200 people, many children, were 
being killed or injured each year by unexploded ordnance, mainly dud cluster bombs); 
Kevin \Vhitelaw, NATO's Nasty Surprises: They May Look Like Toys, But Bright-yellow 
Bomb Remnants Pack a Deadly Wallop, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 25, 1999, at 43 
(reporting four young boys killed while playing with a cluster bomb in Vrbovac, Kosovo 
near where NATO dropped cluster bombs); Child Killed By Cluster Bomb in Southern 
Lebanon, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 13, 1999, Fq 1-2 (noting that a five-year-old 
Lebanese boy was killed by an exploding dud cluster bomb while he was on a picnic with 
his parents three miles from the Israeli-occupied "security" zone in southern Lebanon). 
105. See World Health Organization, WHO Finds Heavy Toll from Land Mines in 
Kosovo, 71 1-2 (1999), available at http://wmmv.who.int/inf-pr-1999/en/pr99-39.html (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2002). A study by UNICEF reached similar results: "The majority of the 
victims are male between the ages of 10 and 25.... When the type of UXO has been 
specified in accounts of accident, more than forty percent are reported to involve cluster 
bombs." UNICEF, Mine Awareness in the Community: Passing the Message On, at 2 
(2002), available at http:llwnmv.unicef.org/kosovol, Mine awareness in the community (last 
visited Apr. 19,2002). 
106. See UNICEF, supra note 105, at 2, available at 
http://www.uniceEorg/kosovo/, Mine awvareness in the community. 
107. See Claire Doole, ICRC Calls for Cluster Bomb Ban (BBC television 
broadcast, Sept. 5, 2000) (citing ICRC report); Peter Herby & Anna B. Nuiten, Explosive 
Remnants of War: Protecting Civilians Through an Additional Protocol to the 1980 
Convention, 841 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 195, 198 (2001) (citing Dr. David Meddings, 
Epidemiologist, Unit of the Chief Medical Officer, ICRC), available at 
http:llwvw.icrc.org/eng/reviewv, March, No 841. 
108. UNMACC, Mine Awareness in the Community, Passing the Message On, at 
2 (2000), available at http://w~mv.un.orglDeptsldpkolmine/macc/do~oa&/p~unicef~ 
mae.pdf (last visited Apr. 10,2002). 
109. See Col. Flanagan E-mail, supra note 80; Lloyd, supra note 80, 1 1 (stating 
that NATO now believes that eight to twelve percent of the bomblets failed to explode, 
resulting in as many as 34,744 bomblets on the ground in Kosovo); UNICEF, supra note 
105, at 2 (quoting UNMACC source), available at http://wmvw.unicef.org/kosovo/, Mine 
awvareness in the community. See generally UNMACC, Home Page, at 
http:llwmmv.welcome.to/macckosovo (last visited Apr. 5, 2002). NATO later reported 
dropping 1321 cluster bomb dispensers on the Kosovo Province alone, at 224 separate 
locations. See UNMIK, supra note 81, 7 11 (the given figures, however, add up to 1421 
cluster bomb dispensers; see supra note 81). Based on its clearance efforts, UNMACC now 
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concluded its work in Kosovo on December 15,2001, it acknowledges that it can 
never be certain that its clearing efforts have been completely effective.'1° 
In conclusion, the cluster bomb's attractiveness to the military-its 
terrific explosive and deadly power and its ability to blanket huge areas-puts 
civilian, non-combatants at risk. After the conflict ends, the dud cluster bombs act 
like unmarked mines, threatening the civilian population. Far more powerful than 
mines, however, these dud cluster bombs wreak much greater damage when they 
go off. 
11. AIR WARFARE, ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, AND 
INTERNATIONAL L W 
A. History 
For much of the last century, the law of air warfare remained moribund, 
locked in rules inspired by the 19th century battlefield, while the technology of 
aircraft, missiles, and bombs shattered record after record, barrier after barrier. The 
Hague Rules of Land Warfare, agreed upon in 1907, made it a violation to bomb or 
othenvise attack an undefended city."' The rules were witten before the advent of 
the airplane, although the use of the dirigible, primarily for scouting the enemy and 
observing the battle scene, had been common for decades. In 1899, the major 
powers signed and later ratified a five-year ban on "the launching of projectiles and 
estimates a dud rate of seven percent for CBU-87s and eleven percent for RBL-755's, 
giving approximately 26,657 dud cluster bombs. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying 
text. 
110. See UNMIK, Mine Action Programme, Annual Report 2000, 7 18 (2000), 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/macc/do~~loads/repo~/mual~2OOO.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2002) [hereinafter UNMLK, Annual Report 20001. The 2001 Annual 
Report indicates that K-FOR troops cleared another 7455 cluster munitions fiom Kosovo, 
yielding a total cleared of 15,940, of the between 20,920 and 22,105 left on Kosovo soil. 
See UNMLK, Mine Action Programme, Annual Report 2001, supra note 81,19, including 
n. 1; and supra note 81. In the Kosovo Province alone, however, these calculations suggest 
that as of December 2001, between nearly 5000 to over 6000 dud cluster bombs remained 
uncleared. 
11 1. See Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex 
to the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, art. 25,34 Martens (3d) 360,36 Stat. 2199, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (1908), 
and in DoCUMENls ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 27, at 48 ('"The attack or 
bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are 
undefended is prohibited.") (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910). 
One commentator notes that "[tlhe anival of aircraft, however, totally undermined 
[the Hague rules], which were tied to the notion of advancing land-based armies through the 
field which could occupy without problem undefended cities, but which needed to bombard 
defended cities in order to occupy them." L. Doswald-Beck, f ie  Value of the 1977 Geneva 
Protocols for the Protection ofcivilians, in CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW: ASPECTS 
OF THE 1977 GENEVA PROTOCOLS AND THE 1981 WEAPONS CONVENTION 137, 142 (Michael 
A. Meyer ed., 1989). 
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explosives from balloons or by other new methods of a similar nat~re.""~ A few 
states signed and ratified a five-year extension of the ban, but all sides ignored it in 
World War LH3 After that war, several states attempted to develop a law of air 
~ar fare :"~  distinguished jurists were designated to develop applicable rules, which 
they did the followi~~g year."' The 1923 "Rules of Aerial Warfare" attempted to 
reestablish the principle that "aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed 
at a military objective ....77"6 "Military objective7' was defined as "[aln object of 
wvhich the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to the 
The Rules, which were never adopted by states, narrowly qualified 
the term "military objecti~e,""~ and would have made illegal some of the 
bombardments of purely commercial establishments in World War 1."' Thus 
during the first seventy-seven years of the 20th century, the state of international 
humanitarian law of air warfare calls to mind Shakespeare's quip: "The law hath 
not been dead, though it hath 
A particularly notable violation of the 1907 Hague Rules and the 1923 
Rules of Aerial Warfare occurred in 1937 when the Nazi German Airforce was 
112. Declaration Concerning the Prohibition, for the Term of Five Years, the 
Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, and Other New Methods of a 
Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens (2d) 994, 32 Stat. 1839, reprinted in 1 AM. J. 
INT'L. L. 153 (1907) (entered into force 1909). Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, 
China, Denmark, Spain, Mexico, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Montenegro, 
the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Siam, Sweden, Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and Bulgaria signed the Declaration and all but China and Turkey 
ratified it. See Declaration to Prohibit for the Term of Five Years the Launching of 
Projectiles and Esplosives from Balloons, and Other New Methods of a Similar Nature, 32 
Stat. 1839 (signed 1899) (noting that the United States has ratified the Hague Declaration), 
available at 1901 WL 16245. 
113. See DOCUMENTS O N ~  LAW OF WAR, supra note 27, at 121-22 (noting that 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia never signed or acceded to the Declaration and 
that the United States, wvhich had been bound, announced in 1942 that it would not observe 
the terms of the Declaration); see also L. Doswald-Beck, supra note 11 1, at 142. 
114. The 1921-1922 Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament was 
called for this purpose. See DOCUMENTS ONTHELA\VS OFWAR, supra note 27, at 121-22. 
115. See id. at 122 (noting that states at the 1921-1922 Washington Conference- 
the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands-agreed to 
appoint a Commission to develop what would become the 1923 Rules on Aerial Warfare). 
116. Id. at 143. 
117. Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and 
Air Warfare, (1922-1923), pt. 2, ch. 4, art. 24(1), available at http://mvw.icrc.org! 
IHL.NSF/52d68dl4de6160eOc12563daOO5fdblb/cd78ffa34e34al82c125641e003al2a0?0p 
enDocument. 
118. "[B]ombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively at the 
following objectives: military forces, military works; military establishments of depots; 
factories constituting important and well known centres engaged in the manufacture of 
arms, ammunition, or distinctively military supplies; lines of communication or 
transportation used for military purposes." Id. art. 24(2) (emphasis added). 
119. See L. Doswald-Beck, supra note 11 1, at 143. 
120. FYILLIA~~ SHAKESPEARE, MEASUREFORMEASURE, act 2, sc. 1. 
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called in by General Francisco Franco to bomb and strafe the Basque City of 
Guernica, apparently to permit the Luftxvaffe to analyze clinically the effectiveness 
of their air force under combat  condition^.'^' Aside from empty pronouncements, 
the world community did nothing after this beautiful city burned and over a 
thousand civilians lost their lives.12' The lack of forceful world action may 
ultimately have led to all sides bombing cities indiscriminately in World War 11. 
As that war commenced, Germany decided to bomb London, deliberately hitting 
civilian neighborhoods as well as some legitimate military targets.'= First, the 
bombing consisted of the Luftwaffe directly dropping bombs, but later V-1 and V- 
2 missiles with crude guidance systems hit London helter skelter.lZ4 In retaliation, 
both Britain and later the United States bombed German cities.lZ5 The Allied 
121. See HUGH THOMAS, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 421 (1961); see also RENE A. 
WORMSER, THE STORY OF THE LAW 526,543 (1962). The bombing of this city became the 
subject of Picasso's famous painting, Guernica, which remained at the Louvre until 
democracy returned to Spain after Generalissimo Franco's death in 1975. But see James S. 
Corum, Inflated by Air-Common Perceptions of Civilian Casualties from Bombing 7 
(1990) (unpublished Graduate Student paper, U.S. Air Force Air War College) (on file with 
the Author) (arguing that Guernica had a bridge and intersection that was vital for the 
withdrawal of as many as twenty-three battalions of Basque army troops). 
122. See THOMAS, supra note 121, at 421. 
123. Furthermore in April and May of 1940, the Germans indiscriminately 
bombed civilian populations in Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium. See Howard Levie, 
Some Major Inadequacies in the Existing Law Relating to the Protection of Individuals 
During Armed Conflct, in WHEN BATTLE RAGES, HOW CAN LAW PROTECT? 1 4 ~ ~  
HAMMARSKJOLD FORUM 7 (John Casey ed., 1971), reprinted in LEVIE ON THE LAW OF WAR 
161 n.143 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998). 
124. It is estimated that the German bombing of London during the blitz, from 
September 1940 to July 1941 cost 10,000 people their lives and badly injured 17,000 more. 
See MICROSOFT 98 ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, London, H i s t o y w a r  Damage (1998). The 
total number of civilians killed in Britain during World War I1 has been estimated as 
follows: 51,509 from bombing fiom aircraEt; 6184 from flying bombs, 2754 from rockets, 
and 48 from cross-channel guns. See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 1 A.F. 
L. REV. 1,225 (1990). The Japanese employed a similarly indiscriminate weapon, attaching 
mines to balloons with no directional system. See MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL J. PARTSCH, & 
WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FORVICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 302 (1982). 
125. See CONRAD C. CRANE, BOMBS, CITIES, AND CIVILIANS 1-3 (1993) (noting 
that Britain engaged in a deliberate campaign of bombing German cities, whereas the 
United States, until much later in the war, aimed at military targets, which, however, owing 
to the relatively imprecise nature of bombing at that time, often did result in a significant 
number of civilian casualties). America's and Great Britain's bombing destroyed 485,000 
residential buildings in Germany and heavily damaged another 415,000, "making a total of 
twenty percent of all dwelling units in Germany"; Allied bombing resulted in a minimum of 
305,000 German military and civilians killed and 780,000 wounded. U.S. STRATEGIC 
BOMBING SURVEY: SUMMARY REPORT, at 15 (1945), available at http://\nmv. 
anesi.com/ussbs02.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2002); see also Mark L. Sacharoff, The 
Ajfennath of the Persian Gulf War: Strengthening the Laws of Warfare, Probleris and 
Paradoxes of the Laws of Warfare, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 71, 74 (1992) (citing IV 
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 7 (1976)). Other sources estimate that 12 million 
civilians died from aerial bombardment during World War 11; furthermore, "during World 
War I, the proportion of civilian dead of the total killed came to thirteen percent while the 
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bombing included the firebombing of Dresden and ~0kyo.l '~ This so-called carpet 
bombing or target area bombing consisted of blanketing a large area of  a city 
which may or may not have military targets within the specified area.'" Expanding 
this concept, the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima destroyed more than four 
square miles (ten sq. km.) or sixty percent of the city, ultimately killing 
approximately 90,000 to 140,000 per~ons.''~ 
proportion rose to seventy percent during World War II." Belt, supra note 24, at 142 n.179 
(citing Levie, supra note 123, at 148, and EDWARD K\VAKIVA, THE INTERNA~ONAL LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT: PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 17 n.52 (1992)); see 
also Levie, supra note 123, at 148 ("The estimate has been made that while World War I 
caused 10 million deaths, of wvhich 500,000 were civilians, World War 11 caused 50 million, 
of wvhich 24 million were civilians; and half of the civilian deaths (12 million) were caused 
by air raids!" (citing Pictet, The Need to Restore the Laws and Customs Relating to Armed 
Conflict, REV. (INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS) 22,37 (1969)). 
126. Approximately 83,000 civilians died in the firebombing of Tokyo; another 
40,000 were injured; 135,000 civilians died in the firebombing of Dresden. See L. Doswald- 
Beck, supra note 11 1, at 145; Sacharoff, supra note 125, at 74 (citing X U.S. STRATEGIC 
BOMBING SURVEY 1,3,38 (1976)). In addition, the Allied firebombing of Hamburg resulted 
in "the most complete blotting out of a city that has ever happened." See, e.g., J.M. 
SPAIGHT, AIR POLVER AND WAR RIGHTS 278 (3d ed. 1947). 
127. Carpet bombing is defined as the "total devastation of an entire area aimed at 
leaving nothing alive." Air Chiefs Talk of Carpet Bombing, available at 
http://www.socialister.dk/s~vorkerl1645/pages/~var2.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2002); see 
also 1957 Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population 
in Time of War, (1956) ch. 3, art. 10 (providing in relevant part as followvs: "Target k e a  
Bombing, Art. 10: It is forbidden to attack without distinction, a single objective, an area 
including several military objectives at a distance from one another where elements of the 
civilian population, or dwellings, are situated in between the said military objectives"), 
available at http:l/~nnvl.umn.edulh~anrts/instree/l957a.h (last visited Apr. 8, 2002). 
This Article was the precursor to the First 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, art. 5 1(5)(a). 
128. Precise casualty figures for Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings probably can 
never be known. Some sources indicate that 70,000 to 80,000 persons died outright from 
the Hiroshima bombing and that another 70,000 were injured. See ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA ONLINE, World War Ll, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, available at 
http:l/search.eb.comlbo1/topic?eu=118868&sctn=26#s (last visited Apr. 5, 2002). This 
source also estimates that 35,000 to 45,000 people died in the Nagasaki bombing. See id. 
Other sources suggest a higher death rate, considering those who died much later from 
radiation sickness and other injuries sustained in the bombing. See 13 FUNK WAGNALLS 
NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 124 (1983) (noting that the Supreme Allied Headquarters reported that 
129,558 persons were killed, injured, or missing and 176,987 made homeless by the 
bombing). Dropping the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki resulted in the following 
casualties: An estimated 70,000 people were "killed outright" and another 70,000 "doomed 
to die of bomb-related causes in the decade that followed." The Atomic Bombing of 
Nagasaki, at http:l/~vw.-gaigo.ac.jp/nagasaki/lO.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002); see also 
Radiation Effects Research Foundation: A Cooperative Japan-US Research Organization, 
(noting that the precise number of fatalities will never be known but estimating 90,000 to 
140,000 persons in Hiroshima and from 60,000 to 80,0000 persons in Nagasaki), available 
at http:/lwnnv.rerf.or.jpleigo/experhp/reome.h (last visited Apr. 8, 2002). One source 
notes that "the combined heat and blast [from the Hiroshima atomic bomb] pulverized 
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From the First World War through the Second World War, as well as in 
Korea and Vietnam, humanitarian law was never changed to deal with the 
exponential advances in weapon technology. Until 1977, aside from customary 
international law, the 1907 Hague Rules of Land warfare contained the only 
arguably controlling law concerning how war could be conducted.129 By the 
outbreak of World War I, the Hague Rules were hopelessly obsolete concerning 
air warfare.130 The 1923 Rules of Aerial Warfare, though well intended, were 
never adopted in a formal treaty and were never followed in practice.131 All sides 
in both World Wars, as well as in Korea and Vietnam, largely ignored custom.'32 
The law of air warfare was so unsettled that the British Commander of the J U F  
during World War 11 could credibly assert in 1947, "International law can always 
be argued pro and con, but in this matter of the use of aircraft in war there is, as it 
happens, no international law at  
Advances in weapons technology and the advent and development of air 
warfare endangered the civilian population as never before: 
[Until the 20th century], [dlestruction [in war] occurred within the 
range of the weapons then available, i.e., small arms and artillery. 
everything in the explosion's immediate vicinity, generated spontaneous fires that burned 
almost 4.4 square miles completely out ...." ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra, 7 2, 
available at http:llsearch.eb.comlboVtopic?eu=l18868&sctn=26#s; see also MICROSOIT 98 
ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1998) ("U.S. estimates put the number 
killed in Hiroshima at 66,000 to 78,000 and in Nagasaki at 39,000 [while Japanese] gave a 
combined total of 240,000."). 
129. See L. Doswald-Beck, supra note 111, at 152; see also Hans Blis, Means 
and Methods of Combat, in UNESCO, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 
135, 136 (1988) (Mr. Blix represented Sweden at the Geneva Conference in which the 
Additional Protocols were drafted.) ("[Llack of rules on bombing from the air was felt to be 
absurd."); Elbridge Colby, Laws ofAerial Warfare, 10 W. L. REV. 123, 148-53 (1926). 
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 did advance humanitarian law, but did virtually 
nothing concerning the manner in which military forces may conduct war. The Geneva 
Conventions focused on the protection of individuals, civilians and prisoners of war who 
were held or under the jurisdiction of an occupying power. 
130. See Colby, supra note 129, at 148-53. 
13 1. See 111 HOWARD S. LEVIE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE 
1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1974-1977 GENEVA 
DIPLOMATIC ONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION A D DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
HU~WNITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 126-27 (Supp. 1979) (statement of 
Mr. Mirimanoff-Chilikine of the ICRC) bereinafter LEVIE, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS]. 
132. See, e.g., id. at 60 (statement of Mr. Mirimanoff-Chilikine of the ICRC). 
"Customary international law," a recognized source of intemational law, is defined as "law 
result[ing] from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of 
legal obligation." RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS $ 102 (1987); see also 
Statute of the Int'l Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(l)(b), U.N.T.S. 993, 59 Stat. 
1031 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). 
133. Parks, supra note 124, at 2 (quoting Sir Arthur T. Harris, Marshal of the 
Royal Air Force, ARTHUR T. HARRIS, BOMBER OFFENSIVE 177 (1947)). But see infra notes 
169-70 and accompanying text (discussing customary international law as restricting air 
warfare even before Additional Protocol I was adopted). 
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The concept of the battlefield contains the idea of geographic 
limitation. Civilians in the area were often able to move away or 
flee (or even watch the fighting fiom the surrounding hills. ..). 
The advent of the airplane fimdamentally altered the nature of 
warfare and brought in its wake a vast potential for destruction to 
the civilian population. Long range-missiles have taken this process 
even further. Bomb and missile attacks on strategic targets carry 
destruction far behind the fiont l i e ,  into the heart of a country, 
where they can strike at cities, toms,  roads and railways, cultivated 
land and, above all, at the population that is not involved in the 
ho~ti1ities.I~~ 
International law has still not caught up with advances in air power and 
weapons technology. The next hvo sections deal with how international law has 
responded to the relevant advances here, namely: (1) whether the cluster bomb 
causes unnecessary and superfluous suffering in violation of international 
agreements, and (2) whether the manner in which NATO used this weapon violates 
the First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Convention of  1949, a treaty 
primarily designed to prohibit methods and means of warfare that unduly endanger 
civilians. 
134. PROKOSCH, supra note 19, at 174 n.31 (quoting HANS-PETER GASSER, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 61 (1993)). In the nineteenth century, there were 
civilian victims. Civilians were often the victims in a defended city under siege; 
humanitarian law did not forbid the starvation of civilians in laying siege to a city or town. 
See Col. William J .  Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional 
Wafare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 114 (1982) (quoting The German High Command Trial, 12 
LRTWC 1, 84 (1948) (concluding but regretting that international law permitted Field 
Marshal von Leeb, who apparently approved of an order to fire upon civilians who might 
attempt to flee Leningrad which was being denied food under the state of siege: 'We might 
wish the law were otherwise but we must administer it as we find it.")). Note, however, that 
the 1977 First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions expressly prohibits starvation of 
civilians. See Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, opened for 
signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 54, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3-608 (1979), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 
(1978), and in DOCUMENTS ONTHE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 27 (entered into force Dec. 7, 
1978). But aerial and artillery bombardment threatens civilians on a scale not experienced 
since the practice of the victorious army killing all men, women, and children of the 
vanquished, a practice carried out by armies of the world &om primitive times until the end 
of the Middle Ages. See L. Doswald-Beck, supra note 11 1 ,  at 139-140, 141; see also Levie, 
supra note 123 (discussing the increased threat that aerial warfare poses for civilians). 
Some commentators, however, have argued that modem air wars generally cause fewer 
civilian casualties than land wars. See, e.g., Major C.B. Shotwell, Economy and Humanity 
in the Use of Force: A Look at the Aerial Rules of Engagement in the 1991 Gulf War, 4 
USAF J .  LEGAL STUD. 15, 26 (1993) (asserting that the civilian death per ton of bombs 
dropped in Desert Storm was the lowest in the history of air warfare, thereby generally 
protecting the civilian population). 
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B. Cluster Bombs: A Weapon Causing Unnecessary and Superfluous Suffering? 
Recognizing the cruel and unnecessary suffering some weapons cause, 
most states over the last 130 years have banned certain weapons and certain 
methods of using legitimate weapons. In St. Petersburg in 1868, the state parties 
banned dumdum bullets and any projectile less than 400 grams containing an 
explosive or charged with "fidminating or inflammable"  substance^.'^^ At The 
Hague in 1899, the state parties banned poison and poisoned weapons. With the 
1925 Geneva protocol, the state parties expressly banned the use of poison gas and 
later biological weapons. Under the First Protocol to the 1980 Convention on 
Conventional Weapons, the state parties banned fragmentation weapons whose 
fragments X-rays could not detect.'36 Under the 1995 Fourth Protocol to that 
Convention, the state parties banned blinding laser weapons.13' Responding to an 
international grass roots campaign, an ovenvhelming number of countries entered 
into the Land Mines Convention in 1997, under which the parties banned anti- 
personnel land~nines.'~~ 
135. Roger S. Clark, Methods of Warfare That Cause Unnecessary Suffering or 
Are Indiscriminate: A Memorial Tribute to Howard Bennan, 28 CAL. W. RES. INT'L L.J. 
379,384 (1998); see also 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of 
War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens 
474-75, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 95-96 (Supp. 1907), and in DOCUMENTS ON THE 
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 27, at 29-31 [hereinafter 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration]. 
136. See Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments to the U.N. Conference on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature 
Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523-26 (1980), and in 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 27, at 473, 479 (entered into force Dec. 2, 
1983) [hereinafter Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments]; see also Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 Martens (3d) 643 (1932-1933), 
reprinted in 25 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 94 (entered into force Feb. 8, 1928), and in 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 27, at 139 (entered into force Feb. 8, 1928); 
1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899,26 Martens NRG 
(2d) 998, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 157 (1907), and in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS 
OF WAR, supra note 27, at 36. 
137. See Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol, supra note 27, art. 1. Unfortunately, 
that Protocol leaves expansive exceptions, failing to prohibit production of laser blinding 
weapons and permitting their use when not intentionally directed at blinding. 
138. See Ottawa Convention for the Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines: 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti- 
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, opened for signature, Dec. 3, 1997, reprinted in 
36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997) (entered into force Mar. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Ottawa Convention]. 
As of this writing, 133 states have signed the Landrnine Convention and 122 have ratified 
it. Signatures, Ratifications/Accessions to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 
Sept. 18, 1997, ICRC, available at http://gvalnwb2.icrc.org/icrceng.nsfidedCE A9 A 0 1 
FDEFEE3044125658D003OBC1A?Opendocument (last visited Apr. 20,2002). The United 
States has refused to sign this treaty. See Christine Capuche, The Ottawa Treaty and its 
Impact on US.  Military Policy & Planning, 25 BROOK J. WL L. 183, 184 (1999) (noting 
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The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg, the first modem intemational 
agreement to ban a weapon of warfare, established, among others, the following 
two principles: (1) "[Tlhe only legitimate object which States should endeavor to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy," and (2) 
"That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly 
aggravate the suffering of disabled men, or render their death ine~itable."'~~ This 
Declaration subsequently led to the Hague Convention of 1899 and later to Hague 
Convention of 1907, Regulation 23(e), prohibiting belligerents fiom "employ[ing] 
arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering."'40 The 
Hague Rules have achieved the status of customary international l a d 4 '  
Following the lead of the St. Petersburg Declaration and the two Hague 
Conventions, the 1977 First Additional Protocol prohibits methods or means of 
warfare that inflict unnecessary suffering on civilians or combatants: 
In any m e d  conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to 
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. 
It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and 
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superj7uou.s injuly or 
unnecessary suffering.'42 
This Article is hardly clear to the uninitiated reader. The first 
subparagraph derives fiom Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Rules. Commentators 
suggest that this subparagraph refers, among other things, to conduct already 
that President Clinton stated that he refksed to sign the treaty because it would require the 
removal of mines separating North and South Korea and would ban anti-tank mines). 
139. 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 135; see also Yves Sandoz, 
ICRC Involvement in Banning or Restricting the Use of Certain Weapons, INT'L 
C O A ~ I ~ ~ ~ E E  ON RED CROSS, (Feb. 9 2000) (presentation by Yves Sandoz at New York 
University School of Law at seminar for diplomats on international humanitarian law), 
available at h t t p : / / ~ w w v . i c r c . o r g / i c r c e n g . n s ~ 5 c a c f d f 4 ~ 4 7  
c76aaea2e22412568a2002c4db5?0penDocument&Highlight=2,yves. 
140. Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 
18, 1907, art. 23(e), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON LAXIS OF WAR, supra note 27, at 52 
(entered into force Jan. 26, 1910). 
141. See the decision of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, In re 
Goering and Others, INTERNATIONAL L W REPORTS 203 (October 1, 1946) (concluding that 
the "pague] Convention expressly stated that it was an attempt to revise the general laws 
and customs of war, which it thus recognized to be then existing; but by 1939 these rules 
laid down in the Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as 
being declaratoq of the laws and customs of war which are referred to in Article 6(b) of the 
Charter."); see also In re Matter of a Proposal for a Formal Request for Deferral to the 
Competence of the Tribunal Addressed to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
Respect of Radon Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, and Mico Stanisci, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (May 16, 1995), 1 64 (concluding that Article 3 of the 
Statute establishing the ICTY provides a non-exhaustive list of facts fitting within the rubric 
of "'laws or customs of war"' and are "not limited to those contained in the Hague 
Convention"). 
142. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, arts. 35(1), (2) (emphasis added). 
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banned by international law such as the use of poison or poison weapons, 
periidious killing, wounding or capturing enemy combatants, denying quarter, 
murdering prisoners of war or other detained persons, and attacks on civilians as 
The second subparagraph "reaffirms" the rule of the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Regulations and "expressly extends" its application to "methods of warfare" as 
well as the "weapons, projectiles and material" which were the subject of the rules 
in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regu1ati0ns.l~~ This subparagraph limits the means 
and methods of warfare a party may employ to those necessary for accomplishing 
the military objective: "The prohibition concerning the infliction of superfluous 
injury of unnecessary suffering is merely an implementing rule derived fiom the 
basic principles. ..prohibiting those measures of military violence, not othenvise 
prohibited by international law, which are not necessary (relevant and 
proportionate) to the achievement of a definite military ad~antage."'~~ 
This standard is vague. Military actors have to weigh the type of weapon 
and the method of employing it to determine whether it is "relevant and 
proportionate" to achieving "a definite military advantage." If the weapon, the 
method of employing it, or both are like using a sledgehammer to kill a fly, 
presumably the military actor has violated this subparagraph. Would, however, 
using an ordinary hammer violate the subparagraph, though a light fly swatter 
presumably would be a sufficient (and actually a more effective) method of 
achieving the objective? Line drawing in this context is ~ha1lenging.l~~ 
143. See BOTHE T AL., supra note 124, at 194; see also ICRC CO~IMENTARY, 
supra note 70, at 390. 
144. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 124, at 195; see also Bums M. Camahan, 
Unnecessary Suffering, the Red Cross and Tactical Laser Weapons, IS LOY. L.A. INT'L & 
COMP. L. REV. 705, 713 (1996) (noting that "[ilt has been observed that '[tlhe term 
"unnecessary suffering" implies that there is such a thing as "necessary suffering,"' because 
'the infliction of some suffering and injury are an inherent feature of armed conflict."' 
(citations omitted)); ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 409-10. 
145. BoTHE ET AL., supra note 124, at 195. The terms superfluous, suffering, and 
unnecessary injury are not defined. See Timothy McCormack, From Solfrino to Sarajevo: 
A Continuing Role for International Humanitarian Law?, 21 MELB. U.  L. REV. 621, 634 
(1997). 
146. At least one commentator suggests that this section should not be analogized 
to the rule of proportionality: 
mn the case of Hague Rules, Article 23(e) and the First Additional 
Protocol, Article 35 (2), which apply to suffering or injury inflicted on 
combatants and damage to material military objectives, the very idea of 
proportionality is irrelevant; the rule adopted by international law- 
making bodies that the suffering, injury or damage likely to result from a 
certain means or method of warfare is 'unnecessary' and 'superfluous' 
absolutely prohibits any recourse to that means or method, and hence 
excludes any evaluation of the proportional relationship between the 
suffering, injury or damage that would be caused if it were used and 'the 
concrete and direct military advantage' that might be 'anticipated.' 
Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering, 299 INT'L 
REV. RED CROSS 9S, 110 (1994). But see McCormack, supra note 145, at 635 (observing 
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The test is even actually more complex than the previous paragraph 
suggests. On the humanitarian side of the equation, the military actor needs to take 
into account the "painfulness or severity of lvounds, mortality rates, and the 
incidence of permanent damage or disfigurement and the feasibility of treatment 
under field  condition^."'^^ The military side of the equation involves the direct 
military advantage anticipated by using the weapon or method of combat. For 
example, if the military actor is attempting to disable the enemy's tanks, an anti- 
tank weapon designed to pierce several inches of armor might be used. No one 
could credibly claim that an artillery shell that is so designed would violate this 
Article. Yet such a weapon could inflict extraordinary suffering upon tank 
crews.'" Only if the military actor used an anti-tank weapon of this sort solely to 
kill troops without intending to disable armor might employment of that weapon 
violate this Article of the Protocol. Consequently, whether a military actor violates 
this Article depends greatly on the circumstances. Only a manifestly clear violation 
of this Article will likely be recognized. 
Employing cluster bombs in some circumstances may, however, meet this 
strict test. By all accounts, the BLU-97 submunition is an exceptionally powerful 
bomb. A single BLU-97 submunition sends 308 pieces of shrapnel at more than 
three times the speed of a bullet shot from an automatic rifle, each piece capable of 
causing injury at long distances.14' The submunition often inflicts fatal wounds on 
all within its direct path, those who survive generally lose one or more limbs. 
Physicians report never having had to treat such horrific wounds. The shrapnel is 
so small, 30 grains, that surgeons have great difficulty in removing it. Each 
submunition also contains a conical metal strip designed to penetrate seven inches 
(17.8 cm.) of armor. If it strikes a human being instead, it obviously would cause 
grave injuries if not death.''' The fragmentation cluster bomb meets the 
that, "the existence of the general prohibition [in Article 35 of the First Protocol] itself has 
never resulted in the prohibition of a specific weapons type"). The only way to stop the use 
of a weapon is to ban it outright. See id. 
147. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 124, at 196; see also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra 
note 70, at 40748,7111428-29. 
148. See Fritz Kalshoven, Conventional Weaponry: The Law from St. Petersburg 
lo Lucerne and Beyond, in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW, supra note 11 1, at 259 
(citing David Hughes-Morgan, U.K. Representative to the Geneva Convention drafting the 
Additional Protocols). The preamble to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration stated that in 
order to achieve military objectives it suffices to put enemy troops hors de combat rather 
than to kill them. Given the advances in artillery and aerial bombardment, that principle is 
now qualified. See BOTHE ET AL., supra note 124, at 196. 
149. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
150. One physician describes the extraordinary power of the BLU-97B 
submunition: 
Cluster bombs cause enormous pain and injury. A person standing a 
metre or two away from the cluster bomb gets the so-called 'air-blast' 
injuries, coming from a powerful air wave. The body remains mostly 
intact while internal organs like liver, brain or lungs are imploded 
inside." Parts of the exploding bombs cause severe injuries to people 
standing fifteen or twenty metres away, ripping apart their limbs or 
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humanitarian test for weapons causing superfluous suffering: cluster bombs cause 
"painfulness and sever[e] ... wounds"; those who are not killed by these weapons, 
suffer maiming, usually losing a limb. Thus there is a "high incidence" both of 
"mortality" and "disfigurement." Needless to say, the wounds caused by cluster 
bombs are so severe that "treatment under battlefield conditions" is hardly 
"feasible." 
Outside of nuclear weapons, biological weapons, or poison gas, it is hard 
to imagine a weapon more harmful to human beings than cluster bombs."' One 
could persuasively argue that these weapons are so deadly and so pernicious that 
the few who survive may envy the dead. Consequently, the case for holding that 
these weapons impose "superfluous injury" and "unnecessary suffering" is 
established regardless of the anticipated military advantage in employing them. 
The Protocol, however, does not so provide. 
Cluster bombs are typically used against airfields, trucks, and tanks, as 
well as troops. If used to defeat tanks, a well-recognized military objective, it may 
be difficult to demonstrate that given the armor that one has to penetrate to defeat a 
tank, that deploying this weapon so violates the Protocol. If deployed solely 
against troops on the ground, the case might be different. Conventional artillery 
shelling though clearly destructive does not necessarily wreak the same degree of 
destruction that is uniformly wrought by the wide swath of cluster bombs, wiping 
out or maiming all in their path. During the Gulf War, the Iraqi soldiers called 
cluster bombs steel rain, h m  which few emerge alive and virtually none 
hitting them into the stomach or head. Only those standing more than 
twenty metres away suffer minor injuries. 
Peric-Zionjic, supra note 55, 7 12 (quoting Dr. Miodrag Lazic, head of the surgical 
department at Nis University hospital). 
151. Incendiary weapons might qualify, but recall that cluster bombs are more 
"effective" against personnel than napalm. See Krepon, supra note 26, at 269. Furthermore, 
the BLU-97 bomblet is also an incendiary weapon. See supra notes 43-55 and 
accompanying text. Anti-personnel incendiary bombs were banned by the Third Protocol of 
the CCW: 
Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation 
effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour-piercing 
projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar 
combined-effects munitions in which the incendiary effect is not 
specifically designed to cause bum injury to persons, but to be used 
against military objectives, such a s  armoured vehicles, aircraft and 
installations or facilities. 
Protocol on Prohibitions of Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, U.N. 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, with 
h e x e d  Protocols, opened for signature, Apr. 10, 1981, art. l(l)@)(ii), 1342 U.N.T.S. 
137, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1287, 1523-26 (198O), and in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF 
War, supra note 27, at 485 (entered into force Dec. 2, 1983) [hereinafter Protocol on the 
Use of Incendiary Weapons]. 
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unscathed.I5' Modem weaponry, however, generally has amazing destructive 
power. 
Balancing the humanitarian concerns against the military ones, as 
required by the Protocol, does not yield a ready answer on  the fiagmentation 
cluster bomb. It is a horrific weapon, leaving death and grievous wounds in its 
huge wake. Logically, such a weapon should be deemed to  cause unnecessary 
suffering, particularly when directed solely against troops.lS3 International 
humanitarian law, however, does not conclusively so hold. When used against 
more hardened targets, international law almost certainly does not prohibit the 
weapon. To  bring the cluster bomb unquestionably under the rule of law requires a 
more specific ban. 
A Red Cross proposal to add more objective criteria to the superfluous 
suffering prohibition may help lend more precision to the legal analysis. In 
examining treaties that have banned weapons, a physician observed that by 
focusing on banning a particular weapon, these treaties left a wide loophole, 
- - - - - - 
152. See, e.g., Kennedy & Kincheloe, supra note 51, at 26 (noting that "the Iraqis 
referred to the grenade barrage as 'steel rain' or 'iron rain' because of the huge quantity 
delivered and impact pattern density, with grenades [cluster bombs] striking ev& few feet 
in the target area"). 
153. But even used against troops, it is not clear that the weapon violates Article 
35 of the Protocol: 
This last assertion, stating that a weapon is unlawful whenever 
unnecessary suffering would foreseeably occur in a simple majority of 
instances, is a more sweeping conclusion than the evidence warrants. 
The military value of a weapon in specific circumstances may be so 
great that it outweighs the fact that these circumstances were not present 
when the weapon produced the majority of casualties. Over the last 
eighty years, for example warplanes using small-caliber incendiary and 
explosive munitions have caused the vast majority of wounds during 
aerial strafing of ground forces, not during air-to-air combat. Yet the 
military value of such munitions in attacking other aircraft is so great 
that today no one would question the legality of their use by fighter 
aircraft. 
Carnahan, supra note 144, at 720. Militarily, the cluster bomb has considerable value. For 
example, against a platoon of tanks, it is 458% more effective than the Mark-82, a 500 lb. 
dumb bomb. See West, supra note 57, at 3 (also noting that the CBU-87 was 37% more 
effective than the Mark-82 against an infantry company, 35% more against a truck park, 
32% more effective against a truck column, and 220% more effective against a tank 
column. Only against an Armor Personnel Carrier (APC) platoon, an APC column, and 
aircraft on a ramp was the Mark-82 more effective.) Aside fiom the Mark series of bombs, 
another alternative to the cluster bomb is the concrete bomb. Note that the United States 
used this weapon in Iraq to limit civilian casualties "[ilf we have a target that-a specific 
target that we are very concerned about collateral damage." US. Dep't of Def, Briefing, 
Oct. 7, 1999 (statement of Gen. Shelton, Chairman on the Joint Chiefs of Staff), available 
at http:l/wm~v.fas.orgIne~vs/iraqIl999/10/t10071999~t007usac-iraq.htm; see also Lance 
Renfio, U.S. Using Concrete Bombs on Iraq, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 7, 1999, 7 8, 
available at http://\mmv.cnn.comn?ro~D/ meast/9910/07/us.iraq/ (last visited Apr. 5, 
2002). 
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allowing states to get around them.lS4 For example, an 1899 treaty outlawed dum- 
dum bullets because such bullets splay open, causing large wounds upon entering 
the body.lS5 The treaty, however, did not limit the velocity of bullets. Smaller 
bullets going at a higher rate of speed can cause wounds as large as those caused 
by dum-durn bullets. By the simple expedient of using faster bullets, states' armies 
circumvented the 1899 Convention.lS6 
The physician did not, however, suggest that the drafters of the 1899 
Convention should also have limited the speed of bullets. She proposed that the 
drafters should have concentrated not on the weapon, but on how the weapon 
affects the human body..''' Consequently, instead of outlawing dum-dum bullets, 
she would have banned any bullet that causes certain effects.Iss For example, 
projectiles could be prohibited if they are "of a nature to burst or deform while 
penetrating the human body, to tumble early in the human body, or to cause shock 
waves leading to extensive tissue damage or even a lethal shock."'5g In this vein, 
the Red Cross initiated the SIrUS Project, whose aim is to develop objective 
criteria for determining whether a weapon causes "unnecessary and superfluous 
Aside fiom criticizing the way the international community has gone 
abbut banning certain weapons, the SIrUS Project criticizes the Wecessary  and 
superfluous suffering" standard as being hopelessly vague and subjective. The Red 
154. See Robin M. Coupland, Xbe SIRUS Project: Towards a Determination of 
Which Weapons Cause "Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering", $ 3.5 (1997), 
available at http://~mm.redcross.org.au/ihl/articles/coupland~the~sims~roject~97.h~ 
(last visited Apr. 8,2002). 
155. See The Hague, act 4, declaration 3, July 29, 1899, reprinted in DOCUMENTS 
ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 27, at 39, available at http://~vww.icrc.org/ 
ML.NSF/52d68dl4de6160eOc12563da005fdblb/81ef87b37f70d8fac125641e003513al?Op 
enDocument. 
156. See Meyrowitz, supra note 146, at 118 (noting that commentators criticized 
"the small-calibre high-velocity weapons used by the United States Army during the 
Vietnam War as violating spirit, if not the letter, of the 1899 Convention"); see also id. at 
119 (quoting Giorgio Malinverni, Armes Conventionnelles Modernes Et Droit 
International, in XXX ANNIJAIRE SUISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 23, 47 (1974) (''Nigh 
velocity projectiles obviously belong to the category of weapons causing superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering."). 
157. See Coupland, supra note 154, at 12. 
158. Seeid. 
159. Meyrowitz, supra note 146, at 118 (quoting GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTRY, 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS-MANUAL 7 407 (1992)). The ICRC report on 
weapons that cause unnecessary suffering states, "Because of the tendency of high velocity 
projectiles to tumble and become deformed in the body, and to set up especially intense 
hydrodynamic shock waves, the wounds which they cause may resemble those of dumdum 
bullets." Id. at 1 19 (quoting INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WEAPONS THAT WY CAUSE 
UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFF CTS: REPORT ON THE WORK OF 
EXPERTS 39 (1973)). 
160. Id. at 119. 
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Cross proposes that the standard be interpreted to include whether the design of the 
weapon foreseeably causes the following: 
Criterion I .  specific disease, specific abnormal physiological state, 
specific abnormal psychological state, specific and permanent disability 
or specific di~figurement.'~' 
Criterion 2. a field mortality of more than 25% or hospital mortality of 
more than 5%.Ih2 
Criterion 3. Grade 3 wounds as measured by the Red Cross wound 
classification. ("Grade 3 denotes skin wounds of 10 cm or more with a 
cavity.")163 
Criterion 4. effects for which there is no well-recognized and proven 
treat~nent.'~~ 
If the international community agreed that these criteria determined 
whether a weapon should be banned for causing ''unnecessary and superfluous 
injury," then cluster bombs would be banned Cluster bombs fall squarely under 
the first three criteria. Cluster bomb submunitions are so powefil that few survive 
the attack. If troops are unluclq enough to be within the footprint of a CBU-87B, 
for example, most will die. The mortality rate is unquestionably higher than the 
twenty-five percent set forth in criterion two. A high percentage of those who 
survive will suffer permanent disability, usually the loss of a limb, criterion one. 
Cluster bombs cause gaping wounds, easily satisfying criterion three.16' 
Unfortunately, current legal interpretations of "superfluous and 
unnecessary injury" do not embrace the SIrUS criteria.'66 Nonetheless, a noted 
commentator has observed that "[allthough weapons or means of warfare are 
seldom prohibited on the sole basis of their incompatibility with such general 
principles as those of humanity or the dictates of public conscience, a sense of 
abhoq-ence of a particular weapon can be an important factor in the development 
of treaty  prohibition^."'^' The SIrUS criteria may help to generate a "sense of 
161. See Coupland, supra note 154, at 12-13. 
162. See id. at 13. 
163. Of the wounds that conventional weapons inflict, less than ten percent fall 
into the Red Cross's Grade 3 category, exceptionally large wounds. See id. at 14. 
164. See Coupland, supra note 154, at 13. 
165, The ICRC wound grading scheme is as follows: Grade 1 denotes skin 
wounds of less than 10 cm without a cavity; Grade 2 denotes skin wounds of less than 10 
cm but with a cavity; Grade 3 denotes skin wounds of 10 cm or more with a cavity. It is not 
possible to establish a precise correlation between grade and energy deposit nor between 
grade and type of weapon. See id. 
166. See Carnahan, supra note 144, at 732 (observing that "[nlone of the criteria 
cited there [in the SIrUS project] refer to the military value of the weapon. As demonstrated 
earlier, such an approach fmds no support in state practice or other accepted sources of 
international law."). 
167. Theodor Meron, i%e Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates 
of Public Conscience, 94 AM. J .  INT'L L. 79,83-84 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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abhorrence" for cluster bombs. If such a sense leads to a ban on cluster bombs, that 
would constitute a significant advance in international humanitarian law. 
rn. THE CLUSTER BOMB, NATO's AIR CAMPAIGN, AND A TREATY 
ATTEMPTING TO PROTECT CIVILIANS FROM MODERN LAND AND 
AIR WARFARE 
A. The 1977Additional ProtocolIto the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
Although the cluster bomb may not yet be classified as a weapon 
inflicting superfluous injury, the typical manner in which it is used may run afoul 
of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. That Protocol arose 
out of the world's experience with air warfare in the first 75 years of the last 
century. In 1938 after the Luftwaffe's and Mussolini's Air Force's bombing in 
Spain and similar types of indiscriminate bombing by Japan in China,'6s the 
League of Nations unanimously issued a resolution "concerning Protection of 
Civilian Population Against Bombing from the Air in Case of War": 
1. The intentional bombing of the civilian population is illegal; 
2. Objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military 
objectives and must be identifiable; 
3. Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out 
in such a way that civilian populations in the neighborhood are not 
bombed through negligence.. ..Id9 
Germany and the Allied Powers ignored the Resolution in World War 11. 
Some commentators assert that the Resolution constitutes customary international 
law and is thus binding on belligerents regardless of their adherence to treaty."' 
168. See IAN BROIVNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, TATE RESPONSIBILITY 
(PART I) 113-14 (1983) (quoting United States Diplomatic Note from the American 
Ambassador in Tokyo to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Protesting Japanese 
Indiscriminate Bombing of Nanking, Sept. 22, 1937); MICHAEL SHALLER, THE UNITED 
STATES AND CHINA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 50 (1979). 
169. L. Doswald-Beck, supra note 111, at 167 n.32 (citing Paper on the 
Protection of Civilian Populations Against Air Bombardment, League of Nations Doc. 
A.69, 1938, IX (1938)); see Fenrick, supra note 134, at 97 (quoting D. SCHINDLER & J. 
TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 162 (2d ed. 1981) (quoting the 1938 League of 
Nations Resolution concerning Protection of Civilian Population Against Bombing). 
170. Explaining that there are three principles of customary international law 
applicable in land, sea, or air warfare, Prime Minister A.N. Chamberlain stated: 
In the first place, it is against international law to bomb civilians as such 
and to make deliberate attacks upon civilian populations. In the second 
place, targets which are aimed at from the air must be legitimate military 
objectives and must be capable of identification. In the third place, 
reasonable care must be taken in attacking those military objectives, so 
that, by carelessness, a civilian population in the neighborhood is not 
bombed. 
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But given the manner in which aerial and artillery bombardment has been 
conducted throughout the world since 1938, at best one can conclude that at least 
as of 1976 this asserted custom was "fragile."'7' 
In 1956 at the XEth  International Conference of the Red Cross, the 
participants adopted Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the 
Civilian Population in Time of War.I7' Although ignored by states at the time, the 
Rules contain the seeds of a treaty later adopted by most countries. The Rules 
require military commanders to identify and target only military objectives: 
Art. 8. The person responsible for ordering or launching an attack 
shall first of all: (a) make sure that the objective, or objectives, to be 
attacked are military objectives withiin the meaning of the present 
rules, and are duly identified.'" 
The commanders are directed to choose military objectives that least 
threaten civilians and consider the "loss and destruction" that an attack "is liable to 
inflict on civilians."'" The Rule then sets forth the customary international law 
proportionality principle prohibiting a military actor from attacking, "if, after due 
consideration, it is apparent that the loss and destruction would be disproportionate 
to the military advantage anticipated.. . ."I7' 
The next Rule requires that military commanders should choose weapons 
that minimize civilian casualties and use the weapons in a manner likely to prevent 
civilian losses, particularly stressing the need for precision bombing in populated 
areas: 
In particular, in towns and other places with a large civilian 
population, which are not in the vicinity of military or naval 
operations, the attack shall be conducted with the greatest degree of 
L.R. Penna, Customary International Law and Protocol I: An Analysis of Some Provisions, 
in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS 
PRINCIPLES 200 (1984) (quoting with approval Prime Minister Chamberlain's statement of 
the rule of customary international law and noting that his statement was later codified in a 
unanimously adopted League of Nations Resolution, quoted supra note 169 and 
accompanying text). This work provides a useful discussion of the customary rules 
protecting civilians. I guess my problem with custom is that all sides violated these rules in 
every war since World War I1 and possibly since WWI. If every side violates a rule over a 
long period of time, the so-called custom appears weak, to say the least. 
171. See L. Dostvald-Beck, supra note 11 1, at 145. 
172. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Draft Rules for the Limitation of Dangers 
Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, fl 1 (1956), available at 
http:l/wvw.icrc.or~ihl.11~B73cb71d18dc4372741256739003e63721fea0b928100 135~125 
63cd002d6c10?0penDocument (last visited Apr. 5,2002) [hereinafter Draft Rules]. 
173. See id.; see also Fenrick, supra note 134, at 97 (quoting Draft Rules, supra 
note 172, art. 8(a)). 
174. Fenrick, supra note 134, at 97 (quoting Draft Rules, supra note 172, art. 
8(a), @)I. 
175. Id. 
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precision. It must not cause losses or destruction beyond the 
immediate surroundings of the objective attacked.'76 
Ten years later, the United Nations International Conference on Human 
Rights held in Teheran passed a resolution seeking "additional humanitarian 
international conventions ... to ensure the better protection of  civilian^."'^ That 
same year the U.N. General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution stating that 
"it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such" and that a 
"distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in hostilities 
and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as 
much as po~sible."'~~ The General Assembly passed a similar resolution the 
following year.17' 
In 1973, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) submitted 
the text of two draft Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventi~ns. '~~ These 
became the working documents of an international conference convened by the 
Swiss Federal Council in 1974."' A principal purpose of the Conference was to 
deal with the "methods and means of combat," the law governing which had 
remained unchanged since the 1907 Hague Conferen~e.'~~ 
Conferences on humanitarian law often respond to perceived abuses in 
recent wars. This conference was no exception. The Second World War, Korea, 
Vietnam, Bangladesh, the Middle East, Nigeria, and Japan's invasion of China 
presented an array of examples that many believed the conference had to 
address.lg3 Protecting civilians fiom armed conflict became one of the key themes 
of the conference. 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 emerged fiom 
the Conference. Section N of Protocol I, the longest of the sections, is devoted to 
protecting civilians.184 The Protocol addresses many of the problems modem 
weaponry and aircraft pose for the civilian population. 
176. Id. 
177. L. Doswald-Beck, supra note 111, at 150 (citing Resolution XXIII adopted 
by the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 12th May 1968). 
178. Id. 
179. See id. at 154 (citing U.N. G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR (1970)). 
180. See BOTHE T AL., supra note 124, at 4. 
181. See id. One hundred twenty-four States participated the first year of the 
Conference; 120 in the second; 107 in the third; and 109 in the fourth. The Conference met 
for several months each year fiom 1974 to 1977. 
182. Id. at 2. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) explains the 
difference between methods and means of combat: "The term 'means of combat' or 'means 
of warfare' (cf: Article 35-'Basic rules') generally refers to the weapons being used, while 
the expression 'methods of combat' generally refers to the way in which such weapons are 
used." ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 621, fi 1957. 
183. See Hans Peter Gasser, A BriefAnalysis of the Geneva Protocols, 19 &ON 
L. REV. 525,525 (1986); see also SHALLER, supra note 168, at 50. 
184. See Additional Protocol I ,  supra note 134, art. 48. 
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World War 11 enshrined the concept of total namely, that the 
civilian infrastructure that helps play a part in developing the technology used in 
the warfare is fair game.Is6 Since civilians themselves work in institutions that 
ultimately play some role in the war effort, killing civilians is an acceptable war 
aim. When one accepts the concept of total war, destroying everything that even 
remotely contributes to the war effort in highly developed societies inevitably 
seems justified. Parallel to this notion is the idea of acceptable "collateral damage," 
an Onvellian euphemism for killing, maiming, and wounding civilians when 
attempting to bomb "military targets." 
Some commentators suggested that "quasi-combatants" could be made 
the subject of attack.'" Quasi-combatants, for example, would be civilians working 
in important industries for the war effort. Under this theory, these civilians 
presumably could be killed in their homes as a lawful military objective. Major 
General Ira Eaker, commander of the Eighth Air Force in World War 11, stated: 
"The material destruction by these overcast attacks in workmen's homes and in 
harbor facilities and allied war industries is considerable and is certainly alone 
worth the effort."1s8 The quasi-combatant notion essentially legitimizes the concept 
of total war. 
Additional Protocol I completely rejects this notion. The Protocol broadly 
defines civilians as anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or who is not 
othenvise actively participating in the conflict.189 The definition also prohibits 
185. See WORMSER, supra note 121, at 543. 
186. See SPAIGHT, supra note 126, at 272 (quoting J.C. Ford, S.J., for the 
proposition that target area bombing or "obliteration bombing" of large sections of cities 
"leads ... to the immoral barbarity of total war"); Sacharoff, supra note 125, at 72 
(explaining that "'[t]otal war' describes strategies, tactics, and weapons that result in 
wholesale destruction of cities and a great part of populations"'). 
187. See, e.g., L. Doswald-Beck, supra 111, at 147 (citing J. STONE, LEGAL 
C O ~ J O L S  OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 630-3 1 (1954)). 
188. CRANE, supra note 125, at 67 (quoting Maj. Gen. Ira Eaker, commanding the 
Eighth Air Force in World War 11. Eaker was "especially enthusiastic" about nonvisual 
attacks occurring at night or in overcast skies, using primitive radar systems.). Maj. General 
James Doolittle, wvho later commanded the Eighth Air Force, opposed non-visual bombing 
and urged only precision bombing. See id. at 72. 
189. The Protocol deiines "civilian" negatively, namely, as one who neither is a 
member of the armed forces nor is othenvise taking an active part in the conflict: 
1. A civilian is any person wvho does not belong to one of the categories 
of persons referred to in Article 4 A(l), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third 
Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a 
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian. 
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 
3. The presence within the civilian population of individual's wvho do not 
come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of 
its civilian character. 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. SO. This broad definition of civilian has drawn 
sharp criticism. See, e.g., Parks, supra note 124, at 116-35; Lt. Col. Bums M. Camahan, 
Additional Protocol I: A Military View, 19 AKRON L. REV. 543,544-46 (1986). 
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attacking a civilian population solely because some combatants mingle with the 
civilian populat i~n. '~~ Consequently, attacking villages in which some guerrilla 
fighters are known to congregate is prohibited."' 
Furthermore, the Protocol addresses other consequences of aerial and 
artillery bombardment. Additional Protocol I does not ban any conventional 
weapons; it does, however, prohibit the way conventional weapons may be used.192 
First, the civilian population itself, as well as individual civilians, "shall not be the 
object of attack."'" The Lufbvaffe's bombing of Guemica thus would have been 
prohibited by this provision. Second, tenor bombing is likewise banned.lg4 
Britain's strategy of massive night bombing of German cities to break civilian 
morale in World War II and Saddam Hussein's employing Scud Missiles to bomb 
Israel during the Gulf War would be prohibited under this p ro~ is ion . '~~  Third, the 
Protocol prohibits "indiscriminate attacks." Article 51(4) defines such attacks as 
follows: 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot 
be directed at a specific military objective; or 
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of 
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and 
190. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 51(7). 
191. Seeid. 
192. In 1974, the International Committee of the Red Cross convened a 
conference in Lucerne to attempt to form a multi-lateral treaty to ban certain anti-personnel 
weapons, namely, cluster bombs, flechettes, incendiary bombs, air laid landmines, and 
tumbling projectiles of small caliber weapons. To the surprise of many, the experts were 
sharply divided on the desirability of abolishing these conventional weapons. See Frits 
Kalshoven, The Solider and his Golf Clubs, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 382 (Int'l Cornrn. of the Red Cross ed., 
1984) (citing Chapter IV of the Official Report of the Lucerne Conference)); see also 
PROKOSCH, supra note 19, at 150-55; Frits Kalshoven, Conventional Weaponry: The Law 
from St. Petersburg to Lucerne and Beyond, in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW, supra 
note 111, at 265. Consequently, it was agreed that there would be a subsequent U.N. 
conference dealing with specific conventional weapons. See PROKOSCH, supra note 19, at 
149, 150. This latter conference resulted in a convention, entitled, U.N. Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, with Annexed 
Protocols, opened for signature, Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 
1287, 1523-26 (1980), and in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF War, supra note 27, at 473 
(entered into force Dec. 2, 1983) (Protocols I & 11 ratified by the United States on Mar. 24, 
1995) @ereinafter Convention on Conventional Weapons]. 
193. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 51(2). 
194. See id. art. 51(2): "Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which 
is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited." Id. 
195. See CRANE, supra note 125, at 18. 
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consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military 
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.lg6 
B. WI2etlzer Ktzowiizgly Delivering "Dud" Cluster Bombs Violates Additional 
Protocol I 
I .  An Indiscriminate Weapon? 
The issue here is whether knowingly bombarding an area with cluster 
bombs coupled with knowledge of their substantial dud rate fails to discriminate 
military targets from civilians. Subparagraph (b) of Article 5 l(4) refers to "blind" 
weapons which "cannot be directed at a specific military obje~tive."'~' Attaching 
incendiary bombs to free flying balloons, as the Japanese did in World War 11, or 
using rocket bombs with crude guidance systems, as the Germans did with their V2 
rockets, would violate this ~ubparagraph.''~ Such blind weapons by their nature or 
by the manner in which they are used cannot be accurately targeted to 
discriminate behveen civilians and military objectives. Unrecorded and unmarked 
minefields of mines without reliable self-destruct mechanisms violate 
subparagraph (b): 
The true problem with manually emplaced mines of obsolete design 
is that they may remain active and in place for many years after 
their military purpose has passed into history. Unless all feasible 
precautions, such as recording, marking or other warning and mine 
removal, are taken to reduce the danger to civilians, such minefields 
could offend against paragraph 4(b) as blind weapons which are 
indiscriminate as to time.''' 
196. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 51(4) (emphasis added). The 
Additional Protocol applies only to international conflicts. See id. art. l(3) (incorporating by 
reference common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949). The Kosovo intervention, 
however, was an international conflict. In any event, there is a recent trend to~vards 
eliminating the distinctions in international humanitarian law behveen internal and 
international conflicts. See Wiebe, supra note 32, at 100 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (I.C.T.Y. 1995) 
(No. IT-94-I), available at http://~nnv.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm) (applying customary 
international law both to internal and international conflicts)). 
197. Id. art. 51(4)(b) (emphasis added); see BOTHE TAL., supra note 124, at 305. 
Subparagraph (a) means aiming at other than a "specific military objective" or aiming 
randomly. See BOTHE T AL., supra note 124, at 305. The Protocol does not define "military 
objective" as narrowly as do the 1923 Rules on Aerial Warfare, but it does qualify the term: 
"military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose 
or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage." Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 52(2). 
198. See B o r n  ET AL., supra note 124, at 305; see also ICRC COMMENTARY, 
supra note 70, at 621, fi 1958. 
199. See BOTHE ET AL., supra note 124, at 308 (emphasis added). Note that the 
principle of discrimination is part of customary international law. Additional Protocol I, 
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The dud cluster bomb is virtually identical to an unmarked and unmapped 
mine without modem self-destruct  mechanism^?^^ As noted above, a minimum of 
five percent of the bomblets are duds. They fail to go off either on delivery or 
impact. This failure, however, does not mean these duds are harmless. A slight 
vibration can set them off. As noted above, every CBU-87B dropped has a 
minimum of 10-11 dud bomblets to a maximum of 60-62 dud b0mblets.2~' The 
effects of the unexploded bomblets "cannot be limited as required by this 
Protocol":202 the bomblets can blow up at any time, even years after their initial 
attempted use. Furthermore they "are of a nature to strike military objectives or 
civilian objectives without distinction7': in other theaters, civilians, most often 
children, have been primary victims of dud cluster bombs, because of the cluster 
bomb's attractive color and sizeFo3 Unlike mines, the military force dropping the 
cluster bomb has no idea precisely where the dud cluster bomblets have come to 
earth. Although armies presumably know where they planted the mines and 
presumably can provide maps to help de-mine an area, the United States Air Force 
cannot provide a similar service either for the Serbs or for the Kosovars or even for 
the NATO-led Kosovo Force troops (K-FOR)?04 By releasing cluster bombs, 
however, fleshes out the meaning of the principle. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 70, 
at 598600,621-22,171863-1875,195940. 
200. Bothe suggested that mines that are obvious and contain self-destruct 
mechanisms might escape the proscription of Article 51. See BOTHE ETAL., supra note 124, 
at 308. Although most dud cluster bombs lie on the surface many hide in the mud, 
undergrowth, water or building roofs. As of this writing, no U.S. cluster bomblets 
(submunitions) have self-destruct mechanisms. None did that were dropped on Kosovo and 
Serbia. (Gator mines, wvhich were not used in Kosovo, do have self-destruct mechanisms.) 
See Federation of American Scientists, CBU-78 GATOR, 7 1, available at 
http://wwwv.fas.org/man/dod-lOl/sys/d~ (last visited Apr. 5,2002). 
201. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text. 
202. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 51(5)(c). Subparagraph (c) creates 
a standard that is less precise than the previous subsection banning blind weapons. 
Subparagraph (c) prohibits a "method or means of combat the effects of wvhich cannot be 
limited as required by this Protocol; ...." Because the bomblets have no self-destruct 
mechanism, as currently constituted, "the effects of cluster bombs cannot be limited as 
required by this Protocol." Id. 
203. Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs Memorandum For Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCFPJ Delegates, 7 6 (1999) (noting its previous documenting that 
1220 Kuwaiti and 400 Iraqi civilians were killed and another 2500 injured in the first hvo 
years after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War by an estimated 1.2 million cluster bomb 
duds, which saw the most extensive use of cluster bombs in history"), available at 
http://ww\~.hnv.org/about/projectsla~~nslmemo-cluster.h (last visited Apr. 5, 2002) 
[hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs Memorandum]; see also TicXing Time 
Bombs, supra note 55,72, available at http://www.hnv.org/reports/1999/nato2/. 
204. The U.N. clearance crews confirmed this inability to precisely mark the 
footprint of cluster bombs dropped on Kosovo: 'WATO gave us information about wvhere 
they thought they dropped them. These were detailed grid references, but many turned out 
not to be correct," stated John Flanagan, a colonel from New Zealand, who heads the U.N!s 
Mine Action Coordination Centre in Kosovo. Jonathan Steele, Kosovo: One year On: 
Unexploded Bombs: Death Lurk in the Fields Kosovo Tries to Clean Up After Air Strikes, 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 14, 2000, available at http://w~v.scienceforpeace.sa.utoronto.cd 
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NATO (or any other military force employing this weapon) can provide only 
general ccprecautions." It cannot "record, mark [and provide clear] warnings" 
because it  does not know exactly either the number of duds or the places where 
they landed. This incapacity underlines the indiscriminate nature of cluster bombs, 
making their use, except in remote areas, generally illegal under all but a narrow 
reading of the P r o t o ~ o l ? ~ ~  
Defenders of cluster bombs might argue that dud cluster bombs are 
merely unexploded ordnance (UXO), a problem common to all modem military 
conflicts, and that alone such UXO do not constitute a violation of  humanitarian 
That UXO is common does not necessarily render it acceptable under 
modem humanitarian law. The foreseeably high dud rate, the small size of the 
cluster bomblets, their ability to hide themselves in the mud, water and 
undergrowth, the extreme sensitivity of their fuzes, their attractiveness to children, 
their extraordinary powerful destructive effects despite their size, all put the dud 
cluster bomb in another category as compared to most other unexploded 
~rdnance?~ '  A recent call to train troops much more thoroughly about dud cluster 
FrontPageFileslDeathLurks.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002). Further quoting Colonel 
Flanagan and explaining the UXO problem, the Article continues: 
They may have intended to drop six bombs on one target and four go off 
somewhere else, as much as one kilometre fiom the intended spot. The 
UN coordinates the work of several civilian demining teams. As well as 
falling wide, about 28,000 of the deadly canisters failed to explode. If 
they stay on the surface and can be seen, they can be detonated by 
putting an explosive charge beside them. But most go through the soil 
and are lying between lOcm and 20cm underground, ready to blast a 
tractor or a person who steps on one. When hidden, they are far harder to 
detect and dispose of than ordinary landmines. "[Flanagan also stated 
that] NATO doesn't want to create a precedent for cleaning up in post- 
conflict situations. They first made this clear in the Gulf war. [The Gulf 
war cleanup] cost $700m, but luckily the Kuwaitis could pay.. .. Kosovo, 
by contrast, is poor and much more heavily populated than the Kuwaiti 
desert. My personal opinion is that if they're going to use these kinds of 
weapons, they have to recognize there is a poshvar environmental effect. 
Id. 
205. If cluster bombs were dropped in a remote area such as a desert where 
civilians cannot reasonably be expected to visit or use, there might not be a danger of 
indiscriminate civilian casualties. Nonetheless, approximately 1600 Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
civilians were killed in the twa years after Desert Storm fiom unexploded ordnance, 
especially dud cluster bombs. See Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs Memorandum, 
supra note 203, 1 4, available at http:l/~wwv.hnv.org/about~projectsla~mdmemo- 
cluster.ht-m. 
206. See Kennedy & Kincheloe, supra note 51, at 29. "Dud munitions, regardless 
of the percentage that may fail to function as designed (that is, the so-called dud rate), 
always cause problems. Uncleared land remains hazardous and uninhabitable. Millions of 
British and German landmines laid in 1942 are still on the ground in Libya, notably around 
Tobmk." Id. 
207. Human Rights Watch points out that the sheer number of bomblets dropped 
causes major humanitarian law issues, given the foreseeable dud rate. For example, at least 
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bombs demonstrates that the military views cluster bombs as different fiom other 
UX0.Zop 
Furthermore, the toy-like appearance of the bomblets violates the spirit of 
another treaty, The Mine Protocol to the Convention Prohibiting Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW)?09 That Protocol prohibits the use "in all 
circumstances" of "booby-traps which are in any way attached to or associated 
with.. .children 's toys.. . .'"I0 Presumably, the designers of the bomblet did not 
intend it to be attractive to children. The yellow color presumably is used to help 
clearance crews find dud bomblets. The small parachute serves an important 
orienting and arming hc t ion .  Under general principles of criminal law, however, 
an actor may still be considered to have acted intentionally when he or she hopes 
that an injury will not occur yet knows to a practical certainty that it Thus, 
even though neither the designers who made the bomblets, nor the Generals who 
ordered their use, nor the pilots who delivered these bombs may have intended the 
harm, they would still be acting intentionally because they knew that it is 
practically certain that a deadly device made to look like a toy will be picked up by 
children. 
Aside from constituting an indiscriminate weapon, the dud cluster bomb 
after landing violates the proportionality principle set forth in Article 51 of the 
~rotocol? '~ Article 51 provides two examples of military force that fails to 
a million and a half bomblets failed to go off and lay on the ground in Desert Storm. See 
Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, supra note 83, 7 6, available at 
http://w\mv.hrw.org/ backgrounder/anns/cluster-bckl03 l.htm#kosovo. See also infra notes 
234-238 and accompanying text regarding how such duds affect the environment. 
208. See Wright, supra note 77. Dud cluster bombs are, however, comparable to 
one type of UXO: unmarked mines. Failing to remove either unmarked mines or dud cluster 
bombs violates Additional Protocol I. 
209. See generally Convention on Conventional Weapons, supra note 192. 
210. Id. arts. 2(2), (6)(l)(v) (emphasis added); see also G ~ m m  MINISTRY OF 
DEF., supra note 159, at 39-40, fi 415. The NATO countries, including the United States, 
have ratified the Second Protocol to the CCW. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, States 
That Have Adhered to the Convention and Annexed Protocols (2001), available at 
http://gvalnwb2.icrc.org/icrceng.nsE/Scacf48ca698b64l256242003b3295/174d6fbfX970b6 
48. An Amended Protocol II, which generally strengthens the anti-mine provisions of the 
original Protocol, has been adopted; it retains virtually verbatim the proscription against 
booby traps "associated" with toys. See Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 
192, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and other 
Devices as Amended (Amended Protocol 11), Oct. 13, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1206 (1996), art. 
7(e), transmitted to the Senate by President Clinton, Jan. 7, 1997, available at 1997 LtrL 
49691. 
21 1. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE 3 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (2000). But see infra note 366 
for a discussion of the argument that since an adjoining Protocol to the CCW expressly 
excludes from its ban incendiary weapons such as the Combined Effects Munition (like the 
BLU-97), the drafters presumably did not intend to ban cluster submunitions in the 
accompanying Mine Protocol. 
212. The proportionality principle also appears in Article 57(2)@) of Additional 
Protocol I. See infra notes 340-41 and accompanying text. 
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discriminate properly between military objectives and ~ivilians.2'~ The second 
example is most relevant here.2I4 It refines the proportionality standard rather than 
presenting a concrete case. This example codifies the customary international law 
rule on proportionality, making indiscriminate: "(b) an attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.. .."215 
This provision was controversial and was contentiously debated by the 
members of the drafting ~onference.2'~ The standard is vague and subject to abuse. 
How does one weigh the importance of a military objective as against anticipated 
"incidental" civilian casualties? As a practical matter, it can be expected only to 
apply to flagrant misconduct, misconduct where, in essence reasonable minds 
cannot differ as to the disproportionate use of force.217 The incendiary bombing of 
213. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 51(5)(a), (b). 
214. See id. art. 51(5)(b). 
215. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 51(5)(b). Including the rule of 
proportionality was an attempt to gain flexibility and also adherents to the Protocol to avoid 
the fate of the 1923 Rules of Aerial Warfare: 
Since the First World War there had been many vain attempts at 
codifying the immunity of the civilian population. The 1922123 project 
prafi Rules of Aerial Warfare] would have required combatants to 
abstain from bombing when it might affect the civilian population, but a 
good text was useless if it went unsigned, unratified and unimplemented. 
The Red Cross was conscious of the fact that the rule of proportionality 
contained a subjective element, and was thus liable to abuse. The aim 
was, however, to avoid or in any case restrict the incidental effects of 
attacks directed against military objectives. 
LEVIE, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS supra note 131, at 126-27 (statement of Mirimanoff- 
Chilikine of the ICRC). 
216. See LEVIE, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 131, at 129-73 ('[Ilt would 
be impossible to prove that the military advantage expected was in fact disproportionate.") 
(comment of Mr. Al-Adhami (Iraq), id. at 133). But see id. at 134 ("An absolute prohibition 
would result in a very difficult situation, for instance where there was a single civilian near 
a major military objective whose presence might deter attack.") (comment of Mr. Samuels 
(Canada)). 
217. See Allen, supra note 19, at 43-46 (Frits Kalshoven, panelist, discussing the 
doctrine of proportionality, noting the "notoriously vague notion of 'military necessity"' 
and the difficulty of balancing it against humanitarian values); see ako BOTHE T AL., supra 
note 124, at 310 (noting the difficulties of balancing the importance of the military target 
and foreseeable extent of civilian casualties andlor damage to civilian objects and 
concluding that "a plain and manifest breach of the rule will be recognizable"). In the 
KupresXic Judgment, the ICTY Trial Chamber addressed the issue of proportionality as 
follows: 
In the case under discussion, [the Martens clause would mean] that the 
prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 (and of the corresponding customary 
rules) must be interpreted so as to construe as narrowly as possible the 
discretionarypower to attack belligerents and, by the same token, so as 
to expand the protection accorded to civilians.. . . 
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Tokyo during World War 11 might fit here, since though the bombing was 
purportedly designed to reach military targets, General Curtis LeMay ordered the 
attack, knowing that thousands of civilians would be killed?'s He defended the 
attack on the ground that the cottage industries in Japan where work was done at 
home justified targeting civilians in their d\~ellings?'~ The incendiary bombing of 
Tokyo cost the lives of  well over 80,000 civilians.u0 
526. As an example of the way in which the Martens clause may be 
utilized, regard might be had to considerations such as the cumulative 
effect of attacks on military objectives causing incidental damage to 
civilians. In other words, it may happen that single attacks on military 
objectives causing incidental damage to civilians, although they may 
raise doubts as to their lawfulness, nevertheless do not appear on their 
face to fall foul per se of the loose prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 (or 
of the corresponding customary rules). However, in case of repeated 
attacks, all or most of them falling within the grey area between 
indisputable legality and unlawfitlness, it might be warranted to 
conclude that the cumulative effect of such acts entails that they may not 
be in keeping with international law. Indeed, this pattern of military 
conduct may turn out to jeopardize excessively the lives and assets of 
civilians, contrary to the demands of humanity. 
Kupreskic et al., Case No: IT-95-16-T (Int'l Crim. Tribunal Former Yugoslavia 2000), 
paras. 524-26 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The Report to the ICTY Prosecutor on the NATO bombing campaign criticized 
the tribunal reasoning: 
This formulation in Kupreskic can be regarded as a progressive 
statement of the applicable law with regard to the obligation to protect 
civilians. Its practical import, however, is somewhat ambiguous and its 
a~~licat ion far from clear. It is the committee's view that where 
A A 
individual (and legitimate) attacks on military objectives are concerned, 
the mere cumulating of such instances, all of which are deemed to have 
been lawful cannot ipso facto be said to amount to a crime. The 
committee understands the above formulation, instead, to refer to an 
overall assessment of the totality of civilian victims as against the goals 
of the military campaign. 
REPORT O THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 23, at f i  52. 
218. See CRANE, supra note 125, at 133. 
219. See id. 
All you had to do was visit one of those targets after we'd roasted it, and 
see the ruins of a multitude of tiny houses, with a drill press sticking up 
through the wreckage of every home. The entire population got into the 
act and worked to make those airplanes or munitions of war ... men, 
women, children. We knew we were going to kill a lot of women and 
kids when we burned that town. Had to be done. 
Id. (quoting General Curtis LeMay). The ICRC gives this example of disproportionate 
bombardment: "The presence of a soldier on leave obviously cannot justify the destruction 
of a village." ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 684. 
220. The incendiary bombardment by American planes on the night of March 9, 
1945 covered six important industrial targets and numerous smaller factories, railroad 
yards, home industries, and cable plants, "but it also included one of the most densely 
populated areas of the world, Asakita Ku, with a population of more than 135,000 people 
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This codified rule of proportionality, however, easily applies to clearing 
dud cluster bombs. After the conflict is over, a military force, here NATO, can 
hardly claim to "anticipaten ... a concrete and direct military advantage" in 
maintaining the dud cluster bombs in the ground. Their presence endangers 
civilians and in many cases prevents civilians fiom using such civilian objects as 
fields, forests, and parks. Since after the conflict there is no "concrete and direct" 
military advantage to keeping the dud cluster bombs, there is no need to balance 
the military objective against the civilian one. 
Defenders of using cluster bombs might argue that the prohibition in 
Article 51(5) applies only to "attacks." The Protocol, however, defines "attacks" 
broadly: "'Attacks' mean acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence 
or in This definition of attacks "appl[ies] to any land, sea or air warfare 
which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians, or civilian objects on 
land."uz Dropping dud cluster bombs with sensitive fuzes that can detonate with a 
slight vibration is an "act of violence." Delivering dud cluster bombs certainly 
"may affect the civilian population and individual civilians." If lodged in a civilian 
object, a dud cluster bomb could prevent civilians fiom using it or if the dud 
explodes, it could seriously damage the object. 
One question is whether the attack occurs within the narrow time frame of 
the launch of the cluster bomb or within a broader time fiame. One authority 
answers this question in the context of whether placing mines is an "attack" within 
the meaning of the Protocol: 
Some authorities express the view that the emplacement of mines is 
not an attack as that term is defined in Art. 50 [art. 491 because no 
act of violence occurs until the mine is actuated by the presence of 
persons or vehicles. This seems to be specious reasoning. There is 
nothing in Art. 50(1) [49(1)] which excludes a delayed act of 
violence fiom the definition. In any event, the laying of a minefield 
is a military operation within the meaning of Art. 48.U3 
per square mile." CRANE, supra note 125, at 132. An estimated 90,000 to 100,000 people 
were killed in the raid See id. Apparently, the incendiary bombs destroyed about one 
quarter of the buildings in Tokyo. See MrcRosoF~ 98 ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, Air 
IVarfare, World War I1 (1 998). 
221. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 49(1); see also ICRC 
CO~~~ENTARY,  supra note 70, at 622 (''Plrorn the legal point of view the use of mines 
constituted an attack in the sense of the Protocol when a person was directly endangered by 
such a mine, [meaning the attack could take place years after hostilities have ceased]. It 
may be considered that mines also come within the scope of subparagraph (c), ...[ which 
prohibits] a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required 
by this Protocol.") 
222. Id. art. 49(3). 
223. BOTHEETAL., supra note 124, at 308 n.26. Article 48 requires military actors 
"at all times [to] distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between 
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
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The ICRC Commentary is in accord with this position.u4 Since forces 
using cluster bombs know that a substantial number of them will be duds and since 
dud cluster bombs function like mines, and, in fact, have more sensitive fuzes and 
more powerful charges, delivering dud cluster bombs should be regarded as the 
hct ional  equivalent of laying mines for purposes of the Additional Protocol I. 
Consequently, an "attack" with cluster bombs, just like an attack with mines, may 
occur long after the cluster bomb is launched and even when formal hostilities 
have concluded. 
On the other hand, a defender of the cluster bomb could argue that 
"attacks" should be narrowly construed only to apply to the initial launch of the 
cluster bomb, not to a dud cluster bomb exploding long aftenvards. When dud 
cluster bombs explode, they are typically not acts of violence "against an 
adversary." Furthermore, the travam preparatories (treaty drafting history) lends 
some support to the proposition that the term "attacks" should be narrowly 
construed. The drafters rejected the phrase "military operations" as a replacement 
for "attacks" in Article 49.225 The travaux and the plain meaning rule suggest that 
the term c c m i l i t .  operations" had a broader meaning and would imply greater 
protection of civilians.u6 Great Britain's representative, however, in arguing for 
retention of the "against the adversary" language, stated that "[tlhe adversary was 
in any case a military adversary, and the protection of the civilian population 
covered the populations of all parties to the conflict."227 Article 51 states that the 
"civilian population, as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object 
of Article 49(3), quoted above, discusses the application of "attacks" in 
terms of protecting civilians. If one strictly applied the "against the adversary" 
language in Article 49(1), an attack on civilians would not necessarily constitute an 
attack within the meaning of the Protocol, because it was not directed against the 
adversary military force. That cannot be the meaning of either Article 49 or 51 of 
the Protocol and should not be the interpretation of attack with regard to dud 
cluster bombs either. 
Given the documented dangers to life and limb that cluster bombs pose 
and the numerous dud cluster bombs dropped in Serbia and Kosovo, risking 
civilians is "excessivey' compared to the non-existent "military advantage" after the 
conflict ended. Any armed forces using cluster bombs, including NATO member 
against military objectives." Additional Protocol I ,  supra note 134, art. 48 (emphasis 
added). 
224. See supra note 221. 
225. See LEVIE, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 131, at 85-86. The United 
States apparently has adopted the narrow view of attack, "'emphasizing direct civilian 
casualties or deaths"' rather than those occurring sometime after the launching of the attack. 
See Wiebe, supra note 32, at 103 (quoting Matthew C. Taxman, International Law and the 
Politics of Urban Air Operations 21, available at http:l/mv.rand.org/publications/MW 
MRl175Iindex/html). 
226. See LEVIE, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 13 1, at 85-86. 
227. Id. at 86. 
228. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 51. 
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states, are thus obligated by the Protocol's rule of proportionality to take all 
necessary steps to prevent the cluster bombs from indiscriminately causing civilian 
casualties. These steps include, at a minimum, mapping of bomb sites and cluster 
bomb delivery points, posting warnings, educating the populus, particularly the 
young who are especially attracted to cluster bombs, and ultimately removing the 
cluster bombs from the stricken areas. 
2. A Weapon Unduly Endangering the Environment and the Health of the 
Population? 
Aside from violating Article 51 of the Protocol, howingly delivering dud 
cluster bombs may violate the articles proscribing military actions that harm the 
environment. Article 35 "prohibit[s] methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage 
to the natural envir~nment."~~ Article 55 employs the same key language: 
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment 
against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection 
includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare 
which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the 
natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival 
of the popula t i~n .~~  
Although it has taken bvo and one half years to clear Kosovo and will probably 
take Serbia longer to clear the country of most cluster bombs,=' the population can 
never be assured that all the duds, in fact, will have been cleared. Unlike mines, 
cluster bombs cannot be precisely marked and often hide themselves in mud, 
underbrush, trees, bodies of water, and even house roofs. As a practical matter, 
therefore, large portions of the land of Kosovo and Serbia will be forever 
environmentally damaged, greatly "prejudicing the health" of the population. In 
229. Id. art. 35(3). 
230. Id. art. 55(3). Although the Articles may seem to be covering the same 
subject, Article 35 refers to environmental harms irrespective of harm to the human 
population while Article 55 applies to environmental harms that endanger the health or 
survival of the human population. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 414. Dud 
cluster bombs would thus fit better under Article 55. 
23 1. The UNMACC hoped to and did finish its clearance efforts in Kosovo by the 
end of 2001. See UNMIK, Annual Report 2000, supra note 110, available at 
http:l/~mmv.un.orglDepts/dpko/mine/macc/dooads/repo/ual2OOO.pdf. UNMACC 
removed 8485 dud cluster bombs and K-FOR apparently removed 7455 for a total of 
15,490 dud cluster bombs cleared. See UNMIK, Mine Action Programme, Annual Report 
2001, supra note 81, 1 9, including n.1. In the Kosovo Province alone, however, these 
figures suggest as of December 2001 that befiveen 5000 to over 6000 dud cluster bombs 
remained on the ground. See supra note 110; UNMIK, supra note 81, fi 15 (noting that all 
of the 224 cluster bomb-affected locations in Kosovo "have now been cleared to some 
degree"). Information about how long it will take to clear the rest of Serbia has not been 
found to be readily available. 
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other theatres of war, for example, such as Laos, civilians are still dying fiom 
Vietnam-era cluster bombs dropped over thirty years ago.232 
The official ICRC Commentary provides a prototypical example of a 
violation of Article 35: 
Landmines and booby-traps have in some cases been scattered in 
astronomical quantities in certain theatres of war. Once the war is 
over, these devices can only be eliminated with considerable risk by 
patient efforts which must continue for many years. Meanwhile they 
form a serious and constant threat to the population. This is just one 
example, but in reality all delayed-action devices or those which 
have not exploded, for whatever reason, have a similar effect on the 
environment, with ominous consequences.233 
The previously documented similarities between cluster bombs and mines 
indicate that widespread use of cluster bombs should likewise violate the 
environmental prohibitions of the Protocol. After Desert Storm, NATO military 
commanders were on notice of the high dud rate of cluster bombs and their 
corresponding dangers. Consequently, the commanders could have "expected 
[cluster bombs] ... to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to 
prejudice the health.. .of the p ~ p u l a t i o n . " ~ ~  
On the other hand, the requirements of Articles 35 and 55 are quite strict. 
The damage must be "widespread, long-term and severe."u5 "Long-term" is 
measured in decades, "widespread" means "on the scale of several hundred square 
1;ilometeres" and "severe" as "involving serious or significant disruption or harm 
to human life, natural or economic resources or other a~sets.""~ Assuming one 
232. See Capati, supra note 94; Pedersen, supra note 104; Wiebe, supra note 32, 
at 92 (noting that ordnance experts estimate that between "nine and twenty-seven million 
unexploded cluster bomblets remain in the ground in Laos"). Admittedly, the number of 
cluster bombs dropped on Laos far exceeds the number dropped on Kosovo and the rest of 
Serbia. Terrorizing a population, however, does not require a vast quantity of deadly duds. 
See supra text accompanying note 101. 
233. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 411. Presumably, this example 
actually better illustrates an Article 55 violation than an Article 35(3) violation. See supra 
note 230 and infra note 236 for a discussion of the differences between the tsvo articles. 
234. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 55(3). 
235. See id. arts. 35,55 (emphasis added). 
236. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 124, at 347; see also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra 
note 70, at 416; Nicholas G. Alexander, Comment, Airstrikes and Environmental Damage: 
Can the United States be Held Liable for Operation Allied Force?, 11 COLO. J .  INT'L 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 471,479 (2000). Compare Additional Protocol I ,  supra note 134, arts. 
35(3), 55, with The 1977 Convention of the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile 
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention), 31 U.S.T. 333, 16 
I.L.M. 88 (1977). That convention uses similar language, prohibiting intentional 
environmental harms that are "widespread, long term or severe." Id. art. 1 (emphasis 
added). Note, however, that only one element there need be established. Furthermore, the 
parties there give the three elements a different definition from that which Additional 
Protocol I gives to "widespread, long term, and severe." ENMOD apparently applies "long 
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could show significant disruption to human life or to natural or economic 
resources, one may have some difficulty in showing that hundreds of square 
kilometers were so affected by the nearly 1,800 cluster bomb dispensers NATO 
planes dropped. Two and one half to five years to clear cluster bombs are not 
decades. That some risk remains after clearance efforts, one could argue, does not 
amount to "significant disruption to human life" under the Proto~ol."~ Therefore, 
meeting the stringent tests of the Protocol would be difficult. In addition, even 
willfilly violating Articles 35(3) and 55 does not constitute a grave breach; thus, 
so violating the Protocol and the environment never amounts to a war crime, but 
rather a civil breach of the Protocol.238 
Yet even if within tsvo and one half to five years, cluster bombs could be 
cleared from most of the land, they will almost certainly never be cleared with a 
degree of confidence such that reasonable parents would permit their children to 
play in the area subject to cluster bomb attack. Although cluster bombs did not 
cover hundreds of square miles, the 350 identified cluster bomb sites in Kosovo 
alone probably covered about a square kilometer each, thus surpassing a hundred 
term" as lasting merely a "period of months," not decades as the Protocol apparently 
requires. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 416; see Mark A. Drumbl, International 
Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and Environmental Security: Can the 
Znternational Criminal Court Bridge the Gaps? 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. k. 305 (2000). 
ENMOD, however, is aimed at deliberately manipulating the environment to cause 
environmental damage such as creating floods, earthquakes, climate change, etc. See ICRC 
COL~~ENTARY, supra note 70, at 415-16. It would not appear to apply to dropping dud 
cluster bombs. In another vein, note that unexploded ordnance is being recognized as a 
domestic environmental problem. See Maj. Egan, Management of Unexploded Ordnance, 
Munitions Fragments, and Other Constituents on Military Ranges, ARMY LAW., Feb. 1999, 
at 42 (observing that the Environmental Protection Agency has indicated that Unexploded 
Ordnance on U.S. Bases and Ranges could become wastes regulated under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act). 
237. UNMACC asserted that by the end of 2001 "[wvlhilst mines and UXO may 
still be encountered [in Kosovo] for some time to come, by and large they will not impede 
social and economic development or pose a serious threat to the local popu!ation." UNMIK, 
Annual Report 2000, supra note 110, available at h~://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ 
mine/macc/do~vnloads/reports/annua1ann2000.pdf. Yet given the capacity of cluster bombs to 
hide in underbrush, roofs, trees, water, and mu4 this assertion should not be deemed 
completely reassuring to the inhabitants of the region. In any event, UNMIK confined its 
efforts only to the Kosovo Province and not to other parts of Serbia. 
Note, however, that battlefield destruction is probably outside the scope of the 
prohibition. See B o r n  ET AL., supra note 124, at 346. If dud cluster bombs were considered 
battlefield destruction, then this Article would not apply. Such, however, would appear to 
be a strained interpretation, since the military actor launching cluster bombs knows that this 
type of environmental damage from duds "may be expected." . 
238. Cf: Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(b)(iv) (prohibiting "widespread, 
long-term and severe" damage to the natural environment but imposing criminal liability 
only where such damage is "clearly excessive" in light of the "concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated"), available at http://www.un.orgAaw/icc/statute/ 
romefra.htm. For a discussion detailing the difficulties of bringing a criminal prosecution 
under the Rome Statute's environmental violation article, see Drumbl, supra note 236. 
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square miles.239 Certainly, the bvo articles could have been more precisely drafted. 
But given the difficulty of finding all the duds and the threat they pose over a long 
period of  time, the better argument, though a close question, is that the fairly 
extensive use of  cluster bombs in Kosovo and Serbia satisfied the "severe, 
widespread, and long-term" requirements for Articles 35(3) and 55 of the 
Protoc01.2~~ 
C. NATO's Response to the Dud Cluster Bomb Question 
NATO and the United States have helped in the reconstruction of  
Kosovo"' and the United States authorized $1.6 million for UXO clearance in 
1999 and will probably authorize up to $3.5 million in the following two years?42 
Unfortunately, however, NATO was initially slow to devote resources to clearing 
dud cluster b0mbs.2~~ AS noted above, it has taken bvo and a half years to clear 
most cluster bombs from Kosov0.2~ NATO also acted slowly in providing 
239. A square kilometer equals 0.386 sq. miles. See AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY 778 (2d College ed. 1976). 350 sq. kilometers by 0.386 = 135.1 sq. miles. 
240. Admittedly, reaching this result would, however, require a liberal 
interpretation of these articles of the Protocol. 
241. All of NATO authorized $1.2 billion in civil implementation aid for Kosovo 
in fiscal year 2000; the United States' share was $169 million, or 13.9%. See Developments 
in Kosovo: Congressional Testimony, (2000) (testimony of James E. Pardew, Principal 
Deputy Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Kosovo), available at 
2000 WL 426085. The United States' share of humanitarian assistance has been "about 
20%" the costs for UN peacekeeping has been 25% and through the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe &om about 10% to 17%. See id. As of April 2000, the 
United States had provided "more than $533 million in response to the Kosovo crisis since 
March 1998." USAID, Kosovo Crisis, Fact Sheet #I44 (2000), available at 
h t tp : / /wmvw.usa id .gov~response /o fda /ko l .  In addition, the United States in 
fiscal year 2000, contributed $25.5 million for global "Humanitarian Demining" efforts and 
an additional $16.5 million for Humanitarian Research and Development. See Jim 
Garamone, DoD Aids Global Demining Efforts, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 9,2000, 
available at http://mw.defenselink.miVnews/Feb2000/ n02092000~20002091.html (last 
visited Apr. 8,2002). 
242. See State Dept. Briefing on Kosovo Landmine Problem, June 25, 1999, at 3 
(unofficial transcript) (statement of Robert Beercroft, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State) 
(noting that the United States is providing $1.6 million for humanitarian demining 
operations in Kosovo in fiscal year 1999), available at http://wm~v.usembassy.it~ 
file9906/alia/99062519.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002) Fereinafter State Dep't Briefing]. 
Apparently, the U.S. increased its funding in fiscal year 1999 to almost $3 million. See 
COL. MARK W. ADAMS, ADDRESS TO U.S. RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOC.: THE U.S. 
HUMANITARIAN D E ~ G  PROGRAM IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND KosOVO, OC~. 15,1999, 
available at http:llwmv.state.gov/wmvlpolicy~remar/l999/991015~adams~demining 
.html (last visited Apr. 5,2002). 
243. See Evans, supra note 15, at 14 (noting that NATO is not clearing mines 
itself but leaving it to U.N. agency with limited staff to remove all the dud cluster bombs). 
244. See State Dep't Briefing, supra note 242 (Donald Steinberg, U.S. Special 
Representative to the President and the Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian 
Demining, states that "regrettably, we estimate that mines and unexploded ordnance will be 
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photographs of the cluster bombs for safety campaigns and in providing detailed 
information about bombsites, which would have helped those organizations trying 
to clear Kosovo of  dud cluster bombs and other unexploded 0rdnance.2~' In fact, 
United Nations officials coordinating UXO clearance in Kosovo criticized NATO 
for failing to hand over information about cluster bomb sites and targets for nearly 
a year after the conflict The director of  the UN clearing effort said, 
"Sometimes the fnst time we knew there was an area [with unexploded bombs] 
was when there was a casualty reported."247 By the end of the Kosovo conflict in 
June 1999, about 150 Kosovar-Albanians had been maimed or killed by  mines or 
other unexploded 0rdnance.2~' About forty percent of these casualties have been 
caused by dud cluster b0mbs.2~' Since the armed conflict ended, the Red Cross 
concluded that more than 50 civilians have died and more than 100 others have 
been injured from dud cluster bombs in K o s o ~ o . ~ ~ ~  
an everyday fact of life for the Kosovar people for some three to five years."). Special 
Representative Steinberg did not mention the length of time it would take to clear Serbia or 
any efforts that should be directed in those areas. He did note that the United States was 
allocating $1.6 million for mine clearance efforts in Kosovo in 1999. See id. at 4. 
UNhiiACC, however, completed their clearance efforts by the end of 2001, approximately 
hvo and one half years from the end of the conflict. They are training local deminers to 
attempt to complete the job after LJNh4ACCYs pullout. See UNMIK, supra note 81, paras. 
15, 18-25. 
245. See Gall, supra note 87, at A3 (reporting that aid agencies were angry that 
NATO waited nearly hvo months before releasing photographs of the cluster bombs for 
safety campaigns). Although NATO countries, and particularly the United States, have 
helped in funding the effort, NATO has generally left responsibility for clearing mines and 
dud cluster bombs to private organizations. United States law prohibits American military 
personnel from serving to clear unexploded ordnance from foreign lands, except as part of 
"supporting a United States military operation." 10 U.S.C. 491(4)(a) (2002). K-FOR 
"organizations," however, apparently cleared 7455 cluster munitions from Kosovo as of 
December 2001. See UNMIK, supra note 81, 19 n.1. 
246. See Carlotta Gall, U.N. Aide in Kosovo Faults NATO on Unexploded Bombs, 
N.Y. Tmns, May 23, 2000, at 3 (quoting John Flanagan, program manager of the U.N. 
hfine Action Coordination Center). 
247. Kosovo Mine Expert Criticism NATO (BBC News Europe television 
broadcast, May 23, 2000) (noting that the UN Mine Action Centre first asked K-FOR for 
information about the location of the bombs in August 1999, but it was not until April 2000 
that the Centre learned it did not have the full details. The UN had to lobby NATO officials 
in Brussels and Washington before finally getting the information); see Evans, supra note 
15, at 14 (noting that the U.N. Mine Action Clearing Centre is urging NATO to help with 
cluster bomb clearance in Kosovo). 
248. See World Health Organization, supra note 105, at 1-2; see also Dan Eggen, 
supra note 104, at A0 1. 
249. See also Kosovo Mine Expert Criticism NATO, supra note 247. Figures in 
Serbia have been more difficult to obtain. 
250. Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, supra note 83, at 5, 
available at http:l/~w~v.hnv.orglbackgrounder/armslcluster-bcklO3l.h (last visited Apr. 
20,2001) (noting that the Red Cross found that between June 1999 and May 2000, alone, 
there were 151 casualties from dud cluster bombs in Kosovo, including 50 deaths). See 
also Col. John Flanagan, UNMACC, Overview of Exit Strategy (concludiig that behveen 
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While Slobodan Milosevic was in power, the United States refused to 
authorize funding to Serbia to help in reconstruction. After the Yugoslav 
government committed to and arrested Milosevic, the United States agreed to 
partial funding of Serbia. The balance of the United States commitment was 
conditioned on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's extraditing Milosevic to The 
Hague for trial for war crimes.=' Since his summary transfer to The Hague, the 
United States committed $181 million for 2001 as part of  the NATO countries' 
commitment of $1.28 billion.252 Other NATO Member States have provided 
economic assistance to Yugoslavia and since Milosevic's transfer have increased 
their commitment by another $450 million.253 It is unclear, however, whether any 
of  this funding has been earmarked for UXO and cluster bomb ~ l e a r a n c e . ~ ~  
the end of the conflict in June 1999 and April 2001, eighty six people had died fiom dud 
cluster bombs and mines in Kosovo and that over 340 others had been wounded), available 
at http:llwnnv.mineaction.org/ unmik-org/departments/hqle~t.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 
2002); see also Col. Flanagan E-mail, supra note SO. He mentioned that there were fifteen 
civilians involved in cluster bomb explosions who escaped injury. 
25 1. See Marlise Simons, War Crimes Tribunal Expands Indictment, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 30, 2001, at A7; Press Release, U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID 
Applauds Congress for Passing Foreign Assistance Bill (Oct. 27, 2000) (noting that 
Congress has authorized up to $100 million for aid to Serbia). President Bush has 
authorized payment of half of this amount, making the remainder contingent upon Serbia 
extraditing Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY at The Hague. More importantly, the United 
States apparently has decided that it will not block loans and other financial assistance fiom 
either the World Bank or from the International Monetary Fund. See R. Jeffrey Smith, 
Prosecutors Say Milosevic May Face Treason Charge; Citing Cooperation, U.S. Lets 
Yugoslav Aid Continue, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2001, at A14, available at 2001 WL 
17617585. The day after Yugoslavia transferred Milosevic to The Hague, the NATO 
countries promised to give Yugoslavia $1.2 billion in aid. See Marlise Simons, Case 
Against Milosevic Is Not Simple to Prove, N.Y. ~ M E S ,  July 2,2001, at AS. 
252. See Simons, supra note 251, at A7; Smith, supra note 251, at Al4. The 
Congressional Research Service indicates that $145 million has been allocated this year to 
help Serbia and Montenegro. See CURT TARNOFF, CONG. RES. SERVICE, THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC 01 YUGOSLAVIA: U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (2001), available at 
http://wvw.globalsecurity.org/militaryl1ibrarylreport/~rslrs2O737.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 
2002). None of the funds is earmarked for clearance of the cluster bombs or other UXO. See 
id. at 3. 
253. See Simons, supra note 251, at A7. By mid-February, 2001 NATO countries 
gave Serbia (FRY) $274 million; the United States ranked eighth on the list of donors "well 
behind the top three: Italy, Germany, and Greece." Paul Watson, Power Struggle Dims 
Likelihood of Quick Arrest of Milosevic, Yugoslavia: Squabble Between Key Leaders 
Reduces Od& of Meeting a US. Deadline of Saturday, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2001, at AS, 
available at 2001 WL 24741 17. Given Serbia's need for electricity and for reconstruction, 
it is not known how much of this aid, if any, is going towvard clearing cluster bombs and 
other UXO. 
254. See supra notes 251,253. 
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D. Inzetlzer Usiizg Cluster Boinbs to Boinbard Large Areas Violates Additional 
Protocol I 
Assuming for argument's sake that cluster bombs produced no duds, 
would their use violate the Protocol? Current humanitarian law, unfortunately, 
provides no clear answer to this question. First, Additional Protocol I reaffirms the 
customary rule that combatants must discriminate between civilians and military 
Second, the Protocol reaffirms the customary international law rule that 
military actors must use reasonable care in identifying the target and in carrying 
out an attack so as to discriminate effectively between civilians and military 
ob je~ t ives .~~  The most specific however, are set forth in subsection 5(a) of 
Article 51, which contains the first example of an indiscriminate attack: area 
255. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 48; see also GERMAN 
MINISTRY OF DEE., supra note 159, at 46,1454 ("It is prohibited in any circumstance to fire 
at or bombard civilians and military objects without distinction." (citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original)). 
256. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 57. In the Kupreskic 
Judgment, Case No. IT-95-16-T Ont'l Crim. Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia 2000), the 
ICTY Trial Chamber addressed the issue of proportionality as follows: 
In the case of attacks on milita~y objectives causing damage to civilians, 
international law contains a general principle prescribing that reasonable 
care must be taken in attacking military objectives so that civilians are 
not needlessly injured through carelessness. This principle, already 
referred to by the United Kingdom in 1938 with regard to the Spanish 
Civil War, has always been applied in conjunction with the principle of 
proportionality, whereby any incidental (and unintentional) damage to 
civilians must not be out of proportion to the direct military advantage 
gained by the military attack. In addition, attacks, even when they are 
directed against legitimate military targets, are unlawful if conducted 
using indiscriminate means or methods ofwarfare, or in such a way as 
to cause indiscriminate damage to civilians. These principles have to 
some extent been spelled out in Articles 57 and 58 of the First 
Additional Protocol of 1977. Such provisions, it would seem, are now 
part of customary international law, not only because they specify and 
flesh out general pre-existing norms, but also because they do not appear 
to be contested by any State, including those which have not ratified the 
Protocol. Admittedly, even these hvo provisions leave a wide margin of 
discretion to belligerents by using language that might be regarded as 
leaving the last word to the attacking party. Nevertheless this is an area 
where the "elementary considerations of humanity" rightly emphasized 
by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel, Nicaragua, 
and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons cases should be 
hlly used when interpreting and applying loose international rules, on 
the basis that they are illustrative of a general principle of international 
law. 
Id. at 71 524-35 (emphasis added); see infra notes 308-312 and accompanying text for a 
more detailed discussion of customary international law. 
257. Of course, a military actor violates international humanitarian law by 
targeting any weapon, including cluster bombs, at civilians. See Additional Protocol I, 
supra note 134, art. 51. 
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bombing in a populated place in which there are "separate[] and distinct" military 
objectives: 
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be 
considered as indiscriminate: 
(a) an attack by bombardment by any method or means which treats 
as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and 
distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other 
area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian 
objects;. . .FS8 
This example outlaws "target area bombing" or "carpet bombing"259 
practiced by the Allies in World War 11:~' by Japan in and by the United 
States in VietnamF6' "[This Article] means, in effect, that if in ...[ a populated] 
area, there are a number of different military objectives that are capable of being 
hit separately[,] then it is forbidden to treat the entire area in which they are 
situated as one large ~bject ive. '"~~ Bombing an entire city or a large populated area 
258. Id.art.51(5)(a). 
259. Starting in 1942, the Allies embarked on an air campaign targeting cities and 
tolvns themselves: "The characteristic feature of the new program was its emphasis on area 
bombing, in which the centres of towns would be the points of aim for nocturnal raids." 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BR~TANNICA ONLINE, Air Warfare, 1942-43, at http://search.eb.com! 
bolltopic?eu=l18867&sctn=8#5 12073 (last visited Mar. 20,2001) (emphasis added). 
260. The development of target area bombing is credited to Sir Arthur Travers 
Hams, commander of the RAF in World War II: 
As a firm believer in mass raids, Air Marshal Harris developed the 
"saturation" technique of mass bombing-that of concentrating clouds 
of bombers in a giant raid on a single city, with the object of completely 
demolishing it. He applied this method with great destructive effect on 
Axis-occupied Europe from 1942 to the end of World War XI. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, Sir Arthur Travers Harris, at http://search.eb.coml 
bolltopic?eu=40156&sctn=1#132424 (last visited on Mar. 2, 2001). The ICRC 
Commentary to Article 51(5)(a) notes that 
[tlhis provision is very important; it conf i i s  the unlawful character of 
certain regrettable practices during the Second World War and 
subsequent armed conflicts. Far too often the purpose of attacks was to 
destroy all life in a particular area or to raze a town to the ground 
without this resulting, in most cases, in any substantial military 
advantages. 
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 619. ~ u t  see SPAIGHT, supra note 126, at 271-73 
(defending target area bombing as the only effective means to destroy Germany's war 
industries). 
261. See SHALLER, supra note 168, at 50; see also B R O ~ ~ ~ L I E ,  supra note 168, at 
113-14 (noting United States' complaint regarding Japan's indiscriminate bombing of 
China). 
262. See supra note 19. 
263. L. Doswald-Beck, supra note 11 1 ,  at 156. The Committee of the Prosecutor 
to the ICTY discussed the requirements of the Protocol regarding the military's obligation 
to distinguish between military objectives and the civilians and civilian objects: 
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to reach some military point targets within that area will probably kill or wound 
many civilians. Aiming at the specific military target-even within a city-will 
probably result in fewer civilian casualties. Although this example was undeniably 
included to ban target area bombing, the drafters intentionally omitted that term or 
the term "carpet bombing" because it might limit the application of the Article to a 
particular type of bombardment: "[Tlhe Working Group considered it unnecessary 
to refer to 'massive' bombardment, 'target area' bombardment, or 'carpet 
bombing', since a11 are covered by this prohibition, and use of such expressions 
lnigl~t be construed to restrict the protection of civilians from other types of 
bombardment." 261 
Like its paired subsection (5)(b) on the rule of proportionality, this 
subsection was also controversial. The main point in controversy was how far apart 
the military objectives had to be in order to render them "separateu and 
distinct."265 The language of the Article is silent on this point. The United States 
and other states, however, insisted that this be interpreted as some significant 
One of the principles underlying international humanitarian law is the 
principle of distinction, which obligates military commanders to 
distinguish between military objectives and civilian persons or objects. 
The practical application of this principle is effectively encapsulated in 
Article 57 of Additional Protocol which, in part, obligates those who 
plan or decide upon an attack to "do everything feasible to verify that the 
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects." The 
obligation to do everything feasible is high but not absolute. A military 
commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to 
collect and evaluate information concerning potential targets. The 
commander must also direct his forces to use available technical means 
to properly identify targets during operations. Both the commander and 
the aircrew actually engaged in operations must have some range of 
discretion to determine which available resources shall be used and how 
they shall be used. Further, a determination that inadequate efforts have 
been made to distinguish between military objectives and civilians or 
civilian objects should not necessarily focus exclusively on a specific 
incident. If precautionary measures have worked adequately in a very 
high percentage of cases then the fact they have not worked well in a 
small number of cases does not necessarily mean they are generally 
inadequate. 
REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR, supra, note 23,729. 
264. LEVIE, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 131, at 159 (emphasis added); 
see Blis, supra note 129, at 145; see also LEVIE, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 13 1, 
at 126 (comments of Mr. Mimanoff-Chilikine of the ICRC) ("[slince it was intended to 
presenre the civilian population from non-selective attacks, it would be impossible to leave 
aside the question of target area bombing"). 
265. LEVIE, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 131, at 16364 (French 
representative indicating that his country could not accept 5(b), because, among other 
things, "clearly separated and distinct military objectives.. .might prove unrealizable when 
such objectives were in small villages or in small to\vns."). 
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distance so that independent targeting of the individual military objectives mould 
be fea~ible.2~~ 
Cluster bombs are "area" weapons, designed to destroy personnel and 
light a r m 0 3 ~ ~  anywhere within a football field or more. The usual practice is to 
deploy several cluster bomb dispensers at once, often covering a square kilometer 
(nearly two-thirds of a mile square) (nearly nineteen football fields). Cluster bombs 
are thus an ideal weapon to carry out "target area bombing7' or "carpet bombing." 
The "mischief' that subsection 5(a) is aimed at is the indiscriminate killing of 
civilians by bombing large areas.268 Given that fragmentation cluster bombs are 
anti-personnel weapons, namely, weapons designed, among other things, to kill 
people, they potentially embody the mischief6' that the ban on target area bombing 
was attempting to eliminate fiom air warfare. 
Whether using cluster bombs amounts to proscribed target area bombing 
depends on the circumstances. The subsection prohibits area bombardment of 
separate and distinct targets "located in a city, tom,  village or other area 
containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects.. .."270 Delivering 
such bombs against an enemy army in a desert presumably would not violate this 
sub~ection.2~' Presumably, a desert is not an area containing a "city, town, or 
village" or a "similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects." The 
"concentration of civilians," however, need not be great: a column of refugees, for 
example, fulfills the "concentration" req~irement.~'~ 
266. The United States representative explained his positive vote on this 
subsection as follows: "[This subsection] refers not only to a separation of hvo or more 
military objectives which can be observed or which are visually separated, but also includes 
the element of significant distance. Furthermore, that distance must be at least sufficient to 
permit individual military objectives to be attacked separately." Blix, supra note 129, at 
135, 147. "How far apart should the objectives be to require separate attacks? This question 
is not answered in the rule nor is it answered in the only military manual containing a 
provision on the matter, that of the Federal Republic of Germany." Id at 135. 
267. The BLU-97, the submunition in the CBU-87, can also penetrate up to seven 
inches of armor. See Leggette, supra note 42, at 25. 
268. "[Ilt is the business of the court to give such construction to the statute as to 
suppress the mischief and to advance the remedy." HAROLD W. HOROWITZ & KENNETH L. 
WT, LAW, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 72 (1969) (quoting Justice Wil~iams' opinion 
in Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 39 (1837) (citing Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 
(1584)). 
269. "Area weapons" are so named because of their dispersion characteristics. By 
virtue of the enormous territory they can cover, such weapons present a strong potential 
danger to noncombatants. An additional element of controversy stems from their 
classification as "antipersonnel weapons"-munitions that are effective primarily or solely 
against human beings. ' 
270. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 51(5)(a). 
271. Cf: J. Ashley Roach, Humanitarian Law, 1983 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PWC. 
212,238 ("The assumption that some weapons are inherently unla\vful, particularly cluster 
bombs, is unacceptable to me because of its noncontextuality."). 
272. LEVIE, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 131, at 161 (Report to Third 
Committee on the Work of the Working Group, Committee III,9 May 1997, noting that "a 
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One of the uses of cluster bombs is to destroy point For 
esample, an anti-aircraft battery may be only eight feet by hventy feet (2.44 m. x 
6.1 m.), a point target offering a very narrow pr0file.2~~ Such a target may be hard 
to hit using conventional unguided bombs. Cluster bombs, however, may be 
effective even if they miss the targeted spot: "The advantage of this type of 
warhead is that it gives a wide area of coverage, which allows for a greater margin 
of error in delivery."27s The advantage for the military is a distinct disadvantage, 
however, for any civilians who happen to be within about a football field or more 
of the point targetT6 
It is the thesis of this Article that where there is a concentration of 
civilians in the neighborhood of a target, the use of area weapons violates 
Additional Protocol I. Because they cover huge areas, these weapons, when used in 
places "containing a concentration of civilians" in essence are ignoring the 
requirement "to treat as a single military objective a number of clearly separated 
and distinct military objectives.77277 The United States has the capability of using 
smart bombs to eliminate point targets rather than using area weap0ns.2~' A 
defender of cluster bombs might argue that even against point targets these 
weapons satisfy the Protocol. The side using the weapon is aiming at the point 
target. That civilians may be injured is unfortunate collateral damage. Cluster 
bombs may be used against a single target, not necessarily against two "separate 
and distinct7' targets. Furthermore, there is no intent to needlessly take civilian 
lives. 
This argument is flawed, however, because it fails to account for the 
purpose of Protocol section 51(5)(a). Indisputably, the drafters intended to ban 
refugee camp or a column of refugees moving along a road" would constitute "a similar 
concentration of civilians"). Compare how the 1980 Third Protocol to the CCW defmes this 
term: "Concentration of civilians" means any concentration of civilians, be it permanent or 
temporary, such as in inhabited parts of cities or inhabited to\vns or villages, or as in camps 
or columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads." CCW, Incendiary Weapons 
Protocol (Protocol III), supra note 192, art. 2, in 19 I.L.M. 1523-26 and DOCUMENTS ON 
THE LAIVS OF WAR, supra note 27, at 485. 
273. See Krepon, supra note 26, at 269. 
274. See id. 
275. See Federation of American Scientists, Big Bullets for Beginners, available 
at http:l/\~wv.fas.org/man~dod-lOl/sys/land/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2002); see 
also http:llsearch.cetin.net.cdinteme~STI/FAS/maddodlOl/navy/docs/~part13.htm 
(last visited May 30,2001). 
276. The ground crew can set the CBU-87 for wide dispersal or narrow dispersal. 
If set for narrow dispersal, the footprint of the CBU-87 may be much smaller. See Leggette, 
supra note 42, at 25. Even so, a single BLU-97 can be deadly at long distances even when 
set for a concentrated footprint. 
277. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 51(5)(a). 
278. Thirty-six percent of the bombs dropped on the former Yugoslavia during 
the Kosovo intervention were precision guided weapons, most of them employed by the 
United States. See Belt, supra note 24, at 115; see also Human Rights Watch, Civilian 
Deaths, supra note 20, at n.18 (citing General Clark's estimate of 35 percent). 
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target area bombing. They intended to do so because of the perceived abuses of the 
practice in World War II and in Vietnam. The goal was to protect civilians, not 
from all bombing, but from bombing large areas where civilians resided when the 
bombing could have accomplished the military objective by individually aiming 
solely at military targets. In essence, this provision approves of the early United 
States practice in World War 11 of bombing only military targets within cities, not 
cities thernsel~es?'~ It condemns (1) the British, German, and Japanese practice of 
bombing cities indiscriminately, regardless of the military objective, and (2) the 
practice of massively bombing a populated area when pinpoint bombing could 
have destroyed the military objective. 
When dropped on or near a place where "a concentration of civilians" is 
found, cluster bombs mimic the abuses of the World War 11 target area bombings. 
As one pilot put it, using cluster bombs is "the shotgun school of bombing."280 It is 
a shotgun that scatters shot wider than any other. Such a defender of cluster bombs 
is using the weapon itself to redefine the issue. Cluster bombs by definition have a 
huge reach and can, under these circumstances, unduly endanger innocent 
civilians. 
E. Additional Protocol Iand NATO's Air Campaign 
NATO's intervention against Yugoslavia was for the stated purpose of 
stopping Serbia's perceived widespread human rights abuses against Albanian- 
Kosovars. NATO conducted solely an air campaign, employing no ground forces 
until Milosevic surrendered. NATO commanders declared that from the start they 
did everything they could to keep civilian casualties to a minim~rn?~' "All targets 
were 'looked at in terms of their military significance in relation to the collateral 
damage or the unintended consequences that might be there.' Then every 
precaution [was] made ... so that collateral damage [was] avoided."282 Lieutenant 
General Michael Short added that "collateral damage drove us to an extraordinary 
degree. General Clark committed hours of his day dealing with the allies on issues 
of collateral damage."283 Despite these stated concerns and efforts, NATO air 
operations did cause civilian casualties. Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented 
279. See CRANE, supra note 125, at 10-1 1. 
280. See PEACHEY & WLEBE, supra note 35, at 14 (quoting Capt. Dan Hampton, 
New Strategy, New Fighter, New Challenges, AIR FORCEMAG., July 1991, at 59). 
281. See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 20, 1 9 (citing 
testimony of Gen. Henry Shelton, of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Apr. 14, 
1999 and testimony of Lt. Gen. Michael Short before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee Hearing on Lessons Learned fiom Military Operations and Relief Efforts in 
Kosovo, Oct. 21, 1999), available at http://~vw.hnv.org/hnv/reports/2OOO/nato/index.htm, 
Operation Allied Force Attacks (last visited June 15,2001). 
282. Id. 
283. Id.; see also CLARK, supra note 16, at 201. 
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ninety confirmed incidents in which civilians died from NATO bombingFg4 IlRW 
estimated that "as few as 489 and as many as 529 Yugoslav civilians" were killed 
in these incidentsFs5 NATO has not disputed the Human Rights Watch figuresFS6 
The Committee of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has likewise accepted the HRW civilian casualty 
fig~res.~" 
Roughly 90 to 150 of the civilian casualties are attributed to cluster 
bombs, not counting those who died from dud cluster bomb explosions after the 
conflict. Human Rights Watch confirmed seven incidents involving cluster bomb 
deaths and considers five additional incidents likely?s8 Perhaps the most 
significant is the bombing of the Serbian city of NisFSg There cluster bombs landed 
at midday in several places within the city, namely, 
near the Pathology building of the Nis Medical Center in southeast 
Nis; in the town center near the Nis University Rector's Office, 
including the area of the central city market place, the bus station 
near the Nis Fortress, and the '12 February' Health Center; and near 
a car dealership and the 'Nis Express,' a parking lot across the river 
from the fortressFgO 
About fourteen people were killed and another thirty ~ o u n d e d ? ~ '  
In this incident, NATO stated that its target was the airfield in the Nis 
Airport, which is about a mile (1.5 kilometers) away from the market and even 
further from the other 10cations.2~~ According to NATO officials, the cluster bomb 
284. See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 20, available at 
http://~mmv.hnv.org/reports/200O/nato/ie, Operation Allied Force 
Attacks. 
285. Id. Fifty-five of these incidents occurred in Serbia, three in Montenegro, and 
thirty-txvo in Kosovo: 'But between 279 and 3 18 of the dead-between 56 and 60% of the 
total number of deaths-were in Kosovo. In Serbia 201 civilians were killed and eight died 
in Montenegro." Id. 
286. See NATO, Kosovo Crisis: The Conduct of the Air Campaign, 7 8, available 
at http://~m~v.nato.intkosovo/repo2000/conduct.h (last modified Oct. 30,2000). 
287. See REPORTTO rn PROSECUTOR, supra note 23, f i  10. 
288. See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 20, 5, available at 
h~:/lwmmv.hnv.or~reports/2OOO/nato~at6dOO.hWP88~14845. 
289. See E-mail from Dragana Jesic, Mayor's Cabinet, Nis City Assembly, to 
Thomas Michael McDonnell, Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law 
(May 7,2001) (on file at Pace Law School Library) (estimating Nis population at 300,000). 
290. See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 20, available at 
http://wmmv.hnv.org/ reports/2000/natoMatbm200-01.htm#P425~113389. 
291. See A ~ T Y  INT'L, supra note 23, at 46; see also Katarina Kratovac, 
Cluster Bombs Hit Hospital Complex and Market, Devastating Nis, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
May 7, 1999 ("At the market, where nine people were killed, one old woman was hit in the 
head, her body partially dismembered. Just a few steps away, a stream of blood trickled 
away from the body of a young man who had been blown to pieces."). 
292. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 23, at 46. 
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dispenser released its submunitions too early, resulting in their wide d i ~ ~ e r s a l . 2 ~ ~  
However, the area immediately around the airport can be considered "urban.77293 
Consequently, NATO and specifically the U.S. used the cluster bomb in an area 
where there was "a concentration of civilians." Even had the bomb reached its 
intended target, NATO would have violated the Protoc01.2~~ Furthermore, NATO 
may have violated its obligations under Article 57 to take precautions to avoid 
civilian casualties. Nis is a major industrial city. Planners can predict that any 
mistakes in launching a cluster bomb in or near a populated area could cause 
substantial civilian casualties. Thus by choosing to use cluster bombs, NATO 
member states may not have "take[n] all feasible precautions in the choice of 
means or methods of attack with a view toward avoiding and in any case 
minimizing incidental loss of civilian life.. .."296 
In other incidents, civilians died as a result of NATO cluster bomb attacks 
in areas with a concentration of ci~ilians,2~' suggesting that NATO member states 
293. See Michael Dobbs, A War-Tom Reporter Reflects, WASH. POST, July 11, 
1999, at B01; see also CLARK, supra note 16, at 196 (stating that the target was Serb 
helicopters on the Nis airport's aix5eld and that the dispenser '"functioned' at excessive 
altitude, scattering the bomblets short of their target and resulting in civilian deaths and 
injuries."). As the altitude at which the dispenser releases the bomblets increases, the 
"wider will be the dispersal radius of the submunitions, and the greater, therefore, the 
potential risk to nonmilitary targets." Ticking Time Bombs, supra note 55, 7 10 n.15, 
available at http://www.hnv.org/reports/1999/nato2/nato995-0 1 .htm#P65-8 106. "Moreover 
at higher altitudes, pilots have a reduced capability to make sighting corrections. Finally at 
greater altitudes the bomblets do not necessarily have the opportunity to fuse properly, and 
the dud rate is therefore likely to be higher." Id at 3. 
294. See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 20,7 82, available at 
http://wmv.hnv.orgl reports/2000/nato/index/htm#Top0£Page. 
295. After the Nis cluster bomb attack, President Clinton issued an executive 
order suspending the use of cluster bombs by United States aircraft. Great Britain, however, 
did not observe the suspension, and continued using cluster bombs. The United States 
ultimately ended the suspension, but the suspension probably saved civilian lives. See 
PEACHEY & WIEBE, supra note 35, at 15 (quoting a letter &om Lieutenant General Fulford 
to Representative Dennis Kucenich that the use of cluster bombs was "temporarily haltled]" 
during the Kosovo air campaign); Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 20,7 
84, available at http: //www.hnv.orglreports/2000/nato.htm#P6558106; cf: Belt, supra note 
24, at 158 (noting the general practice of NATO to use precision guided munitions in urban 
areas and unguided gravity bombs on battlefields, such as "mountainous areas in Kosovo 
and Serbia"). 
296. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 57(2)@). 
297. Some believed that NATO planes dropped heat seeking cluster bombs 
(CBU-97s) on a column of Albanian refugees on April 14, 1999 (between Djakovica and 
Decane). See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 20,17 6-7, available at 
http:/lww.hnv.orglreports/2OOO/nato.NatbOO-Ol.h~#P202.47195; Paul Watson, Cluster 
Bombs May Be What Killed Refugees, L.A. RMES, Apr. 17, 1999, at Al. The heat seeking 
cluster bombs apparently cannot distinguish the heat of a tractor fiom that of a tank. 
Clearance crews, however, have not uncovered evidence that CBU-97s had been used in the 
conflict. See PEACHEY & WIEBE, supra note 35, at 22 (citing an interview with the 
Information Officer at the U.N. Mines Action Coordination Centre, held in Pristina, 
Kosovo). Approximately seventy-three people were killed and another thirty-six were 
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breached the Protocol in these instances as well. 298 AS noted above, Human Rights 
Watch estimates that cluster bombs killed 90 to 150 civilians during the conflict, 
injured. See Watson, supra, at Al; see also Brian Bender, Weapon Additional to the Use of 
Cluster Bombs, JANE'S DEF. WEEKLY, Apr. 7, 1999 (indicating that U.S. Air Force was 
"likely" to use the CBU-97 in the conflict), available at 1999 WL 7270134. There is a 
conflict in the evidence as to whether civilians were mixed with military vehicles and 
troops. NATO also denies using cluster bombs in this attack. See supra note 40. Amnesty 
International criticized NATO's 15,000-ft. minimum altitude rule: 
NATO's accounts do not suggest that its aircraft believed that the 
convoys of displaced civilians were being used to shield Serb military. 
Rather they [the NATO pilots] mistook the convoy for a military 
column. The mistake stemmed from a failure to institute sufficient 
precautions to be able to distinguish between civilians and military 
objectives [by flying at a minimum altitude of 15,000 ft.]. 
See Ahmn INT'L, supra note 23, at 37. See supra note 69 for a more detailed discussion 
of the 15,000-ft. altitude rule and its effect on civilian casualties generally and in this 
incident. See also CLARK, supra note 16, at 254-55 (describing NATO's taking 
responsibility for civilian casualties). 
298. See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, Appendix A, supra note 20,116, 
8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, available at  http:llwww.hnv.orglreportsl2OOOlnato/index/ 
htm#TopOfPage. Note also that the Prosecutor for the International War Crimes Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) appointed a committee to examine alleged war crimes 
committed by the NATO bombing campaign. The Committee identified what it considered 
key incidents of civilian casualties caused by the NATO bombing. The incidents possibly 
involving cluster bombs are indicated; HRW's interpretation is in brackets: 
b. the attack on the Djakovica Convoy-1414199-70-75 civilians 
killed, 100 or more injured, P W  details this attack as #19 in its report. 
See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 201 
. . . 
f. the attack on Hotels Baciste and Putnik-1314199-1 civilian killed, 
W W  details this attack as #22 in its report; a person died trying to 
clear a cluster bomb. See id.] 
. . . 
k. the attack on a bus at Pec-315199-7 civilians killed, 44 injured, 
W W  details this attack as #46 in its report; HRW received photo 
documentation of cluster bomb use; NATO denied responsibility for the 
attack. On the following day, one person was allegedly injured from a 
delayed submunition exploding. HRW #47. See id.] 
1. the attack at Korisa village-131519948-87 civilians killed, [UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights concludes that 80 were killed. 
HRW details this attack as #57 and confirms a cluster bomb attack, but 
NATO has denied using cluster bombs in this incident. See id.] 
. . . 
[the] attack on Nis City Centre and Hospital-715199-13 civilians killed, 
60 injured, W W  details this attack as M8, confirms a cluster bomb 
attack, concluding that 14 civilians were killed and 87 were injured. See 
id.] 
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fifteen to twenty-six percent of all civilian deaths although the cluster bombs 
dropped represent only six percent of the weapons expended in the war."' 
.., 
[thelattack on journalists convoy Prizren-Brezovica Road-31/5/99-1 
civilian killed-[HRW has no corresponding incident number but 
confirms that on that date there was a casualty from a British cluster 
bomb. See id.] 
REPORT O THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 23,19. Aside from the attacks on the Report to the 
Prosecutor's list, HRW confirms cluster bomb attacks on Merdare and Mirovac, killing five 
and injuring three on April 10, 1999 (incident #14); three British cluster bomb attacks 
causing civilian casualties on May 17, June 3, and June 4. See Human Rights Watch, 
Civilian Deaths, supra note 20, 1 38, available at http://\wmv.hnv.org/ 
reports/2000/nato.Natbm200.htm#P116-24514. HRW lists as possible cluster bomb attacks: 
(a) April 14,1999, Pavlovac south of Vranje, bvo killed, at least one injured, from attack on 
unidentified bridge or military convoy (incident #20); April 17, 1999, attack on Batajnica 
airfield, killing three injuring one. See id. 
The Yugoslav government claimed cluster bomb attacks on the following dates and 
HRW commented as indicated: (a) May 1, 1999, Jablanica, two killed, sixteen injured; 
three children and two adults. HRW noted that the Yugoslav government provided forensic 
detail of the incident in its White book (incident #42), id.; (b) April 12, 1999, Djakovica- 
Klina road, five killed. HRW noted that it could find no authoritative source identifying the 
dead; (c) April 17, 1999, Kamena Glava, three injured, two die on 4/18/99; HRW made no 
comment on this alleged attack, incident #26; (d) April 15, 1999, Raljan, three killed; HRiV 
made no comment, incident #21. See id. HRW could find no support for the following 
claimed attacks by the Yugoslav government: (a) April 2, 1999, Orahovac, four killed; 
twelve injured (incident #3); (b) May 11, 1999, Nis Airfield, killing two and injuring four. 
Cluster bombs are reported as having been used, but Nis oficials disputed this allegation, 
stating that eleven weapons, ten missiles and one unexploded bomb were dropped on Nis on 
that date. Id. 
299. See Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs Memorandum, supra note 203, 
available at http://www.hn~~.org/about~projects/arms/memo-c1uster.htm. Some argue that 
Additional Protocol I does not prohibit the cluster bomb, at least when military actors aim 
at a military target. See Capati, supra note 94, at 227 (calling for a ban on cluster bombs, 
but apparently not considering whether Additional Protocol I sharply restricts their use); 
Roach, supra note 271, at 238 ("The assumption that some weapons are inherently 
unlawvful, particularly cluster bombs, is unacceptable to me because of its 
noncontextuality.''); cf: Carnahan, supra note 144, at 713 (arguing that laser blinding 
weapons did not cause "unnecessary suffering" either under Additional Protocol I (art. 35) 
or under customary international law). The Protocol was not intended to ban any weapon 
but rather to restrict the manner in which all weapons are used. Furthermore, the 
international community apparently felt it necessary to develop a treaty to ban anti- 
personnel land mines, even though the language of the Protocol wvould appear to require, if 
not their complete ban, at least immediately removing them from the ground absent reliable 
self-destruct mechanisms or clearly marking and fencing off mine covered areas. See 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 51; Ottawa Convention, supra note 138. The 
landmine problem had grown worse in the last quarter of the twentieth century, prompting 
the call for the ban. The Ottawa Convention defines "anti-personnel mine" as a "mine 
designed to be exploded by the proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, 
injure, or kill one or more persons." Id. art. 1. It probably would be a strained interpretation 
to conclude that cluster bombs fall within this language. In fact the Ottawa Convention 
expressly rejected the follo\ving "effects-based" definition of land mines: "[An 
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F. Uizited States, a Sigizatory, but Not a Party to the Protocol-Is the US.  
Noizetlzeless Bound Uizder a Territoriality Theory or Uizder Customary 
Iizterizafioizal Law? 
Never having ratified Additional Protocol I, the United States could argue 
that i t  is not bound by its terms. However, Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, and the other NATO countries, except France and Turkey, 
however, are parties to the Protocol. A s  members of the alliance and centrally 
involved in the military planning and in the canying out of the mission over 
Kosovo~QO they helped the United States in this effort and had the purpose, along 
with the United States, of having the bombing raids s~cceed .3~ '  Knowing the 
weapons the United States and British aircraft were using, these States can be 
charged with violating the Protocol, as aiders and abettors. Given the central 
planning that NATO undertook and the extensive coverage o f  the war over 
Kosovo, none of these States can claim lack of  knowledge of the kinds of bombs 
the United States and Britain were dr0pping.3~~ 
International law recognizes the doctrine of  complicity.'03 Under 
"generally principles of law recognized by civilized nations," an individual bears 
antipersonnel landmine is] any device or piece of ordnance which, although its primary 
purpose or design may be other than [to explode on contact, presence, or proximity of a 
person] can be deployed in a manner to achieve this effect without modification or through 
specific design feature." Wiebe, supra note 32, at 116 (quoting Foster, supra note 81,16, 
available at http~l~nnv.Ploughshares.ca~content/MO NITOR/mons99c.html (Sept. 1999)). 
Additional Protocol I does not specifically proscribe cluster bombs, mines, or, for that 
matter, any weapon or weapon system. Nonetheless one does not have to engage in the 
teleological method of treaty interpretation to conclude that any military actor, including 
NATO, that uses cluster bombs, may, under most circumstances, violate Additional 
Protocol I. 
300. See CLARK, supra note 16, at 114, 270-71; NATO, Policy and Decision- 
Making, THE NATO HANDBOOK, ch. 7, available at http:ll~~v.nato.int/docu/ 
handbook/2001/index.htm (last modified Jan. 29,2002). 
301. See NATO, supra note 300, ch. 12. 
302. See, e.g., AF~ER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 35, at 20-24. 
303. See Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 165 (1972) 
(noting that the Nuremberg Tribunal recognized complicity as a legitimate doctrine in 
determining criminal liability, apparently coming in under the "general principles" of legal 
systems, codified in the Statute of the ICJ). One tribunal defined complicity where troops 
"were found to have known the purpose of their assembly in the woods was to kill prisoners 
of war and civilian detainees. Paust, supra, at 165 (quoting The Alamo Trial, 1 L.R.T.W.C. 
35,43 (1947)). The report on the trial stated that under the circumstances: "If people were 
all present together at the same time, taking part in a common enterprise which was 
unlawful, each one in their own way assisting the common purpose of all, they were equally 
guilty in law." Id. Furthermore it is "no excuse that those who commit the actual injury are 
allies when the crime of complicity has been committed." Id. at 169. The Ad Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia devised the follo~ving test for 
complicity in genocide: "[Aln accused is an accomplice in genocide if he knowingly aided 
and abetted or provoked a person or persons to commit genocide, knowing that this person 
or persons were committing genocide." JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNA~ONAL CrUMrNAL 
LAW 42 (2d ed. 2000) (quoting Prosecution v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1 4 6  (I.C.T.Y. 1998) 
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criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting a primary perpetrator in committing 
an international crime.304 Likewise, states that act together in violating international 
law bear a "reparation obligation," namely, multiple state re~ponsibility.~'' The 
doctrine of joint liability can also be considered part of international law as 
"general principles o f  law."306 Civil liability can be imposed under customary 
international law, general principles of international law, or directly under 
Additional Protocol Po' 
Although not a party to the Protocol, the United States may nonetheless 
b e  bound under customary international la~.~'"f the 189 U.N. member states, 
(No. ICTR-9694-T), available at http://wwvw.un.org/ictr (last visited Apr. 10, 2002)); see 
also W G S A K  ~ I C H A I S S A R E E ,  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 236-47 (2001); Kai 
Ambos, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law: A 
Jurisprudential Analysis-From Nuremberg to the Hague, in I SUBSTANTIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5, 8-11 (Gabrielle Kirk 
McDonald & Olivia Swvaak-Goldman eds., 2000). 
304. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(l)(c), 
U.S.T.S. 993, 59 Stat. 1031 (entered into force Oct. 25, 1945); see also Control Council 
Law No. 10, from the Nuremberg Tribunals, "Any person. ..is deemed to have committed a 
crime as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an 
accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a 
consenting part here in...." Cf: MODEL PENAL CODE $ 2.06 (2000) (imposing criminal 
liability on individuals who aid and abet). 
305. John E. Noyes & Brian D. Smith, State Responsibility and the Principle of 
Joint and Several Liability, 13 YALE J .  INT'L L. 225,226 (1998). 
306. BROWNLIE, supra note 168, at 189. Although noting that state practice is not 
as clear as the general rules might otherwise suggest, he observes that if an "invasion were 
unlawful the existence of a joint responsibility would be undoubted [if more than one state 
participated]." Id. at 192. Presumably the same reasoning would apply to a joint invasion 
. 
when one state's armed forces, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the other state's 
commanders use a prohibited means or method of warfare. 
307. Additional Protocol 1's article on responsibility derives "almost verbatim" 
from Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention No. N, and provides as follows: "A Party to 
the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the 
case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed 
by persons forming any part of its armed forces." Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 
91. This Article imposes duties both on the victor and on the defeated party, but does not 
include any details; it "says nothing" about when compensation is due, leaving that question 
open. See BOTHE ET AL., supra note 124, at 547. 
308. Of course, the United States could claim that by rehsing to ratify the treaty, 
it has registered its objection to the formation of any custom. It thus would not be bound, 
unless the custom had achieved the status of jus cogens. Bombing civilians as such might 
possibly have achieved that status, but the proscriptions contained in Article 51(5)(a) and 
(b) probably have not. In any event, however, the United States accepts Article 51 as 
custom. See Robert G. Goldman, The Legal Regime Governing the Conduct of Operation 
Desert Storm, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 363, 380 (1992) (citing Symposium, 6th linnual 
American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International 
Humanitarian law: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International 
Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. 
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159 have ratified Additional Protocol I.309 While some of the Protocol's articles 
have not yet reached the level of customary international law, others may have, 
such as "Article 51, prohibiting attacks against civilians, including target area 
bombardment and other indiscriminate attacks that violate the rule of 
pr~portionality."~'O ne commentator suggests that Article 51(5)(a), prohibiting 
target area bombing, "probably reaffirms" customary international law if the words 
"clearly separated" means separated by a "significant di~tance."~" "[Tlhe 
principles behind Article 51 have long appeared in international conventions and 
now enjoy almost universal (if only superficial) acceptance as custom."312 While it 
is probably fair to say that the general rules contained in Article 51 have achieved 
customary status, whether all the ramifications of the Article have done so is more 
open to question. 
President Ronald Reagan opposed ratification of Additional Protocol I, 
mainly because of fears that Articles l(4) and 96 would have given "prisoner-of- 
war privileges.. .to the Palestine Liberation Organization and [would have] 
promote[d] various liberation movements to state or quasi-state status."313 Such 
fears, however, proved unfounded. No liberation movement has invoked Article 
96, probably because such a rebel movement would have difficulty "accepting and 
carrying out all the obligations stated in the Protocol and could thus expose its 
members to war crimes  prosecution^."^^^ 
The United States accepts that certain articles of the Protocol have 
become customary international law. Among other articles, the United States 
accepts the following as custom: Article 35(1) & (2) (limiting methods and means 
of warfare, including methods and means producing superfluous injury) but not 
& POL'Y 419 (1987) (Remarks of Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. 
Department of State)). 
309. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
and the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: Ratifcations, Accessions, and Successions, 
available at http://gvalnwb2.icrc.org/icrceng.ns~5cacfdf48ca698b641256242003b3295/ 
600d2bd30d7b93e64125624b00402ebb?OpenDocument&Hi&light=2,mti~7 (last 
modified Apr. 8,2002). 
310. George H. Aldrich, Yiolations of the Laws or Customs of War, in I 
SUBSTANTIVE AM) PROCEDURAL SPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL AW, supra note 
303, at 97, 103 (Judge Aldrich headed the United States delegation to the 1974-1977 
Geneva Conference, which produced the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949). 
3 1 I. Robert G. GoIdman, The Legal Regime Governing the Conduct of Operation 
Desert Storm, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 363,380 (1992). 
312. Matthew C. Waxman, Siegecraft and Surrender: The Law and Strategy of 
Cities as Targets, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 353,416 (1999). But see Waldemar Solf, Protection of 
Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary International Law, 1 AM. U. J. 
INT'L L. & POL'Y 117 (1986). 
313. Meron, supra note 167, at 175. For additional details on U.S. objections, see 
Adriane L. DeSaussure, The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict in the Persian Gulf War, an 
Overview, 1994 A.F. L. REV. 41,49-51. 
3 14. Meron, supra note 167, at 184. 
Heinonline - -  44 Ariz. L. Rev. 105 2002 
106 ANZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:l 
Articles 35(3) or 55 (protecting the environment); Article 51 (protecting civilians) 
except subsection 6 (prohibiting reprisals against the civilian population); and 
Articles 73-89 (establishing, among other things, criminal responsibility for grave 
breaches of the P r o t o ~ o l ) . ~ ~ ~  Consequently, except for the provisions protecting the 
3 15. See U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (Capt. Jeanne M. Meyer & 
CDR Brain J. Bill eds., 2002), ch. 2, p. 11, available at http://\nnv.jagcnet.amy.mill 
J A G N E T I n t e m e t / H o m e p a g e s / A C / T J A G S A W e b . n s B  11 
3edb3e018696910b85256ab9005979b8/$FILE/ChapterO/o202.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 
2002). The Operational Law Handbook states as follo\vs: 
The U.S. views the follo\ving articles of Additional Protocol I as either legally binding 
as customary international law or acceptable practice though not legally binding: [art.] 
5 (appointment of protecting powers); [art.] 10 (equal protection of wounded, sick, and 
shipwrecked); [art.] 11 (guidelines for medical procedures); [arts.] 12-34 (medical 
units, aircraft, ships, missing and dead persons); [art.] 35(1) & (2) (limiting methods 
and means of warfare); [art.] 37 (perfidy prohibitions); [art.] 38 (prohibition against 
improper use of protected emblems); [art.] 45 (prisoner of war presumption for those 
who participate in the hostilities); [art.] 51 (protection of the civilian population, 
except para. 6, reprisals); [art.] 52 (general protection of civilian objects); [art.] 54 
(protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population); [arts.] 
57-60 (precautions in attack, undefended localities, and demilitarized zones); [art.] 62 
(civil defense protection); [art.] 63 (civil defense in occupied territories); [art.] 70 
(relief actions); [arts.] 73-89 (treatment of persons in the power of a party to the 
conflict; women and children; and duties regarding implementation of GP I). The U.S. 
specifically objects to article l(4) (on . . . the applicability of protocol I] to certain 
types of armed conflicts-wars of national liberation from "colonial domination," "alien 
occupation", and "racist regimes"); [art.] 35(3) (environmental limitations on means 
and methods of warfare); [art.] 39(2) (limits on the use of enemy flags and insignia); 
[art.] 44 (expansion of definition of combatants, relaxing of requirement to wear futed 
distinctive insignia recognizable at a distance; reducing threshold of lawful combatant 
status to requirement to carry arms openly during military engagement or in military 
deployment preceding an attack; when visible to an adversary); [art.] 47 (non- 
protection of mercenaries); [art.] 55 (protection of the natural environment); and [art.] 
56 (protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces). 
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Department of Defense, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN 
GULF CONFLICT, AN INTERIM REPORT O CONGRESS 12-3 (July 1991). After quoting Article 
48, which requires, among other things, that combatants "shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants," the Report goes on to say: 
For military, political, and humanitarian reasons, the United States in 1987 declined to 
become a party to Protocol I; nor was Protocol I in effect during the recent conflict, as 
Iraq is not a party to that treaty. However, the language of Article 48 quoted above is 
regarded as a codification of the customary practice of nations, and therefore binding 
on all nations. 
Id. at 13-3; see also Michael J. Matheson, The United States' Position on the Relation of 
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 419-20 (1987); Human Rights Watch, Civilian 
Deaths, supra note 20,736 n.44 (quoting ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 626: "The 
idea has also been put forward that even if they are very high, civilian losses and damages 
may be justified if the military advantage at stake is of great importance. This idea is 
contrary to the fimdamental rules of the Protocol .... The Protocol does not provide any 
justification for attacks that cause extensive civilian losses or damage. Incidental losses and 
damage should never be extensive."), available at http://~nnv.hnv.org/reports/2000/ 
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environment, the United States accepts as customary international law most of the 
relevant articles. On the other hand, it is doubtfbl whether the United States 
accepts as custom interpretations of the Protocol to relatively new situations, 
namely, that cluster bombs with substantial dud rates amount to blind, 
indiscriminate weapons, or that they constitute prohibited target area bombing 
when dropped in areas with a "concentration of civilians."316 
Aside fiom customary international law, the United States is a signatory 
to the First Protocol. As a signatory, it is obliged under the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties to do nothing to defeat the treaty's object and purpose?17 
Using an indiscriminate weapon is arguably so inconsistent with the treaty as to 
defeat its object and purpose. The United States, for the reasons set forth below, 
would be "responsible," at least in the civil law sense, for such a breach. 
Lastly, the United States and its armed forces may be bound to the extent 
that they commit their actions on the territory of States that have ratified the 
Protocol. Under standard conflict of law rules, the law of the territory in which the 
act takes place governs.318 The former Yugoslavia ratified the first Protocol on 
June 11, 1979. Under general rules of international law, treaties negotiated by prior 
governments are binding on successor govern~nents?'~ The United States may 
argue that, as an international conflict, the war over Kosovo cannot be governed by 
one state's law. Though possibly true, the law in question is the law of its allies as 
well as the law of the territory in which the acts took place. The international 
character of the conflict derives primarily fiom the humanitarian intervention itself. 
If such an intervention is legal, the intervening parties must at a minimum abide by 
nato.Natbm200-Ol.htm# P 2 3 2 -57126. The Defense Department has established that 
"[tlhe law of war obligations of the United States are observed and enforced by DoD 
components," presumably including all armed forces of the United States. See DoD 
Directive 5100.77 of December 9, 1998, fi 4.1. 
3 16. See supra note 35. 
317. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18(a), 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39127, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980). The 
United States government could argue, however, that it never ratified the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties either, so it is not bound by a treaty it has not ratified. 
Various United States governmental bodies have declared that the Convention is, however, 
declaratory of custom or has become custom through recognition and practice. See, e.g., 
Chubb & Sons, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 n.5 (2d Cir. 2000); see also 
Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States 
Cour&s, 28 VA. J .  INT'L L. 281 (1988). 
318. CJ Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 12 (conferring jurisdiction on the court 
when the alleged criminal acts take place in the territory of a state party to the ICC, 
presumably applying even to nationals of states that have neither signed nor ratified the 
Convention establishing the ICC). But see Guy Roberts, Assault on Sovereignty: The Clear 
and Present Danger of the New International Criminal Court, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 35, 
61 (2001) (sharply criticizing the ICC's asserting jurisdiction over non party nationals and 
characterizing this territorial basis as a radical expansion of traditional notions of 
jurisdictions). 
319. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL L W CASES AND 
MATERIALS 530, 1043 (3d ed. 1993). 
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strict respect for human rights contained both in human rights treaties and 
guaranteed by custom and general principles of international law. 
IV. CLUSTER BOMBS, WAR CRIMES, AND REPARATION 
A. Proseczrtion Under Additioizal Protocol I 
Do any of these asserted violations of the Protocol constitute a war crime? 
The high mens rea requirement for the War Crimes article of the Protocol suggests 
not. The relevant language of the war crimes article is as follows: 
3. In addition to the grave breaches defined in Article 11, the 
following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, 
when committed willfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of 
this Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or health: 
(a) Making the civilian population or individual civilians the object 
of attack; 
@) launching an indiscriminate attack aflecting the civilian 
population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)(iii); . . . 
5. Without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and of 
this Protocol, grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded 
as war crimes.)20 
In the original draft, the ICRC made any violations of the Protocol a war 
~rime.3~' The United States and other states strenuously objected, insisting on 
including strict culpability req~irements.3~' The express language of the war crimes 
article requires that the actor "commit" the grave breach "willfully." Under Anglo- 
Saxon jurisprudence, "willfully" means at least knowingly and often is construed 
as meaning "knowingly violating a legal The drafting history of this 
Article suggests that the drafters intended to make the culpability requirement 
high, so it is at least reasonable to believe that the stricter interpretation of willfully 
is the intended interpretation. 
Not only must the actor willhlly commit the grave breach, he or she 
must "launch[] an indiscriminate attack afecting the civilian population or civilian 
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to 
320. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 85 (emphasis added). 
321. See LEVIE, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 131, at 185,194-95. 
322. Seeid. 
323. See, e.g., United States v. Cheek, 498 U.S. 192 (1991). But see Bryan v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998) (over vigorous dissent of Justice Scalia, holding that 
"willfUlly" did not mean knowing of the legal duty). 
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civilians or damage to civilian objects....'"" In the context of the two alleged 
violations of the Protocol here, the prosecutor would have serious difficulty in 
proving a "grave breach." Assume that delivering dud cluster bombs except in the 
most isolated areas imaginable is indiscriminate, because such duds are blind as to 
time, weapons in essence that do not permit the attacker to discriminate between 
civilians or troops. To be held criminally liable, the actors-fiom the pilot all the 
way up the chain of command--(a) would have to know that delivering a cluster 
bomb violated a legal duty, and (b) would have to deliver the bombs "in the 
hno~vledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects." Aside fkom the fact that the latter standard is vague 
(what is excessive to you may not be excessive to me), a prosecutor would have to 
prove that the actor was subjectively aware of the excessiveness. Only in the most 
egregious cases would a prosecutor be able to make such a showing. 
The United States and Russia maintain that using cluster bombs does not 
violate international Although ignorance of the law is generally not an 
excuse, the strictest standard of willfulness does provide a defense for mistake of 
law. If that is the standard, fiont line actors such as the pilot and crews would 
probably be able to successfully assert such a defense. Even those higher up the 
chain of command may be able to successfully defend on this ground. 
Aside fkom proving willfulness, showing that the actor knew the attack 
caused excessive loss of life and injury, as noted above, would be quite difficult. 
The discussion above demonstrates that leaving dud cluster bombs on the ground 
violates the rule of proportionality-since after the conflict no military objective 
esists to balance against civilian casualties. While this point may be demonstrated 
324. The intent requirement is considerably higher than that necessary for a 
simple violation of the Protocol: 
It is not sufficient that the will to launch an indiscriminate attack exists. 
In addition the person taking the action has to have the knowledge that 
certain consequences still follow. . . . The attack is already illegitimate if 
it may be expected to cause such losses [excessive loss of civilian life 
considering the 'concrete and direct military advantage anticipated']. A 
high degree of precaution is required. A grave breach on the other hand 
presupposes more: the knowledge (not only the presumption) that such 
an attack will cause excessive losses in kind. 
BOTHE, supra note 124, at 516; see also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 994 
(defining willfully as follows: ''[qhe accused must have acted consciously and with intent, 
i.e., with his mind on the act and its consequences, and willing them ('criminal intent' or 
'malice aforethought'); this encompasses the concepts of 'wrongful intent' or 
'recklessness,' viz., the attitude of an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, 
accepts the possibility of it happening; on the other hand, ordina~y negligence or lack of 
foresight is not covered, i.e., when a man acts without having his mind on the act or its 
consequences (although failing to take necessary precautions, particularly failing to seek 
precise information constitutes culpable negligence punishable at least by disciplinary 
sanctions)..."). Note, however, that the ICRC Commentary definition rejects the mistake of 
law interpretation and concludes that acting "recklessly" satisfies the "willfully" 
requirement. 
325. See supra note 35. 
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objectively, it is quite another thiig to prove that the actor knew of this calculus 
before dropping the cluster bombs. The "knowingly" standard requires that the 
actor be subjectively aware or at the very least consciously disregard a high risk 
that a fact ex i~ t s . 3~~  Reasonable minds can differ as to whether dropping dud cluster 
bombs causes "excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects." Thus, to prove the actor knew the dud cluster bombs caused such 
excessive civilian casualties would be thus that much harder. 
A prosecutor could argue that after the Persian Gulf War, NATO 
commanders certainly were aware of the risks to civilians posed by dud cluster 
bombs. While true, the commanders could defend, claiming lack of wvillfulness and 
that they did not know that dropping duds caused "excessivey' civilian casualties. 
The same arguments apply to the second type of violation, using cluster 
bombs on military targets where there is a concentration of the civilian population. 
Assuming that an independent investigation confirmed NATO's explanation of the 
cluster bomb falling on Nis, then there would not appear to be a basis for a war 
crime. NATO admitted from the start that this bombing was a mistake, and it 
appears to have been a mistake?" The center of Nis was not targeted; an airfield 
approximately a mile away was. NATO stated that the dispenser released its 
submunitions prematurely, causing them to spread over a much wider distance, 
straying fiom the target.'28 Neither the pilots nor the crews apparently acted 
- - 
326. Article 30 of the Rome Statute for the International Court defines 
"knowingly" strictly: 
2. For the purposes of this Article, a person has intent where: 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; 
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events. 
3. For the purposes of this Article, "knowledge" means awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course 
of events. "Kno~v" and "kno~vingly" shall be construed accordingly." 
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 30. See also Yoram Dinstein, Defenses, in I SUBSTANTIVE 
AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 303, at 367,371- 
78 for a discussion of the mens rea requirements established by the ICC for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The ICC statute apparently does not include a willful blindness 
provision, a lower standard for proving knowledge. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE 8 2.02(7) 
(2000) ("Requirement of Knowledge Satisfied by Knowledge of High Probability: When 
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge 
is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually 
believes that it does not exist.") (emphasis added). See United States v. Jewel], 532 F.2d 
697 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (the then Circuit Court of Appeals Judge 
Kennedy provides an informative gloss on this section, which codifies the "willful 
blindness doctrine"). 
327. See CLARK, supra note 16, at 196 
328. See id. 
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willfully nor in the knowledge that they would cause excessive civilian 
ca~ualties.3~~ 
On the other hand if, for example, the U.S. Air Force failed to equip the 
CBU-87B with a Doppler altitude detector, the prosecutor might argue that such a 
failure amounts, at the very least, to reckless indifference to civilian lives. The 
bombing of Nis was apparently caused by the CBU-87B dispenser opening 
prematurely. The Department of Defense has yet to release information as to what 
caused the premature release. A Doppler altitude detector was readily available, 
standard optional equipment for the CBU-87B. Kosovo and Serbia are 
mountainous regions and fairly densely p0pulated.3~~ Errors in delivery of cluster 
bombs could be foreseen. Failure to use a piece of equipment that would have 
prevented such errors or at least limited them amounted to reckless disregard, 
because the commanders were aware of the central facts, namely, the risks posed 
by cluster bombs to civilians and the errors inherent in aerial bombing. If and only 
if the cluster bomb dispenser in question was not equipped with a Doppler radar 
sensing device would this be an issue.331 
Even assuming a prosecutor could make such a showing, the command 
could still defend, claiming a lack of willfulness and that they never acted "in the 
knowledge" that failure to equip CBU-87B with the Doppler altitude sensor would 
cause "excessive" civilian casualties. The same argument would apply to NATO's 
targeting the Nis Airport in the first place, an area with a concentration of civilians. 
Commanders and pilots could assert that they did not know dropping cluster 
bombs on this presumed military target violated humanitarian law, and, even if 
they did, prosecutors could not prove that these military actors knew that dropping 
the cluster bombs on the Nis Airport would cause excessive civilian casualties. 
The prosecution thus bears a very heavy burden in proving war crimes, 
grave breaches of the Protocol: 
[Plaragraphs 3(b) and (c) are dram so narrowly that they limit 
application of Article 85 to only a few situations in which the rule of 
proportionality would be breached. Specifically the attack must be 
launched 'in the knowledge that' it will cause excessive civilian 
329. The conclusion here is necessarily tentative because neither NATO nor the 
Department of Defense has made available the results of any investigation of the incident. 
The ICTY Prosecutor should have demanded that such an investigation be made. But see 
Robert M. Hayden, Woodrow Wilson Int'l Centre for Scholars, U.N. War Crimes Tribunal 
Delivers a Travesty of Justice (concluding that NATO had committed a war crime in 
dropping cluster bombs on Nis just as the ICTY had concluded that the Serb Milan Martic 
had committed a war crime in shelling Zagreb with cluster bombs), available at 
http:llwww.~vwics.si.edu/NEWShaydsenh (last visited Apr. 10,2002). 
330. Yugoslavia has a population density of 269 persons per sq. mile (104 persons 
per sq. Ian.). See MICROSOFT 98 ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, Yugoslavia, Land and Resources 
(1998). 
331. There may, in fact, be other issues concerning the bombing of Nis. Unless 
the Department of Defense publishes the results of a full investigation of the incident, it is 
impossible to render a definitive judgment. 
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casualties or damage to civilian objects. This makes most violations 
of obligations such as that found in Article 57, subparagraph 
2(a)(iii) mere breaches of Protocol I. It also results in the conclusion 
that very few weapons violations will be grave breaches under 
Protocol I unless the weapon is used to violate some other 
proscription such as making civilians the object of attack.332 
Under the current available evidence, prosecuting actors in NATO for 
delivering cluster bombs should fail. 
B. Prosecution Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
In July 1998, the vast majority of countries of the world agreed to create 
an International Criminal Court, and in fact, the Court appears to becoming a 
reality.333 Although not in effect during the Kosovo intervention, the ICC may 
ultimately be a major judicial body for interpreting and enforcing international 
human law. The individuals and parties involved in the NATO air campaign in 
Serbia and the Kosovo province were obviously not covered by the ICC. Yet, as 
the most recent expression of international humanitarian law, the Rome Statute 
establishing the ICC could provide guidance on the legality of cluster bombs. The 
ICC, however, focuses exclusively on criminal prosecution, not necessarily on 
protection of civilians. The mens rea and actus reus requirements are actually 
somewhat harder for a prosecutor to meet under the ICC than under the Protocol. 
Under Article 8 of the ICC, an individual is guilty of a war crime when he 
or she:334 
332. Maj. William G. Schmidt, The Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflcfs: Protocol IAdditional to the Geneva Conventions, 1984 A.F. L. REV. 189, 242- 
43. 
333. See Rome Statute, supra note 4. On April 11,2002, ten countries deposited 
their ratifications with the Secretary General of the United Nations, raising the number of 
ratifications to sixty-six and thereby enabling the Statute of the Court to come into force. 
Barbara Crossette, War Crimes Tribunal Becomes Reality, Without US.  Role, N.Y. TI~ES, 
Apr. 11,2002, at A3. As of that date, 139 countries had signed this Convention. See United 
Nations, m e  Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court, Signatures, 
Ratifications, and Accessions, available at http:llwww.un.org~aw/icclstatutelromef 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2002). Although President Clinton signed the ICC Statute, President 
Bush's administration adamantly opposes the ICC and will not send the Statute to the 
Senate for approval, which would presumably be difficult to obtain in any event. See 
Crossette, supra, at A3. President Bush is also considering nullifying President Clinton's 
signing the Statute of the ICC. See id.; Elizabeth A. Neuffer, US. to Back Out of 
Court Plan Envoy: Bush Team May 'Unsign' Treaty, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 2002, at 
A22, available at 2002 WL 41 19306. 
334. Article 8 also criminalizes the following: 
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflict, within the established framework of 
international law, namely, any of the following acts: 
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such 
or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; 
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Intentionally launch[es] an attack in the knowledge that such attack 
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to 
civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated[.]33s 
The language resembles that of  Article 85 of Additional Protocol I, which 
imposes criminal liability for grave breaches.336 ICC's Article uses the language 
"[i]ntentionally launches an attack," arguably similar to the Protocol's language?' 
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects 
which are not military objectives; 
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, 
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians 
or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict .... 
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8. 
335. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(iv) (emphasis added). 
336. A cluster bomb attack directed against civilians could also be prosecuted as a 
crime against humanity, defined in Article 7 of the ICC: 
For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of 
the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack: (a) Murder;...@) Persecution against any identifiable group or 
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with 
any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; ...( k) Other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
Id. at art. 7;  cJ supra notes 352-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Martic 
case (defendant indicted by ICTY for allegedly launching a cluster bomb attack on a city). 
The ICC defines "attack" as follows: "For the purpose of paragraph 1: (a) 'Attack 
directed against any civilian population' means a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or 
in hrtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack ...." Rome Statute, 
supra note 4, art. 7(2). To establish a crime against humanity, the prosecution will have to 
show that the defendant targeted the civilian population, a heavy burden. In most situations, 
the accused will be able to point to some military objective at which the cluster bombs were 
aimed. The crime against humanity article only applies in egregious cases. 
337. 
In addition to the grave breaches defined in Article 11, the following 
acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when 
committed willfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of this 
Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or health: 
(a) Making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of 
attack; 
(b) Launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population 
or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive 
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requiring the defendant to have ccwillfully" committed the violation.338 Both the 
ICC and the Protocol require that the defendant act "in the knowledge" of the key 
facts the attack will bring about, for example, under the ICC "injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
environment." Additional Protocol I codifies the proportionality principle as a 
basis for criminal liabiIity.339 That Article incorporates by reference language fiom 
another Article, which prohibits: "launching any attack which may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, 
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct militaly advantage anticipated.. .."340 
The ICC waters down Additional Protocol 1's language in two ways. First 
it adds the word, ccclearly" to "excessive." The prosecutor has to prove that 
defendant knew that the attack would cause not merely ccexcessive" civilian 
casualties but rather "clearly excessive" civilian casualties. What this means in 
practice remains to be seen. As pointed out above, a prosecutor would probably be 
able to prove a violation of the Protocol's proportionality rule only in absolutely 
egregious cases. So even under Additional Protocol I, the prosecution will, in fact, 
be able to meet that element of the offense only where in fact the attack caused 
ccclearly" excessive civilian deaths and injuries. On the other hand, the tribunal 
could reasonably assume that the parties to the Conference intended "clearly" to 
convey some meaning, presumably to make the prosecutor's burden a heavier one: 
"The use of the word 'clearly' ensures that criminal responsibility would be 
entailed only in cases where the excessiveness of the incidental damage was 
obvious."341 
Second, the ICC also qualifies "direct military advantage anticipated" by 
adding the one word, Under the ICC's version of the proportionality 
rule, the civilian casualty side of the scale is balanced against the weight of the 
"concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated."343 This proposal 
renewed a debate in the ICRC Conference establishing the First Additional 
loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in 
Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)(%). . .. 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art 8543). 
338. The Prosecutor could argue that "willfUlly" may denote a mistake of law 
defense whereas "intentionally" does not. Consequently in this respect the ICC's mens rea 
requirement is less strict than the Protocol's. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying 
text for a more detailed discussion of this point. 
339. Thus, defendant is criminally liable when he or she "0) launch[es] an 
indiscriminate attack afecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge 
that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)(iii)." Additional Protocol I, supra note 
134, art. 85(3)(b). 
340. Id. art. 57(2)(iii) (emphasis added). 
341. REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 23, 721  (relying on the Rome 
Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(a)(iv) as "evolving customary international law"). 
342. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(a)(iv) (emphasis added). 
343. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Protocol. Instead of examining whether attacking a particular target caused 
excessive casualties, the "overall military advantagey' language can be interpreted 
to mean whether in examining the entire battle, if not the entire conflict, the 
tribunal determines whether the attack on this particular target caused excessive 
civilian casualties. Proponents of this view lost in the ICRC Conference, because 
the majority of the conference delegates believed this proposal would unreasonably 
weaken the already weak proportionality rule, leaving civilians largely 
unprotected.344 
As previously NATO commanders and pilots will not be 
found to have violated the proportionality rule under the Protocol for using cluster 
bombs in Kosovo and Serbia. Consequently even had the ICC been in force in 
Yugoslavia, they could not be found to have violated the less stringent 
proportionality rule in Article 7 of the ICC for using cluster bombs. 
C. Prosecrttio~r Under tlte litterizatioizal Criirziilal Tribunal for tlze For~~zer 
Yz~goslavia 
Interestingly, the Kosovo intervention came under the jurisdiction of one 
of hvo currently existing international criminal tribunals, the Ad Hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (ICTY).346 A Canadian law 
professor and others drafted a complaint naming President Clinton, Madeline 
344. See ICRC CO~~ENTARY,  supra note 70, at 683: "This Article [on 
proportionality] like Article 51 '(Protection of the civilian population)' is not concerned 
with strategic objectives but with the means used in a specific tactical operation." On the 
other hand, defendants before the ICC could argue that the word "overall" changes the test 
from examining a "specific tactical operation" to examining "strategic objectives" of at 
least the entire battle if not the entire conflict. It must be noted that some NATO members 
who are parties to Additional Protocol I attached reservations or declarations on this point. 
The Federal Republic of Germany's is typical: "In applying the rule of proportionality in 
Article 51 and Article 57, 'military advantage' is understood to refer to the advantage 
anticipated fronz the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular 
parts of the attack." Federal Republic of Germany, Declaration Made at Ratification of 
Additional Protocol I, 7 5 (1991), available at http:l/~nnv.icrc.org/ihl.nsf7677558c021 ... I 
3f4dS706b6b7ea40c1256402003fb3c7?0penDocen (emphasis added). The following 
NATO countries have made similar reservations or declarations: Belgium, Declaration at 
Tirrze of Ratification, 7 5; Canada, Statement of Understanding concerning Articles 51(2) 
and 57(2)(a)(iiS); Italy, Declarations Made at Tinze of Ratzjication; Netherlands, 
Declaration Made at Time of Ratification, 7 5; Spain, Declarations Made at Time of 
Ratificatiorz; United Kingdom, Reservations, ql I, available at http://mv.icrc.org/ 
ihl.nsf7677558~021 ... /Oa9e03fDQee757cc1256402003fb6d2?0penDocmen (last visited 
June 2,2001). 
345. See supra notes 321-29 and accompanying text. 
346. The ICTY was established by the U.N. Security Council to impose the rule 
of law on those responsible for "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia, especially in 
Bosnia and Croatia. The Tribunal is empowered to adjudge guilt or innocence and impose 
appropriate sentences on those convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity. S.C. 
RES. 817, May 25, 1993. 
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Albright, Tony Blair and other NATO leaders as defe11dants.3~~ Among other 
charges, the complaint alleged that the defendants violated the Protocol by using 
cluster bombs in civilian areas. Members of the Russian Parliament and legal 
experts apparently also met with the ICTY Prosecutor's predecessor, urging an 
investigation of NATO's bombing ~ampaign.3~' The Prosecutor, however, refused 
to initiate an investigation into the allegations and refused to indict any NATO 
leaders or military personnel.349 
After receiving the complaint, the Prosecutor did appoint a committee to 
look into the allegations informally. It concluded that cluster bombs do not 
currently violate humanitarian law. The Committee first found that anti-personnel 
landmines do not yet violate customary international law although "there is a 
strong trend in that direction."350 In any event, the Committee then concluded that 
"[tlhere is ... no general legal consensus that cluster bombs are, in legal terms, 
equivalent to antipersonnel land mine^."^^' The Committee acknowledged that the 
Prosecutor's office had previously indicted a Serb, Milan Martic, for allegedly 
ordering cluster bomb attacks upon the Croatian city of Zagreb, resulting in seven 
civilian deaths.352 The Prosecutor's Committee distinguished the Martic case from 
NATO's use of cluster bombs, noting in that case "the Chamber stated there was 
no formal provision forbidding the use of cluster bombs as such (para. 18 of 
judgment) but it regarded the use of the Orkan rocket with a cluster bomb warhead 
in that particular case as evidence of the intent of the accused to deliberately attack 
the civilian population because the rocket was inaccurate, it landed in an area with 
no military objectives nearby, it was used as an antipersonnel weapon launched 
against the city of Zagreb, and the accused indicated he intended to attack the city 
as Neither NATO nor the United States has publicly disclosed the 
347. See Michael Mandel et al. (Osgoode Hall Law School), Request that the 
Prosecutor [Justice Louise Arbour] Investigate Named Individuals William J. Clinton, 
Madeline Albright, William S. Cohen et al.] for Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law and Prepare Indictments Against them Pursuant to Articles 18.1 and 18.4 of the 
Tribunal Statute, JURIST, available at http://jurist.la~v.pitt.edu/icty.htm (visited on Apr. 10, 
2002). Other individuals also submitted requests to investigate NATO leaders in connection 
with the Kosovo bombing campaign. See, e.g., Alexander Kykourezosf (Greece), Request to 
Investigate, available at http://balkanpeace.orgAan/greece.html (last visited Mar. 30,2002); 
Glen Rangwala (University of Cambridge), Request to Investigate, 
http://balkanpeace.org/lan/lNDEX.HTM (last visited Mar. 30,2002). 
348. Steven Lee Myers, Kosovo Inquiry Confirms US.  Fears of War Crimes 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,2000, at A6. 
349. See Barbara Crossette, UN. War Crimes Prosecutor Declines to Investigate 
NATO, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,2000, at A4. 
350. REPORT TOTHEPROSECUTOR, supra note 23, 127. 
351. Id. 
352. See id. 7 27 (citing ql23-3 1 of the Martic judgment); see also Prosecutor v. 
Martic, qn5-6 (I.C.T.Y. 1996) (No. IT 95-11-R61), available at http://~vw.un.org. 
/icty/transel1/960227IT.txt; Christopher Lockwood, Zagreb Bombing Was Criminal Act, 
ELECTRONIC TELEGRAPH, Feb. 28, 1996, available at http:l/~mmv.telegraph.co.uWet?ac 
=05274126916657&rtrno=3HYHxE33M&atmo=mm~q&p/e96/2/2S/ wserbs2S.htrnl. 
353. REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 23, fi 27. 
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results of any investigation into the Nis attack. The Committee concluded that 
'%based on the information presently available," NATO did not use cluster bombs 
"in such a fashion."354 The Committee neither called on NATO or the United 
States to investigate this incident nor did the Committee recommend to the 
Prosecutor that she do so. 
Furthermore, the Committee did not directly address whether NATO's 
use of cluster bombs violated Article 51(5)(a) & (c) of the Protocol, that dud 
cluster bombs are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the Protocol's ban on 
indiscriminate weapons. Nor did the Committee address whether NATO's use of 
cluster bombs in some populated areas constituted prohibited target area bombing. 
In any event, the Committee recommended against investigating NATO for a 
possible violation of humanitarian law on this or other grounds. 355 
The Prosecutor followed the Committee's re~ommendation.~~~At leas  
with regard to NATO's employing cluster the Committee reached the 
correct result on the available evidence, but on the wrong grounds. As pointed out 
above, dud cluster bombs, if anything, pose greater risks to civilians than 
unmarked anti-personnel mines. Dud cluster bombs act like extraordinarily 
-- - -- - 
354. Id. 
355. See Charles Trueheart, U.N. Tribunal Rejects Calls for Probe of NATO; No 
Kosovo FVar Crimes Found, WASH. POST, June 3, 2000, at A09 (noting, however, that the 
Prosecutor's informal review "stoked fury in Congress and among military leaders in 
Washington, who were angry that U.S. leaders were being scrutinized for war crimes 
comparable to those widely ascribed to Yugoslav President Slobadan Milosevic"). The 
Tribunal's Statute does not expressly ban indiscriminate attacks on civilians or target area 
bombing as does Additional Protocol I. Thus, it may not be surprising that the Committee 
did not discuss a treaty that was not directly binding on the Tribunal. Nonetheless, the 
Statute of the ICTY does authorize it to 
prosecute persons violating the laws or custom of war.. .includ[ing], but 
not limited to...@) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity; (c) attack, or 
bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, 
dtvellings, or buildings.. .. 
Statute of the International Tribunal (for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of Humanitarian Lawv Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia), 
May 3, 1993, art. 3, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993), available at 
http://\nnv.un.org/icty/basic/l-b-ens.ht (last visited Apr. 8, 2002) (emphasis added). 
Many of the Articles of Additional Protocol I, including Article 51, have assumed the status 
of custon~ary international law. See supra notes 308-16 and accompanying text. 
356. See Trueheart, supra note 355, at A09. 
357. Note that Amnesty International concluded that the bombing of the RTS 
Television Station constituted a war crime. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 23, at 46. But 
see Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 20 (questioning the bombing of the 
station but implying that it did not rise to the level of a war crime), available at 
http://wnnv.hnv.org/reports/2OOO/nato/ie, The Civilian Deaths; Human 
Rights Watch, A m ,  Weapons and the Conduct of War, World Report 2000, 7 1 (2000) 
('?\JATO violated international humanitarian law, but did not commit war crimes."), 
available at http://~nnv.hnv.org/wr2kl/armsIarms5.html. 
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powerful anti-personnel lan~lmines.3~~ They fall under Article 51(5)(c) of the 
Protocol, because once on the ground, a dud cluster bomb cannot be aimed so as to 
distinguish between civilian and military targets. Since, however, the mens rea 
requirements for war crimes were not met, NATO commanders and pilots are 
apparently not criminally responsible under humanitarian law?" The Committee, 
however, should have insisted that either the Prosecutor herself or at a minimum 
NATO and the United States cany out an investigation of the Nis attack. Clearing 
NATO of war crimes on the bald assertion by the side in question that a cluster 
bomb dispenser opened prematurely exposes the ICTY to charges of bias.360 
D. NATO's Obligation to Make Reparation 
Any state that violates international law must make reparation: "The 
juridical consequences of the breach of any international obligation is the creation 
of a duty to make reparati~n."~~' The Permanent Court of International Justice 
discussed this duty, noting that "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed."362 Reparation may 
take the form of restitution, compensation, or satisfaction, or any combination of 
these three remedies.363 
For the reasons set forth above, NATO member states have the obligation 
to make reparation for delivering cluster bombs. It is a thesis of this Article that 
any armed force using cluster bombs has at a minimum the obligation to make 
358. See supra notes 70-98 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of 
this issue. 
359. See id. 
360. See, e.g., Hayden, supra note 329; Obradovic, supra note 16; Steve Erlander, 
The Handover of Milosevic, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at A12 (quoting Aleksa Djilas, a 
Serb historian, complaining that only Milosevic and neither NATO commanders nor any 
commanders from the JSLA or from Croatia who engaged in war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are being prosecuted). See also Wiebe, supra note 32, at 142 (noting that the 
distances between the areas in Nis in which cluster bomb submunitions were reported to 
have landed by Human Rights Watch "is larger than even the largest footprint reported for a 
CBU-87 (a square kilometer [.62 sq. mile]"). 
361. Noyes & Smith, supra note 305, at 238 (emphasis in original) (citing 
Choaow Factory Case (Merits) (Germ. V. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47; 
accord, e.g., Opinion in the Lusitania Cases (U.S. v. Ger.) 7 R. Int'l Arb. Awvards 32, 35 
(1923)). 
362. Id. at 238 (quoting the Choaow Factory Case, supra note 361, at 47). 
363. See id. at 238. For an illustration of a combination of compensation and 
satisfaction, see BRO\VNLIE, supra note 168, at 238 (noting that in responding to 
S~vitzerland's claim against Germany for violating Swiss neutrality from 19141916, 
Germany "expressed regret, punished or transferred the aviators responsible, and offered an 
indemnity"). Although restitution is often said to be the preferred remedy in international 
law, compensation is the preferred remedy in practice. See id. at 21 1; CHRISTINE GRAY, 
JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL L W 12 (1990). 
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restitution, "rectification of harm already caused by the illegal namely, to 
clear dud cluster submunitions from the territory on which they were dropped. A 
military actor violates Protocol I, "[u]nless all feasible precautions, such as.. .mine 
removal, are taken to reduce the danger to civilians...."365 Given that dud cluster 
bombs operate just as mines, with the exception that cluster bombs are far more 
destructive and cannot be as accurately recorded, mapped, or marked to warn the 
community of their presence, the minimum obligation of a force using such 
weapons is to "remov[e]" them after the conflict is over. To  avoid indiscriminate 
injury to civilians, the military force has the related duty immediately to provide 
the location of bombing sites and estimated delivery points to both enemy and 
friendly authorities to help warn civilians and to aid in clearing dud cluster 
bombs.366 
364. GRAY, supra note 363, at 13. 
365. BOTHE T AL., supra note 124, at 308. 
366. As noted above, a problem with dud cluster bombs is that the force that 
dropped them will usually be unable to know where all of them landed and thus even acting 
in good faith will be unlikely to be able to remove them all. 
This interpretation is similar to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, supra 
note 192, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
other Devices (Protocol II), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 27, 
at 479. (Protocols I & II ratified by the United States on Mar. 24, 1995) Fereinafter Mine 
Protocol]. The Mine Protocol defines "mine" as "any munition placed under, on or near the 
ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, 
proximity or contact of a person or vehicle," and "remotely delivered miney' as "any mine 
so defined delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped from an 
aircraft." Id. art. 2(1). This Protocol prohibits "remotely-delivered mine[s]" unless they 
have self-destruct mechanisms or can be "accurately recorded." Id. art. 5(1). 
Although dud cluster bomblets are not mines per se, they are "placed. ..on or near 
the ground." Although not expressly "designed ...[ to] explode0 by the presence, proximity 
or contact of person or vehicle," their designers were aware of the substantial dud rate and 
of the sensitivity of the bomblet's fke.  The designers knew that the dud cluster bombs can 
explode in the presence of a slight vibration, however caused. A broad interpretation of the 
second Protocol could fit dud cluster bombs within the definition of mine, and in particular 
"remotely delivered mine," since cluster bombs are "delivered by artillery, rocket ... or 
dropped from an aircraft." Since they lack self-destruct mechanisms and since their precise 
landing cannot be accurately recorded, their use would violate the Mine Protocol, to which 
the United States is a party. 
On the other hand, cluster bombs were in existence at the time the Protocol was 
entered into. If the parties intended to ban them or to ban dud cluster bombs, one would 
think they would have done so expressly. Furthermore, the third Protocol of the CCW 
dealing with incendiary weapons was entered into at the same time as the Mine Protocol. 
The Incendiary Weapon Protocol expressly excludes from the ban "combined-effects 
munitions," such as the CBU-87B bomblet. Convention on Conventional Weapons, supra 
note 192, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 
(Protocol In), art. l(l)(ii), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 27, at 
484. Since the parties expressly refused to ban cluster bombs from the Incendiary Weapons 
Protocol, the Parties presumably did not impliedly ban them in the adjoining Protocol. 
Nonetheless, dud cluster bombs and remotely delivered mines endanger civilians 
in virtually the same way: they can explode at the slightest touch; absent self-destruct 
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Additional Protocol I provides that the parties to the Protocol and to the 
conflict "shall without delay take all necessary measures for the execution of their 
obligations under the Conventions and this ~ r o t o c o l . " ~ ~ ~  Furthermore, the Protocol 
provides that parties to the conflict "shall give orders and instructions to ensure 
observation of the Conventions and this Protocol, and shall supervise their 
execution."36s The Protocol goes further than Article 1 of the Hague Convention of 
1907, which only covered instructions to armed f0rces.3~' The Protocol "includes 
orders or instructions issued by civilian authorities and addressed to civilians as 
Ordering military and civilian personnel to map, mark, and clear dud 
cluster bomb sites falls within the express language here of "supervising" and 
"giv[ing] orders and instructions to ensure observation of the Conventions and this 
Protocol." 
Mapping, marking, and removing may be difficult, if not impossible, 
while the hostilities are on-going or where the adversary party limits or denies 
physical entry onto the territory it holds. Consequently, mapping, marking, and 
removing mitigate, but do not completely purge the violation of the C0nvention.3~' 
Additional Protocol I also requires a breaching party to pay c~mpensation."~ The 
mechanisms and precise marking, neither can discriminate between civilian or military 
targets. Consequently, the use of dud cluster bombs violates the spirit if not the letter of the 
Mine Protocol to the CCW. Of course if states possessing cluster bombs equipped them 
with reliable self-destruct mechanisms and destroyed stockpiles of currently outfitted 
cluster bombs, neither the letter nor the spirit of the Mine Protocol would be violated. But 
see Ekberg, supra note 104, at 149 (criticizing the Landmine Protocol for not adequately 
addressing remotely delivered mines with unreliable sglf-destruct mechanisms and arguing 
for a complete ban). 
367. Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 80(1). 
368. Id. art. 80(2). 
369. Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, art. 3, provides as follows: "A belligerent party which violates 
the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay 
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its 
amed forces." Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
opened for signature Oct. 18, 1907 (entered into force on Jan. 26, 1910), reprinted in THE 
HAGUE CONVENTIONS A D DECLARA~ONS OF I899 AND 1907 100-27 (J.B. Scott ed., 3d ed. 
19 18), and in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 27, at 52. 
370. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 124, at 492. 
371. Developing self-destruct bomblets wvould greatly reduce the hazard and 
possibly eliminate this violation. See infra notes 380-84 and accompanying test discussing 
the United States and Great Britain's initiative in this direction. 
372. Article 91 sets forth the civil liability of a breaching party: "A Party to the 
conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the 
case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed 
by persons forming part of its armed forces." Additional Protocol I, supra note 134, art. 91. 
In addition, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility provide in relevant part, 
that 
[a] State, which has committed an internationally wrongful act, shall: (a) 
discontinue the act, release and return the persons and objects held 
through such act, and prevent continuing effects of such act; and 
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relevant Article providing an obligation to pay compensation was considered to be 
declaratory of customary international law?" Consequently, the United States 
would be obligated to pay compensation if it violated customary intemational law 
or if it was othenvise bound by Additional Protocol I.374 The United States 
@)...apply such remedies as are provided for in, or admitted under, its 
internal law; and (c) re-establish the situation as it existed before the 
breach. 2. To the extent that it is materially impossible for the State to 
act in conformity with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present 
Article, it shall pay a sum of money to the injured State, corresponding 
to the value which a fulfillment of those obligations would bear. 
Draft Articles on the Content, Forms, and Degrees of International Responsibility (part 2 of 
the Draft Articles) Proposed by Special Rapporteur Riphagen, 2 Y. B. INT'L L. COMM. (Part 
1) 100-101 (emphasis added); see also Michael Bachrach, The Protection and Rights of 
Victinzs under International Criminal Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 7, 10 (2000) (quoting Van 
Boven's principles of compensation and reparation, namely, that reparation and 
compensation should "re-establish the situation that existed prior to the violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law"); The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of 
Detainees, Revised Set of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Prepared by Mr. Theo 
van Boven Pursuant to Sub-Commission Decision 19951117, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on 
Human Rights, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 (1996)); 
Invin Cotler, Holocaust, Thefticide, and Restitution: A Legal Perspective, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 601 (1998). Note that the Security Council Resolution establishing the ICTY provides 
that the criminal responsibility imposed by the ICTY Statute does not preclude the victims 
from seeking compensation: "[Tlhe work of the International Tribunal shall be carried out 
without prejudice to the right of the victims to seek, through appropriate means, 
compensation for damages incurred as a result of violations of international humanitarian 
law ...." S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2,17, U.N. Doc. S/RESl827 
(1993). 
373. The official comment in the travaux preparatoires to Article 91, which 
imposes civil liability on breaching parties, states in relevant part as follows: "The article 
adds nothing to humanitarian law applicable in international armed conflict." LEVIE, 
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 131, at 473; see also Yvonne Park Hsu, "Comfort 
Wonlerz" from Korea: Japan's World War II Sex Slaves and the Legitimacy of l l e i r  Claims 
for Reparations, 2 PAC. RUI L. & POL'Y J. 97, 116 (1993); Michael J. Reisman, The 
Lesso~~s of Qana, 22 YALE J .  INT'L L. 381, 392 (1997), describing the purposes of 
compensation for violations of humanitarian laiv: 
[First,] belligerents must compensate injured noncombatants or their 
survivors promptly, in proportion to the degree to which each caused the 
injuries suffered .... The issue is not absolute liability, for a state may 
substantially reduce, if not eliminate, liability by using more 
discriminating (and hence more operator-vulnerable) weapons, thereby 
"internalizing" what would othenvise be collateral damage .... Second, 
compensation should also be conceived of as a sanction for violations of 
treaty terms-in short, an international expiation for criminal 
responsibility. 
374. The United States has paid compensation for damages caused by aerial 
warfare but did so as a so-called "act of grace," denying that it had any responsibility to do 
so. See Act of July 3, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-656 (1956) (authorizing the payment of 
$964,199.35 for damages by aerial bombing of the Papal Domain of Caste1 Gandolfo in 
World War IJJ; H.R. 10766,84th Cong. (1956); SENATEFOREIGNREL. COMM., 8 4 ~ ~  CONG., 
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aclcnowledges that Additional Protocol I does state some principles of custom, but 
it may be a stretch to conclude that using cluster bombs, except directly against 
civilians, violates customary international law at this point?" The sixteen of the 
nineteen NATO countries that are state parties to Additional Protocol I, however, 
have the obligation to pay compensation (1) for the cost of (a) marking, (b) 
warning and educating the public, (c) clearing dud cluster bombs, if NATO is not 
going to perform this obligation itself, and (2) for civilian deaths and injuries 
caused by dud cluster bombs or by cluster bombs dropped on military targets in 
areas "with a concentration of civilians."376 
In Kosovo, NATO funded the clearing of mines and cluster bombs, most 
of which have now been cleared from Kosovo, if not fiom Serbia proper.377 NATO, 
however, failed to provide detailed information on the air strikes that apparently 
dropped over 1400 cluster bomb dispensers with over 265,000 cluster bombs on 
the Kosovo Province alone until nearly a year after the conflict ended.378 
Furthermore, it is not yet clear whether the United States or other NATO member 
states will be directly funding the clearance of cluster bombs in Serbia (outside of 
REP. 2292 (1956); ALWN V. FREEMAN, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR UNLA~YFUL ACTS OF 
THEIR ARMED FORCES 35 n.4 (1957). 
375. Since United States' development of this weapon in Vietnam, cluster bombs 
have proliferated. See Wiebe & Peachey, supra note 49, $! 6-9 (observing that cluster 
bombs have been used by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, by the Taliban and their 
opponents in that country, by Angola, by Azerbaijani, by Bosnian Serbs, by Russia in 
Chechnya, by a drug cartel in Colombia, by Ethiopia, by Georgia, by Israel, by Nicaragua, 
by Sierra Leone, and by Turkey). That is not a complete list, but it is enough to show that 
there is scant state practice suggesting that states have either banned or strictly limited their 
use of cluster bombs. But see Belt, supra note 24, at 173 (arguing that a customary rule of 
international law requiring the use of precision bombing in areas with a "concentration of 
civilians" is emerging.) Irrespective of customary international law, the United States may 
be bound to make reparation under the other grounds set forth in supra notes 317-19 and 
accompanying text. 
States are not responsible for damages inflicted by their armed forces in another 
state as long as the armed forces in question are engaged "in legitimate military operations 
in time of war." FREEMAN, supra note 374, at 31. When states conduct military operations 
in violation of international humanitarian law, causing injury to a subject of a foreign state, 
the subject aggrieved has the basis of an international claim. Id. at 32. 
376. See supra note 272. 
377. Special Representative Donald Steinberg on Humanitarian Demining 
Assistance states that the United States is paying between $3.5 million to $4 million to aid 
in mine and UXO clearance in Kosovo. Press Conference given by Special Representative 
Steinberg, AFR. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 21, 1999; see also State Dep't Briefing, supra note 
242, at 8 (quoting Special Representative Steinberg as saying, "The cluster bombs that are 
on the ground are a particularly dangerous element. They are, in some cases, small balls 
that are silver; in other cases they look almost like soda cans painted orange, in many cases, 
or yellow. They, unfortunately, are very attractive to young children ....[ qhere is, in 
general, a dud rate that goes from five percent on upward, and this will indeed be one very 
heavy focus of not only our mine awareness program, but our unexploded ordnance 
priorities"). 
378. See Gall, supra note 87, at 3; supra note 84. 
Heinonline - -  44 Ariz. L. Rev. 122 2002 
20021 CLUSTER BOMBS OVER KOSOVO 123 
Kosovo). The obligation of restitution and compensation is not limited to Kosovo, 
but extends to all places in which cluster bombs were dropped, including Serbia 
itself. 
Rarely have victors who have committed international humanitarian law 
violations compensated the vanquished. A treaty of peace typically waives such 
claims.'79 Such a waiver may form a noteworthy example of "victor's justice." 
States carrying out a humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, ought to adhere 
to the strictest norms of international law. Consequently, they should make 
reparation, including restitution and compensation, for any international law 
violations their armed forces commit. 
A. Respoilding to Critickin 
As a result of the criticism concerning its use of cluster bombs in Kosovo, 
the Pentagon has announced the beginning of its efforts to formulate a policy to 
limit unexploded ordnance, particularly from dud cluster bombs. On January 10, 
2001, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen issued a memorandum 
stating: "It is the policy of the DoD [pepartrnent of Defense] to reduce overall 
UXO [unexploded ordnance] through a process of improvement in submunition 
system reliability-the desire is to field future submunitions with a 99% or higher 
functioning rate."380 Those assigned to accomplish this objective have 
acknowledged that "the technology to take reliability to that level is going to be 
very 
379. See FREEMAN, supra note 374, at 34. 
380. Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, supra note 83, 1 31 
(quoting Memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments: DoD Policy on 
Submunition Reliability from William Cohen (Secretary of Defense, Jan. 10, 2001)), 
available at http:ll~nnv.hnv.orgPoackgrounderlarmslcluster-bcklO3 1.htm. Secretary Cohen 
added that the "[s]ubmunition functioning rates may be lower under operational conditions 
due to environmental factors such as terrain and weather.. .." Id. 
381. Robert Wall, Criticism Forces Bomb Upgrade, AVIATION WK. & SPACE 
TECH., Nov. 27, 2000, at 37 (quoting Navy Captain Robert Wirt); see also David C. Isby, 
AGM-154B JSOW Will Carry Improved Submunitions, JANE'S MISSILES & ROCKETS, Mar. 
1, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (noting that AGM-154B will 
employ a new submunition, the BLU-108 P31, which will have three separate self-destruct 
mechanisms, primarily, however, acting as a sensor fuzed weapon); Rupert Pengelley, 
Close Fire Munitions Shoot Ahead-Projectile Developers Pursue Price, Precision and 
Utility Goals, INT'L DEF. REV. 1 18, Aug. 1, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
Cumws File (noting new efforts towards developing self-destruct bomblets yet "despite 
many years of effort the US devoted to the development of a reliable self-destruct fuze for 
bomblet rounds, none has so far been applied to its 155mm ICM stockpile ... consist[ing] of 
M483A1 and M864 projectiles, respectfdly filled with 88 and 72 M421M46 grenades, 
which have been known to exhibit dud rates as high as 15%. The situation is no better with 
the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and ATACMS missile stockpiles"). In 2000, 
the Air Force began equipping its fighters and bombers with new guidance kits to improve 
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A possible solution would be to include a battery with each submunition, 
causing it to explode within a set time after impacting the ground.'" Assuming 
such a self-destruct mechanism is built, the Navy, which is the armed service 
leading this effort, has not yet decided whether to retrofit existing BLU-97 
b ~ m b l e t s . ~ ~ ~  Under former Secretary Cohen's directive, the Services "may retain 
'legacy' submunitions until employed or superseded by replacement systems.. .."384 
In Afghanistan, however, the United States continued to use CBU bomblets 
without self-destructive devices.'85 
Such a technological fix, however, presents problems of its own. Self- 
destruct mechanisms in other weapons systems have not proven to be completely 
reliable.'86 Attempts to build in additional secondary fuzing systems may increase 
the instability of dud bomblets, because when such a system fails, it "has a 
tendency to be especially sensitive to any disturbance or m~vement."~" 
Substantially increasing the costs of these \veap0ns,3~~ such an effort should cut 
down but not eliminate live duds: "The problem of duds will always be with us 
the accuracy of cluster bombing. See US Air Force startsfitting smart bomb kits, JANE'S 
DEF. WEEKLY 7 1, Nov. 15, 2000, available at http://~~v.janes.com/defence/ 
air~forces/news~briefs/jdw001115~02.shtml (last visited Apr. 5, 2002) [hereinafter US Air 
Force]. Critics have questioned whether the kits saved any civilian lives in Afghanistan. 
See Watson, supra note 83, at Al. 
3 82. See US Air Force, supra note 3 8 1,7 1. 
383. See US Air Force, supra note 381. Britain has apparently decided to keep 
current models of cluster bombs in its inventory. See Calls for Cluster Bomb Ban (BBC 
television broadcast, Aug. 8, 2000) (stating that the Royal Air Force has decided that "it is 
not going to remove cluster bombs fiom its inventory"), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
hi/english~uk/newsid~870000/870644.stm (last visited Apr. 10,2002); see also Robert Wall 
and David A. Fulghum, Upgrades Planned for Existing Cache, AVIATION WK. & SPACE 
TECH., Sept. 25,2000, at 90 ("Military planners recognize they will have to rely on existing 
munitions as their stable in future conflicts, even as researchers focus their attention on the 
next generation of weapons" including a self-destruct mechanism on the sensor fuzed 
weapon, the CBU-108.). Great Britain apparently has decided to move away fiom cluster 
bombs toward smart unitary warheads. See Richard Norton-Taylor, Smart Missiles to 
Replace RU's Dumb Bombs, GUARDIAN, July 25,2000, at 1. 
384. See Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, supra note 83, 
available at http://~~v.hrw.org/backgr0under/arm~/cluster-bcklO3 1 .htm. 
385. See id. Some controversy arose when it was observed that the food packages 
that the U.S. dropped had the same yellow color as the bomblets. See supra note 83. 
386. See Ekberg, supra note 104, at 152-53 (noting that many mines specially 
equipped with self-destruct mechanisms continued to remain live). 
387. Wiebe, supra note 32, at 118 (quoting RAE MCGRATH, THE MILITARY 
EFFECTIVENESS & WACT ON CIVILIANS OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS 18-23 (2000)). 
388. The DPLCM grenade assembly "typically costs less than $3, depending on 
the year of manufacture, the applicable inflation factor and the quantity procured per 
contract." Kennedy & Kincheloe, supra note 51, at 29. The unit cost list price for the CBU- 
87B is $13,941. See FAS, Bombs for Beginners, supra note 36, available at 
http://imv.fas.org/man/dod-1 Ol/sys/dumb/bombs.htm. 
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even though the dud rate itself may be reduced by incorporation in the mine or 
bomb fuse of either [a] self-destruct or self-sterilization mechanism."38g 
In addition, creating self-destructing bomblets does nothing to restrict the 
one-to-five football-field-size footprint of a single cluster bomb. Assume for 
argument sake that the self-destruct mechanisms would be reliable. The cluster 
bomb would, at least in urban areas, still kill and wound civilians indiscriminately. 
B. The Cluster Boinb and Hulnaizitarian Interventioiz 
NATO dropped cluster bombs in this, its first war, which it justifies 
principally on the grounds of humanitarian interventi~n?~" The doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention is controversial. The plain text of the U.N. Charter 
permits countries to use force, absent Security Council consent, only for self- 
defen~e.3~' None of the NATO countries had been attacked by the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia nor were any under an imminent threat of such an attack. China and 
Russia presumably would have vetoed any Security Council Resolution calling 
upon a U.N. military intervention into the former Yugo~lavia.3~~ Only a 
teleological interpretation of the Charter, an interpretation the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties rejects, would pennit an ad hoc interventi~n?~~ 
-- - -- - - 
389. Kennedy & Kincheloe, supra note 51, at 29. 
390. See CLARK, supra note 16, at 157,16061. 
391. Article 2 of the U.N. Charter requires members to "refi-ain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state." See U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, art. 2(4), 59 Stat. 
1031,3 Bevans 1153 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). The Article requires states to settle 
their international disputes "by peacefil means," Id. art. 2(3), only permitting intervention 
in another state by the Security Council under its Chapter VII authority. See id. art. 2(7). 
States may othenvise only use force in individual or collective self-defense. See id. art. 51. 
The Charter also prohibits regional agents from using force without Security Council 
permission: " N o  enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by 
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." Id. art. 53(1). See 
Cassese, supra note 12, at 24 (citing OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAWIN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 129 (1991) for the proposition that humanitarian intervention absent Security 
Council authorization violates international law). 
392. See Cassese, supra note 12, at 25. 
393. See id. at 25-27 (concluding that the NATO intervention violated 
international law but that it was not only ethically justifiable but also that it may "gradually 
lead to the crystallization of a general rule of international law authorizing armed counter- 
measures for the exclusive purpose of putting an end to large-scale atrocities amounting to 
crimes against humanity and constituting a threat to peace"). Small countries usually reject 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, because, as a practical matter, large, powerful 
countries are exempt from it. Russia has killed far more Chechen civilians than the 
Milosevic regime killed Albanian-Kosovars, yet no one is seriously calling on the world 
community to intervene militarily in Russia. See Emil Pain, The Second Chechen War: The 
Informaation Component, 80 MIL. REV. 59, available at 2000 WL 16594676 fi 52 ("In the 
last war at least 30,000 civilians died."); Europe: Russia's Chechen war reaches crisis 
point, JANE'S INTELLIGEKCE REV., Oct. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 11960900 fi 2 
("Chechen casualties, civilian and guerrillas, cannot be reliably calculated but must total 
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On the other hand, the world community can no longer stand idly by 
while a government grossly abuses its citizens' human rights. The Charter itself 
suggests that the human rights of all persons within a government's borders must 
be respected and that a government does not have absolute sovereign power to 
deprive its citizens of these rights?94 A few noted scholars and jurists have 
recognized the doctrine of humanitarian intervention under sharply defined 
conditions, firstly, that "widespread and grave international crimes as [defined in 
the ICC] are being committed in the state, that the state supports them, acquiesces 
in them or cannot control them.'9395 All alternative means to ending such abuses 
must have been exhausted, the Security Council must have refused to act, and the 
intervenors must use only that degree of force necessary to stop the human rights 
abuses from recurring?96 
Since using force under these circumstances is not expressly authorized 
by the U.N. Charter or by other international agreements or clearly permitted under 
international custom, the intervenors must strictly adhere both to the letter and the 
spirit of humanitarian law. Strict observance is all the more necessary because such 
several thousand deaths."). But see Alvi Zakriyev, Russians battle Chechens for south as 
civilian casualties rise, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, F B. 15, 2000, available at 2000 \VL 
2733910 7 13 (Since the start of Russian bombings in the republic, Chechen spokesmen 
have claimed some 15,000 civilians have been killed. Officials in RlIoscow have put the 
figure at "several hundred''); David Briscoe, Chechen Leader Doesn't Want US Aid, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Jan. 13,2000, available at 2000 WL 3305974 7 7 (estimating 
10,000 Chechen civilian casualties fiom the conflict with Russia). 
394. See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 391, art. 2(7) ("Nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.") (emphasis added). 
See also id. arts. 55(c) & 56 (member states pledging to promote universal respect for 
human rights). 
395. See Chamey, supra note 12, at 1244. 
396. See id.; see also Cassese, supra note 12, at 27 (in addition to the stated 
criteria, requiring that a group of states, not a single hegemonic power, conduct the 
intervention and that a majority of the members of the United Nations do not oppose the 
intervention); Falk, supra note 12, at 856 (suggesting a five prong test authorizing 
humanitarian intervention: "[I] there is a strong burden of persuasion associated with the 
rejection of the United Nations framework of legal restraint on the use of force; [2] this 
burden can be initially met if there is a credible prospect that a humanitarian catastrophe 
will otherwise occur; [3] such a burden cannot be discharged fully if diplomatic alternatives 
to war have not been fully explored in a sincere and convincing manner; [4] the 
humanitarian rationale is also sustained or undermined by the extent to which the tactics of 
warfare exhibit sensitivity to civilian harm, and the degree to which the intervenors avoid 
unduly shifting the risks of war to the supposed beneficiaries of the action so as to avoid 
harm to themselves; and [5] the humanitarian rationale is also weakened if there were less 
destructive means to protect the threatened population than those relied upon"). 
Heinonline - -  44 Ariz. L. Rev. 126 2002 
20021 CLUSTER BOMBS OVER KOSOVO 127 
an intervention marks the intersection between human rights law and humanitarian 
law.397 
While some may claim that "[tlhe law speaks too softly to be heard 
among the din of arms,"398 the Nuremberg, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda tribunals and 
the surprisingly broad endorsement of the International Criminal Court testify to 
the world community's outrage about governments and their militaries flouting 
international humanitarian law. If an armed force intervenes in another country to 
stop gross human rights abuses, that armed force sows the seeds for future human 
rights abuses if it violates humanitarian law in the process. 
Armed conflict has afflicted the Balkan Peninsula for over 600 years?g9 
World War I began there over ethnic rivalry.4'' World War II pitted ethnic groups 
against each other!' The communist era further aggravated ethnic tensions while 
keeping a lid on them!02 Each ethnic group in the former Yugoslavia appears to 
have well-documented historical claims to much of the same land, each with at 
first glance legitimate grievances against the other, each with scores decades or 
centuries old to settle.403 Given the ethnic hatred and their history of ethnic 
warfare, the intervening force needed to comply strictly with the letter and the 
spirit of international humanitarian law to avoid further inflaming centuries-old 
resentments. 
397. Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
was concerned about the civilian casualties of the NATO air campaign and stated, "if there 
is be a military campaign with humanitarian purposes, it must be very targeted as a military 
campaign on military targe &...[and that the NATO air campaign] is seen as being too 
indiscriminate in relation to civilian casualties.. .." U.N. Human Rights Chief Airs Concerns 
on Indiscriminate NATO Campaign, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE 71 7, 9, May 14, 1999; see 
Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good or Bad War, " 93 AM. J. WL L. 841, 847 (1999) 
("Does not humanitarian intervention entail a responsibility to ensure that the methods used 
are appropriate for the achievement of the objectives sought?"); Falk, supra note 12, at 856 
("[Tlhe humanitarian rationale is also sustained or undermined by the extent to which 
tactics of warfare exhibit sensitivity to civilian harm....''). 
398. Caius Marius, c.157-86 B.C., quoted in W QUOTABLE LAWYER 321 (David 
Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986). 
399. See KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 35-37 (noting that the Turks conquered the 
Serbs in Kosovo in 1389); NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOVO 81-92 (1999) (documenting the 
troubled history of Kosovo and the Balkans). Ironically, Vidovan, June 28, 1389, which the 
Serbs celebrate as their glorious defeat by the Turks, is also the date that Gavrilo Princep, a 
Serb nationalist, assassinated the Archduke Ferdinand in 1914; it is also the date that 
Slobodan Milosevic gave his fiery nationalistic speech to the Serbs in Kosovo in 1989; and 
it is also the date that the Serbian authorities summarily transferred Milosevic to the Hague 
in 2001. See Erlander, supra note 360, at A12. 
400. See BARBARA TUCHMAN, % GUNS OF AUGUST 91 (1962) (noting that the 
Austrian heir apparent, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated by Serbian nationalist 
Gavrilo Princep on June 28,1914). 
401. See MALCOLM, supra note 399, at 289-3 13. 
402. See KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 38-39; MALCOLM, supra note 399, at 314-33. 
403. See KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 29-48. 
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NATO did go to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties. "Collateral 
damage" could have been far greater. Yet NATO's use of cluster bombs, at least to 
some extent, undermined the moral and legal principles upon which the 
intervention was based. During the NATO intervention, at least 135 to 195 
civilians were killed by cluster bombs, and almost certainly many more were 
injured; after the hostilities ended, dud cluster bombs in Kosovo alone caused a 
significant number of deaths and injuries.404 Like most military forces' use of 
cluster bombs, NATO's violated the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. Dud cluster bombs are indiscriminate weapons, creating fear 
in the populus and endangering civilians, particularly children. When dropped in 
populated areas, cluster bombs also violate the Protocol as the modem equivalent 
of banned target area bombing, putting civilians at too great a risk. 
The United States' nascent efforts to develop cluster bombs with self- 
destruct mechanisms are to be commended. If the United States has the political 
and moral will to destroy current stockpiles of cluster bombs and if it equips 
bomblets with highly reliable self-destruct devices, one objection might, to a great 
extent, be eliminated. The other objection, however, remains. That a single cluster 
bomb can shower as many as five and a half football fields with deadly shrapnel 
and that a typical multiple launch cluster bomb footprint covers nearly nineteen 
football fields demonstrate this weapon's potential for carrying out banned target 
area bombing. Using this weapon in a remote desert might enable one to avoid the 
strictures of the First Protocol. The cluster-bomb-shot-gun approach to bombing 
will not do, however, in cities or towns, where most military targets tend to be 
located. Finally, the horrific nature of this weapon, the grievous wounds it causes, 
resulting in death and amputation for many, further undercuts the moral imperative 
of an armed force carrying out a humanitarian intervention. These objections are 
not lost on the Serbians?'' Given the strife in the Balkans and in particu!ar in the 
former Yugoslavia, any attempt to bring stability to that area of the world may 
have been made more difficult by NATO's having employed the cluster bomb. 
This Article argues that the First Protocol prohibits the use of the cluster 
bomb in areas with "a concentration of civilians" and in other less concentrated 
areas where people may be injured by dud cluster bombs. Even under the broadest 
interpretation, the Protocol does not ban this weapon. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
enforce Protocol I standards that require subjective judgment. How many civilians 
does it take to make a "concentration of civilians"? What dud rate is required 
before the weapon producing the duds becomes indiscriminate? Line drawing is 
not easy here. As a practical matter, given the limited situations in which the 
cluster bomb may legitimately be used, steps toward banning the weapon entirely 
- - -- 
404. See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 20, 9 5; Human 
Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, supra note 83, at 5; Flanagan, supra note 250, 
at 4. 
405. See Obradovic, supra note 16. 
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should be considered.406 A ban would also presumably render the use of the cluster 
bomb a war crime and thus serve as a greater deterrent. A ban is easier for the 
military to implement and for the media, other parties to the conflict, and 
ultimately the International Criminal Court to help enforce. Lastly, a ban of a 
weapon that has such an inherent potential to cause brutal injuries and deaths of 
both civilians and combatants may help stem support for terror groups in the lands 
of the aggrieved and the dispossessed. 
406. The Second Review Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons has "established a group of governmental experts to discuss ways and means to 
address the issue of 'explosive remnants of war' (ERW), which presumably would include 
dud cluster bombs." See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Second Review Conference of the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Ends; Convention Framework Amended 1 7 
(2001), available at http:llwww.icrc.org/icrceng.nsE/5cacfdf48ca698b641256242003b3295/ 
f90257fb46c54df8c1256b29005471de?OpenDocent (last visited Apr. 5, 2002). Among 
other items for consideration are developing self-destruct mechanisms, the adequacy of 
existing humanitarian law to reduce post conflict risks of ERW both to civilians and 
military, warning the civilian population and clearing the ERW. Id. fi 8. Unfortunately, it is 
doubtfbl that this Conference will go far enough. See Peter Herby & Ann R. Nuiten, Int'l 
Comm. of the Red Cross, Explosive Remnants of War: Protecting Civilians through an 
Additional Protocol to the I980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (2001), 
available at h t t p : / / ~ m n v . i c r c . o r g / i c r c e n g . n s ~ d b c 6 e a 3 e l 8 O l d d  
5ld65186c96cl256a45002d7cea?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 5,2002). 
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